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ABSTRACT 
Advocacy-Orientated, Advocacy-Related and Scholarly Literature on 
the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: Assessing whether the Main Points of 
Concern, Criticism or Dispute about the Literature Arise from the Basic 
Facts and Evidence Presented or from the Interpretive Frameworks 
Employed to Analyse Them 
Nompumelelo Motlafi 
M.SocSc. International Relations thesis, Department of Political Studies, University of 
Cape Town 
Guiding Text: Timothy Longman, "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the 
Rwandan Genocide," .Iol/mal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004): 29-45. 
Reviewed Works: Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
FHomme, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence dl/ring the RWQl1dal1 Genocide Gild its 
Ajier/llal/z (New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale 
des Ligues des Droits de I'Hornme, 1996). 
Adam J. Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," Journal a/Genocide Research 4, 
no. 1 (2002): 65-94. 
IVlahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the 
Genocide ill Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, 2nd edition (London: 
Verso, 2006). 
This literature review is written as a response to Timothy Longman's general suggestion 
that much of the literature on the "Rwandan genocide of 1994" was based on empirically 
poor secondary analyses instead of "rigorous" original empirical research. The study was 
further alerted by Longman's indication that there had been "myths and inaccuracies" 
circulating in the literature. This raised the question of whether these "myths and 
inaccuracies" were with regard to the basic facts and evidence of what is known about the 
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events of the "Rwandan genocide" or with regard to how these events had been 
interpreted by different authors. As its point of departure, the study proposes that a 
general literature review could not fully appreciate the contributions made by different 
types of literature on the subject at hand. The study contends that each type or "genre" of 
literature had its own research priorities, objectives, preferred methods of evidence 
gathering and its own range of interpretative frameworks for the processing of the facts 
and evidence. Rather than attempt a large-scale and superficial survey of the literature, 
the study searches for the answer to the research question by conducting an examination 
of a small selection of works. The works are paired according the complementary themes 
that they investigate. Melvern's advocacy-related investigative journalism is compared 
with Mamdani's scholarly theoretical analysis on the theme ofHutu civilian participation 
in the killings of the "Rwandan genocide"; while the advocacy-orientated human rigllts 
reporting of Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
I'Homme was contrasted with .lones's scholarZ)1 theoretical analysis on the theme of sex-
selective or sex-specific manifestations of violence of the "Rwandan genocide." 
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Chapter One: From Longman's Proposal on what the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
Research Priorities should be, to Questioning what the Research Priorities have 
been in the Advocacy-Orientated, Advocacy-Related and Scholarly Literature 
1.1. Introduction 
The literature on the Rwandan genocide of 1994 is concerned with giving accounts or 
analyses of the mass killings, sexual violence and other mass violence perpetrated by a 
variety of Hutu agents against mainly Tutsi victims in the period of April-July 1994. I 
The current study requires the investigation of the possible analytical or classificatory 
uses of the term 'genocide' within the literature on the 1994 genocide, as well as the 
investigation of the various documented acts of violence perpetrated in Rwanda in the 
period of April-July 1994 that may not necessarily be considered as falling under the 
concept of genocide.2 Therefore while aclmowledging the use of the term' 1994 Rwandan 
genocide' as the commonly designated reference for the violent events of the period in 
question, tllis study also uses more general terms such as: 'the mass killings of April-July 
1994' or 'the 1994 mass killings' or 'the mass sexual violence of April-July 1994' or 'the 
mass violence of April-July 1994'. 
Timothy Longman noted in 2004 that prior to the mass violence of 1994, few people 
lmew or were interested in Rwanda "outside the limited circle of African studies 
scholars.") Himself a member of the "tiny coterie" of pre-1994 Rwanda specialists,4 
Longman posited that it was the extensive press coverage of the "genocide and its 
brutalities" that brought Rwanda worldwide attention and that ultimately attracted new 
I See for example: Timothy Longman, "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan 
Genocide for the Rwandan Genocide," Journal afGenocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004): 35; Linda Melvern, 
COllspiraG:vlO AJurder: The Rwandan Genocide, revised ed. (London: Verso, 2006), XV, 252; Scott Straus, 
UHow Many Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate," Jour11al a/Gellocide 
Resew'cll 6, no. I (2004): 87, 88 .. 
:! See Stuart Stein, "Geno- and other Cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation," JOllr1lal of 
Genocide Research 4, no.l (2002): 46. Stein proposed that the events that have been called "genocides" 
need to be dissected into their various parts. 
3 Longman, 29. 
oj Mahmood Mamdani, Whe1l Victims Become Killers: Colollialism, Nativism alld the Gellocide ill RWllIlda 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2001), 4l. 
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researchers to the country. 5 Longman was concerned that too much of the literature on 
1994 mass killings was based on secondary sources and a handful of original interviews 
and that not enough literature was based on "rigorous empirical research.,,6 He was also 
concerned that the reliance on secondary sources had led to the circulation of "myths and 
inaccuracies" from earlier accounts of Rwanda, which "have long been disproved.,,7 The 
"myths and inaccuracies from earlier accounts" to which Longman directly refen'ed 
concerned the colonial scholarship on the "supposed conquest of Rwanda by the Tutsi", 
which was used "to bolster the developing political and social systems of the increasingly 
centralized state," thereby helping to "solidify ethnic identities" and justifying the Tutsi 
minority's domination of the Hutu majority.s The "myths and inaccuracies" that colonial 
scholarship created were again used to feed the anti-Tutsi revolt on the eve of Rwanda's 
independence from European colonial rule. However within the article as a whole there 
are suggestions that there may be "myths and inaccuracies" with regards to the 
documentation of violence of the April-July 1994 period. 
Longman's article identifies at least four problems that have arisen from the scarcity of 
good quality Oliginal empirical research on the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The first 
problem is that "myths and inaccuracies from earlier accounts" of Rwanda's history have 
marred the historical accounts offered by some of the more recent authors as background 
information for primary accounts as well as secondary analyses9 The second problem is 
that some of the research on the violence of 1994 was conducted in haste without 
verifying details; contributing to the presence of factual inaccuracies in plimary 
descliptive accounts, which are then circulated into secondary analyses. lo Longman did 
not give details about the exact factual inaccuracies documented. The third problem is 
that there is very little new empirical evidence being generated, which is needed for the 
production of more detailed descliptive accounts of the violence of April-July 1994. 11 
The fourth problem is that, while macro-level causal and theoretical explanations have 
, Longman, 29. 
" Ibid. 
1 Ibid. 
, Ibid., 31. 
" Ibid. , 30-33. 
10 Ibid., 33. 
11 Ibid., 33-38. 
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been proposed for why the violence broke out, few have been suhjected to local level 
testing; meaning that there are doubts about the extent of applicability of these 
1 . I' exp anatlOns. -
Longman suggested that original empirical research was needed not just on the factual 
details of the violence of the April-July 1994 period itself, but also on the historical, 
cultural and regional context in which the violence occurred. IJ He added that the research 
needed cun'ently was "sectoral, thematic, and local-level research that tests theories of 
genocide," which would add new data to the existing empirical record and enable a 
"more complex and complete understanding of Rwanda's tragedy.,, 14 
Longman's recommendations for the direction of research on the events of April-July 
1994 were proposed in view of his extensive literature survey, which included 
journalistic accounts, human rights reports, scholarly works and the personal accounts of 
survivors. However, his recommendations seem to have had a focus that would serve the 
purposes of scholarly descriptions or explanations and ultimately build a lmowledge base 
that would more than likely be primarily of scholarly interest. He admitted that he had not 
attempted "to catalogue the numerous publications on the 1994 genocide".15 In the 
process he lost sight of the fact that different types or "genres" of literature make 
different contributions to how the mass violence of 1994 is understood. 16 Literature 
reviews and proposals need to take into consideration the "genre" of literature under 
review. At the same time, his concems attest to the real or possible inter-disciplinary use 
of "Rwanda texts". While it is a basic requisite that all the literature conveys the basic 
facts as accurately as is possible, one needs to keep in mind that different "literary 
12 Ibid., 30, 36-38. See also Stathis N. Kalyvas' comparative discllssion on the local1evel dynamics of civil 
wars. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars," 
Perspecfives 011 Po/ifics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475-494. 
D Longman, 30. 
14 Ibid. 
IS Lonl!ITlan, 30. 
III This-study appropriates the use of tenn "literary genre" as a reference to different kinds of literature on 
Ihe same subject matter from Ron Dudai. See Ron Dudai, "Advocacy with Footnotes: the Human Righls 
Report as a Literary Genre," review of Through No Faull oJJ7wir 011111: PU1Iitive House Demolitions 
Duri1lg the al-Aqsa Intifada by B'Tselem, the Israeli lnfonnation Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories, HlIlIlall Rights Quarter!v 6, no. 3 (2006): 783 [Electronic]. Available from HeinOnline at: 
http: //www.lib.uct.ac.za.ezproXV.UCU1C.zaiindex.nhn?hlm1=/I ibs/dbases:.nlatroI111s.htm& I i bid=flR [2009, 
May 15]. 
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genres" are interested in different aspects or issues concerning the Rwandan genocide, in 
line with "genre-specific" target audiences, objectives, data collection methods and 
interpretive frameworks. Furthermore, the study cautions against the presumption that all 
works based on secondary sources are inherently prone to recording factual inaccuracies. 
Likewise, the study does not presume that all works based on pnmary sources are 
inherently free of factual inaccuracies and poor-quality evidence. 
1.2. Identifying Advocacy-Orientated, Advocacy-Related and Scholarly Literature 
It is not possible to account for all the "literary genres" involved in producing fact-based 
literature on the Rwandan mass killings and mass sexual violence of 1994 within the 
limited space of a minor dissertation. The focus herein is limited to those literary genres 
that, from Longman's article, appear to have been the most prolific in generating 
literature on the events under consideration (in no particular order): journalistic works; 
human rights reports; and scholarly works. I? For reasons stipulated below, it is proposed 
that journalistic works within the investigative journalism sub-field constitute advocacy-
related literature and human lights repOlts constitute advocacy-orientated literature. 
a) Works a/Investigative Jaumalisl11 as Advocacy-Related Literature 
All journalistic works have the public as their mal11 target audience. IS Investigative 
journalism is set apart from other types of journalism by its more vigorous and more 
extensive research. Investigative journalism is concerned with stories that expose 
17 Longman, 33-38. 
18 Theordore L. Ghlsser and James S. Ettema, "Investigative Journalism and the Moral Order." Critical 
Studies jn A1ass Commllnication 6, no. I (1989): 3 [Electronic]. Avai lable fTom EbscoHost at: 
http://www.lib.ucLac.za.ezproxv.ucl.ac.za/index.php?htm1=/libs/dbases/nlalrarms.htm& I ibid=H ~ [2009, 
April 16]; Murray Levine, "Investigative Reporting as a Research Method: An Analysis of Bernstein and 
Woodward's Alilhe Presidenl Men," American Psycho/agist 35, no. 7 (1980): 628 [Electronic]. Available 
from EbscoHosl al: 
http://www.lib.uct.ac.za.ezproxv.ucl.ac.za/index .php?html=/libs/dbasesmlati.oI1l1s.111m& 1 ibid=R R [2009. 
April 16]. 
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5 
transgressions/ "wrongdoing". 10 Published works produced through investigative 
journalism are herein considered as advocacy-related literature: the instance of 
"wrongdoing" is presented to the public in the hopes that public opinion might be 
mobilised to put pressure on policy-makers and/or "transgressors" to acknowledge, end. 
rectify or mete out punishment for the transgressions in question.20 
The first task of exposing transgressions is establishing the details of what has happened 
and what has been done by whom against whomlwhat.21 This involves "gathel~ng 
evidence and assessing its quality.,,22 The journalism trade entails a constant search for 
new stories or new developments in existing stories, making direct access to primary 
sources of evidence vitaL23 Thus they primarily seek out interviews with informants who 
have first-hand knowledge of the events under investigation as well as access to 
"concrete" documentary evidence (such as government and personal records).24 
However, the judgement that a transgression is a transgression cannot be made solely 
with reference to the basic evidence and facts; nor can it be explicitly made with 
reference to the journalist's personal sense of right or wrong.25 The second task, then, 
involves tlle journalist's location, selection and interpretation of some "empil~cally 
determined" standards "that can be used by tlle public to make such judgements,,26 The 
prefelTed interpretive frameworks that make for "empirically determined" standards of 
judgement include (in descending order): the law; formalised codes or guidelines; 
recognised expertise in a specific field; statistical or other comparative data that gives 
suggestions of what is n01mal; common decency?7 
19 Glasser and Ettema, 2-3; Carl Bernstein and Robert Woodward, All the Pres idem 's A1el1 (New York: 
Warner Books, 1974), cited in Levine, 626-638. Levine conducted a study of the methods used by 
investigative reporters Bernstein and Woodward in their breaking of Nixon's Watergate scandal. 
21l Glasser and Ettema, 6-7; See also Linda Melvern, COllspiracy 10 J\1urder: The RlI'{lIldan Genocide, 
revised ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 235. Melvern reported that certain observers believed that there may 
have been an anned international humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in 1994 had the Western media 
mobilised public opinion in the Western Stales to put pressure on Western governments to respond 1O the 
crisis. 
21 Glasser and Etterna. 2, 10. 
" Ibid., 10. 
" Levine, 627-628. 
" Ibid. 
2S Glasser and Etterna, 10. 
26 Ibid., 2-3. 
" Ibid., 10. 
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Longman generally dismissed journalistic accounts for being "impressionistic", without 
due regard that this kind of writing may be more accessible and palatable to a public with 
a more general interest in the killings.28 For his interest on specific aspects of the killing 
and other violence of 1994, he may have done better to look at works of investigative 
journalism. The interpretive frameworks used by investigative journalists may also attract 
the interest of specialists and other interested parties within the general public. 
Incidentally, Longman made mention of one prominent investigative journalist on the 
Rwandan genocide: Linda Melvern29 Longman stated that she was "accumulating an 
archive on the Rwandan genocide, particularly on the reaction of the United Nations, 
available at the Hugh Owen Library of the University of Wales. ,,30 Although Longman 
seemed to be more interested in the national-level research that scholars could produce 
using Melvern's archive rather than what Melvern herself might produce from it, his 
mentioning of her has indirectly brought Melvern to the reader's attention and thus 
indirectly suggested that Melvern's work might be worth investigating. Melvern 's book 
COllspiraGJ' to lvIlIrder: The Rwandan Genocide, which is partially based on documents 
that she appears to have added to the archive mentioned by Longman, is reviewed in this 
study.3l The book is introduced in section 1.6 of this chapter. 
b) Human Rights Reports as Advocacy-Orientated Literature 
Human lights reports are typically intended to effect a response to humanitarian crises 
(from natural disasters to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law) and 
28 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to b!form YOIi thaI Tomorrow We will be Killell wilh our Families: Stories 
from Rwanda (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. 1998), cited in Longman , 33; Christian Jennings, 
Across (he Red River: Rwanda, Burulldi, alld the Heart of Dar/mess (London: GoJlancz, 2000), cited in 
Longman, 34; Fergal Keane. Seaso1l qf Blood: A Rwanda Journey (London: Viking, 1996), cited in 
Longman, 34 . 
29 Longman, 39. 
3U Ibid. 
31 The first edition of Melvern's book C011spiracy 10 A1l1rder: Th e Rwandan Genocide was published in the 
same year as Longman's article (2004). It has not been possible to confiml which was published first, 
which could have provided further explanation ror the book's exclusion from Long.man's review. 
Nevertheless, one notes that Melvern 's other works do not appear in Longman's anicle, namely: Linda 
Melven, Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: the Role q( th e West in Rwanda's Genocide (London and New 
York: Zed Books. 2000). This earlier book concentrated primarily on the reaction of the United Nations to 
the Rwandan genocide. 
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human rights violations by making explicit recommendations addressed directly to the 
relevant policymaking bodies, namely governments and inter-governmental organisations 
(for example, the United Nations)3" For this reason, human rights reports are considered 
herein as advocacy-orientated literature. To a certain degree, human rights repOlts 
function in a similar way to investigative reporting: they indirectly target audiences who 
may be in a position to pressure policymakers to take the required steps.JJ These 
'invisible audiences' include: the media, the general public and others34 
As with investigative journalism, the first task of human rights reports is to establish the 
factual details of violence perpetrated against humans.)5 In terms of the evidence, it is 
vital to human rights reporters to gather the direct testimonies of victims and others who 
may have firsthand knowledge of the violence under investigation.J6 This evidence is 
supplemented with information from statistical reports, graphs and other recorded data37 
Thus human rights reporters tend to conduct on-site investigations in what is called fact-
finding missions in human rights reporting parlance (and called "fieldwork" in scholarly 
parlance)38 Human rights reports differ from works of investigative journalism in that 
human rights repOlts also try to make generalisations about the widespread nature of the 
violence under investigation. J9 Human rights reporters are arguably more limited to using 
the standards provided in International Law and other international agreements as 
frameworks with which to interpret the facts. 4o Where applicable, they may also refer to 
domestic laws and standards.41 
32 Stanley Cohen, "Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials and Counterclaims," 
Humall Righls Qllarler/v 18. no. 3 (1996): 517-518; Dudai ; 793; Diane F. Orentlicher, "Bearing Wilness: 
the Art and Science of Human RighL, Facl-Finding," Harvard Humall Righls lOll/'lla/3 (1990): 83-84 
[Electronic]. Available from HeinOnline at: 
htlD:l/www.lib.uct.ac.za.ezor0xv. lIel.ne.za/ index . phn?lullll=/l i bs/dbaseslplat fOfms. hI m&1 ihid=R f.i [2009, 
April 16]. 
3.1 Cohen. 518; Dudai, 793. 
" Ibid. 
35 Orentiichter, 94-95 . 
.1(, Ibid.: Dudai. 790 
)7 Dud~i , 791. 
'" Orentiichler, 108. 
" Ibid., 95. 
40 Dudai, 791 ; Orentlichter, 97. 
41 Ibid. 
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Of the three human rights reports reviewed, Longman gave an overall positive review to 
only one. The positively-reviewed rep0l1 approximated a scholarly work in its efforts to 
provide a more complex account of the cause of the mass violence of 1994, concentrating 
on the planning and organisation of the genocide and "the ideology behind the killing".42 
He criticised one report for being based on hastily-conducted research that had left no 
time for the verification of facts and had resulted in flawed factual details 43 He 
commended another for "providing a first glance at the use of sexual violence as a 
weapon in the genocide", but pointed out that it left unanswered questions concerning the 
relative prevalence of certain acts of sexual violence in certain local communities over 
others and other possible comparative data.44 The criticisms and questions raised in 
relation to these reports are very valid. Still, one recalls that the research of the latter two 
rep0l1s was conducted soon after the end of mass violence of April-July 1994 relative to 
the former report. Thus, both probably provided a starting point for international 
responses and more intensive investigations. 45 It is with this in mind that one of the 
latter two reports has been selected for review in this study, namely the report produced 
jointly by Human Rights Watch and Federation lnternationale des Ligues des Droits de 
I 'Homme in 1996. 
c) Scl/O/ar(v Literature 
Scholarly literature is concemed with scientific description and explanation for its own 
sake.46 Other scholars are the main target audience of this "literary genre". It is in this 
light that one makes sense of Longman's request for research that would add "new data, 
creating building blocks upon which a more complex and complete understanding" of the 
4::! Human Rights Watch and Federation lntemationale des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme, Leave NOlle to 
Tell the Story: The Rwandan Genocide (New York and Paris: Human Rights Walch and Federation 
lntemationale des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme, 1999), cited in Longman, 34 . 
.jJ African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995), cited in 
Longman 33. 
44 H~man Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Oroits de L'Homme, Shattered Lives: 
Sc"'(ual Violence durillg tlIe Rwandan Genociele und its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch and 
Federation International des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme, 1996), cited in Longman, 35. 
45 Orentlichter, 107. 
46 Dudai, 793; Glasser and Ettema, 5. 
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Rwandan mass violence of April-July 199447 This is not to say that scholars do not have 
normative concerns; it simply means that the dominance of positivism in scientific 
research has meant that scholars have had to avoid putting normative concerns "explicitly 
in the heart of the project.'.4H It is necessary to acknowledge but - due to the limited scope 
of the study - not to get drawn into the epistemological debates within the philosophy of 
science that have challenged the positivist position of value-free science.4o With regard to 
studies of mass killings and other mass violence within comparative genocide studies, 
sociologist Stuart Stein expressed concern that social scientists' focus on the detection 
and prevention of genocide had been pursued "at the expense of the development of 
micro- or macro-comparative frameworks.,,50 
From Longman's survey, one can identify at least three categories of scholarly literature 
(regarding the events of 1994 the preceding hi stOlY): works that provide primarily 
descriptive accounts;5] works that provide causal explanations;52 and works that provide 
theoretical explanations. 53 Conventional thought on the scholarly knowledge economy (in 
the social sciences) holds that there is a division of labour in which scholars in historians 
and "area specialists" (those specialising in the study of specific geographical regions) 
are expected "to yield up empirical materials" through descriptive accounts "for 
theoretical processing by social sc entists.,,54 Some observers have noted that there have 
been challenges to this division of labour: area specialists have also developed theory in 
-1 7 Longman, 30. 
-1 8 Dudai. 789; Glasser and Ettema. 5. 
019 Readers who are more interested in these philosophical debates may refer to the fo llowing readings: 
Birger Hjerland, "Theory and Melatheory of Infonnation Sc ience: a New Interpretation," ./oltrJIal ql 
Docllmelllarioll 54, no. 5 (1 998): 610; Eugene Miller, "Positivism, Historicism and Political Inquiry," The 
American Political Science Review 66, no. 3 (1972): 796-817; Leo Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy'!" 
SOllllle/'ll Political Science Association 19, no. 3 (1957): 343-3 68. 
50 Stein, 46. 
51 David Newbury, "Precolonial Rwanda and Burundi: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties," Intematiollal 
Journal of A/i-icall HiSTOrical Studies 34. no. 2 (2001): 255-314, cited in Longman. 32 . 
j:! For ex;mple: Peter U"ill , Aidiug Vio/~l1ce: the Developmem Ewe/prise i1/ RWl1I;da (Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 1998) cited in Loneman,37 
S3 For example: Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nati"ism and (he 
Genocide ill Rwallda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), cited in Longman. 33. 
54 Joseph M, Bryant, "On Sources and Narrative in Historical Social Science: a Realist Critique of Positivist 
and Postmodemist Epistemologies," British JOl/l'/lal o{Sociology 51 , no. 3 (2000): 491. 
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their research endeavours; and political scientists do produce descriptive accounts 55 It is 
in view of this "traditional disciplinary division of labour" that the validity of Longman's 
criticism of a work by Mahmood Mamdani (a political scientist) is noted. Longman noted 
that while Mamdani heavily criticised "area studies research" on Rwanda, he relied 
"almost entirely on it for his ' sources. ,,56 Mamdani criticised area specialists for 
specialising in the production of new facts , which he argued led to area studies' 
resistance to theoretical explanations.57 Mamdani later stated that his book was "an 
attempt to rethink existing facts in light of rethought contexts, thereby to illuminate old 
facts and core realities in new light.,,5R By this statement, Mamdani confirmed his 
reliance on a knowledge 'production line' wherein "area specialists" and others collected 
the evidence and established the facts on which his own theoretical labour relied. 
Mamdani ' s work is included for review in this study because Mamdani's work is an 
example of a theoretical work that "processes empirical materials" produced through "the 
original empirical research" of others. 
1.3. Research Question 
Given the existence of different "literary genres" responsible for producing fact-based 
literature on Rwanda and Longman's statement about myths and inaccuracies circulating 
in the post-1994 literature on Rwanda, one central question arises: have factual 
inaccuracies and limited or poor-quality evidence been the main points of concem, 
criticism and dispute to have arisen from the advocacy-orientated, advocacy-related and 
scholarly literature on the Rwandan mass violence of April-July 1994? Or does the 
problem lie in the interpretive frameworks used to analyse or "process" the basic facts 
and evidence? 
;; Ibid.; Rene Lemarchand, "A Hi story of Genocide in Rwanda." review of Wh en Victims Become Killers: 
C%nialism. Nativism and the Genocide ill Rwanda, by Mahmood Mamdani • ./ourl1al ql African History 
43, no. 2 (2002): 307. 
56 Longman, 33. See also Lemarchand, review of Wh en Victims Become Killers, 307. 
51 Ma';;dani. XllI. 
58 Ibid., XIV. 
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To answer the question, one must first grasp: a) how the evidence may be used to 
establish facts; b) how the facts and evidence function in relation to generalisations; c) 
how the facts and evidence function in relation to concepts and conceptualisations; d) 
how the facts and evidence functions in relation to causal and theoretical explanations. 
a) The Basic Facts and Evidence 
The establishment of the basic facts about past events of mass killing and sexual violence 
is the substance of descriptive accounts and is a necessary starting point for any 
interpretive analysis of those events and is the substance of descriptive accounts 59 It 
involves a search for evidence, evidence being usefully understood as the 'residue' of 
past deeds, occurrences and circumstances. 60 The basic evidence may be usefully 
understood as the 'residue' of past events and past circumstances. 61 Evidence is gathered 
from sources. In the context of historical research, one distinguishes between primary, 
secondary and even tertiary sources of evidence. Primary sources include people who 
have first-hand information about the events under study, for example surviving 
witnesses, perpetrators and other eye-witnesses.62 Primary sources also include any 
documents and records produced by the people who were directly involved in the 
investigated events or otherwise generated by others who have directly observed the 
people who were involved in the investigated events, such as government records, 
registers, diaries and so forth. 63 Secondary sources are those sources that have referred to 
plimary sources for the facts and empirical evidence while tertiary sources refer to 
secondary sources. In the context of legal proceedings, one distinguishes between direct 
and indirect/circumstantial evidence.64 Direct evidence is that evidence that "proves a fact 
59 Bryan!, 502., 497-498. 
60 Ibid., 497-498. 
61 Bryant, 498. 
62 Dominic LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 18; Levine, 628: 
Dudai,791. 
6) Levine, 627 . 
6-1 David Yau Fai Ho, Rainbow Tin Hung Ho. and Siu MilO Ng. "Investigative Research as a Knowledge-
Generation Method: Discovering and Uncovering," Joumalfor Theoryc!.fSocial Behaviour 36, no. 1 
(2006): 23-24 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHosl al: 
Imp :/1 \\'\\'\\1.1 ih. ucLac .za.ezrm:\: v. L1el . ac .za/i ndex .plm?htm 1=/1 ihs/dhasesl Dim r orms. lnm& I i bid- RS P009, 
April 16] 
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without an inference or presumption and which in itself, if true, establishes that fact. ,,65 
Eye-witness testimony is an example of direct evidence, and an eye-witness is an 
example of a pnmary source. Direct evidence may also be gathered from primary 
documents, if the documents explicitly express factual and other details about actions and 
agreements under investigation. Circumstantial Evidence is "evidence from which a fact-
finder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.,,66 Examples of 
circumstantial evidence include forensic evidence, such as DNA and fingerprints."7 
Circumstantial evidence may also be gathered from primary documents that give details 
fi'om which certain actions and agreements may be inferred. Thus, primalY sources do not 
always provide direct evidence; although the overlap is frequent. 
b) The Bearing of the Basic Facts and Evidence on Generalisations 
Generalisations entail the description of "broad patterns" of occurrences from facts based 
on limited samples of empirical evidence.6s They may be unavoidable in empirical 
studies. The question is whether the samples are representative and/or what level of 
inductive support they provide for those generalisations. 
c) The Bearing of the Basic Facts and Evidence on Concepts and Conceptualisations 
Conceptualisation is the process whereby individuals and groups - whether they are 
members of a language, political, professional or other community - come to agreements 
about the rules concerning the actual or possible use of telms, thereby controlling to some 
degree what is commonly understood by the use of those telms.69 The product of the 
process is called a concept. Concepts are different from conceptions in that conceptions 
(15 Kevin Jon Heller, "The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence," Michigan Law Review 105, 
no.2 (2006): 248 . 
6(, Ibid. , 250. 
67 Ibid .. 241: Ho. Ho and Ng, 23. 
MI Orentlichter, 95. 
61) Earl Babbie and lohann Mouton, The Practice o/Social Research (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 
2001),109, III. 
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have to do with individual perspectives and perceptions, while concepts are general and 
. b" 70 mter-su ~ ectrve. 
Conceptualisation involves the specification of one or more indicators of what the above-
mentioned individuals or groups have in mind, indicating the presence or absence of the 
concept under review or study.71 Indicators pertain to what Abraham Kaplan 
distinguishes as three classes of things that scientists (and others) are concerned with 
measuring.n The first class is direct observables, which entails those things that people 
can observe simply and directly. The second class is indirect obsel1iables, which require 
"relatively more subtle, complex or indirect observations". The third class is constmcts, 
which are theoretical creations that are based on observations but which cannot be 
observed directly or indirectly. 
At tlle basic level there are concepts involved in ordinGl), language or usage such as 
'killing,' 'mass killings,' and 'violence' that are used and understood by the competent 
speakers of any given language, without reference to special definitions or 
justifications73 Nevertheless, the telms can be used incOITectly when they are not used 
according to the conceptual rules of ordinary usage. Technical or specialist terms such as 
'murder', 'culpable homicide', 'involuntary manslaughter', 'rape' and 'statutory rape' 
have authoritatively deternlined meanings in law. 74 'Genocide' is a technical ternl in as 
far as it applies to the definition thereof as encapsulated in the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime (j{ Genocide (henceforth refeITed to as the 
Genocide Convention).75 Telms like 'rape' and 'murder' may be used in ordinary 
language in ways that are similar or contrary to the authoritative legal-technical 
7U Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
72 Abraham Kaplan (1964), The Conduct a/I11qlliry: A1ethodology for Behavioural Sciences (New York: 
Thomas Y Crowell, 1964),55, cited in Babbie and Mouton, 110. 
7:1 Louise du Toit, "Conceptual Analysis ," in I11tellectual Tools: Skills/or 'he Human Scie11ces, ed. Dean 
Roussow (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2000), 23. 
74 Ibid., 25. 
75 COl1VCllliollfor tile Prevention and Punishment of the Crime o.fGcnocide, Approved and Proposed for 
Signature and Ratification or Accession by General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of9 December 1948, 
Entry into force January 1951 , in Accordance with Article XIII, Article 2 [Online]. Available: 
hnp:l/w\\'w.unhchr.ch/hlml/menu3fb/p L!:enoci.htll1 [2007, November 28]. 
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definitions thereof. Descriptive terms with historical and cultural ongms - such as 
' pogroms ' , 'lynchings' and 'ethnic cleansing' - were part of ordinary usage in certain 
historical contexts and social contexts (Eastern Europe, the American South, the 
Balkans), but have since been incorporated into (scholarly) comparative genocide studies 
for other contexts. 76 When used in the latter sense for academic and scholarly purposes, 
it is crucial that they be clearly defined and used consistently while keeping the original 
usage in mind. 
Theoretical concepts such as 'etlmicide' and 'gendercide' are formulated within general 
theories that are elaborated in abstract conceptual frameworks around law-like 
generalisations linked to empirical evidence77 They require a general and systematic 
understanding of the theory as a whole; contingently, their definitions and justifications 
are bound up with the justifications of the theory as a whole. invented terms with 
stipulative definitions have meanings and definitions that are stipulated by the 
inventorluser of the term. 78 This means that stipulative definitions are neither right nor 
wrong; but tllis also means that nobody else is bound to the new tenn or its meaning and 
individuals can choose to ignore it or to make up their own terms with different 
stipulative meanings. This was the case with the teffi1 'genocide' when the jurist Raphael 
Lemkin coined it in 19447 9 He then campaigned for it to become a teclmical tenn in law. 
He eventually succeeded when as pm1s of his concept were incorporated in the Genocide 
Convention in 1948 and subsequent international law80 "Genocide" as a legal-technical 
telm has a different meaning and a higher status than the stipulative telm. Concepts also 
concern the problem of classification, which requires "c1mity and closure about the scope 
of application of a pm1icular concept," in relation to another concept.S] 
70 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Sciellce (Engel wood Cliffs: Prentice Hall , 1966). 85-86; Drazen 
Petrovic, "Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at Methodology," Europeall .Jollmal of imcmariollal Lalli 5 
(1994): 343 , 347; YIVO Ellcyclopedia ofJe",s ill Eastel'l1 Europe (2005),s.v. "Pogroms". 
71 Hempel, 88. 
78 Ibid., 85-86. 
79 Raphael Lemkin, .-Ly;s rule ill Occupied Europe: Laws a/OcclIpation, AlIa~vsis a/Government, 
Proposals/or Redress (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Internalional Peace, 1944), 79. 
8() Samantha Power, A Problem/rom Hell: America i1lthe Age a/Genocide, Revised ed. (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2007). 47-60. 
" du Toil, "Conceptual Analysis,"24. 
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d) The Bearing of the Basic Facts and Evidel1ce 011 Causal al1d Theoretical Explal1atiol1s 
Causal and theoretical explanations require that there is agreement regarding the basic 
empirical facts about the killings to be explail1ed (technically the explalUlIIdllll1 or 
dependent vatiable) as a condition for proposing different causes as independent 
variables or as theoretical explanations (technically the explal1al1s). 82 Causal 
explanations propose a factor or a set of factors - based directly on the empirical evidence 
or facts - as the cause (independent variable) and an event or phenomenon as the 
consequence (dependent variable)83 Causal explanations depend on logical inferences 
between the set of factors proposed and the event/phenomenon proposed. Theoretical 
explanations, like concepts, do not depend simply or directly on the empirical evidence. 
They are composed of abstract related theoretical entities that point to possible 
observations. 84 
1.4. Research Methodology 
This study is conducted tlu'ough a literature review of four selected works on the 
Rwandan mass violence of April-July 1994. This study includes: a work that is an 
example of advocacy-related investigative journalism; a work that is an example of 
advocacy-orientated human rights reporting; and two works that each provide an example 
of scholarly theoretical analysis. All the works are typically concerned with more than 
one issue or argument. This study has identified the main issue in each work and 
endeavours to limit its examination to the main issues. The works are organised 
thematically: two works employ different methods to explore the subject of mass civilian 
participation in tlle violence of the demarcated period; two works are similar in their 
focus on the violence directed at females and males respectively. The study separates the 
basic facts that are the foundation of each work from the interpretive frameworks used by 
82 Andre du Toit and Annette Seegers, An Introduction to the Study of Politics (Unpublished nOles: 
University orCape Town, 1997),12-13. 
Hl Ibid. 
R4 Garvin McCain and Erwin M. Segal, The GallIc a/Sciellce (St. Paul: Brookes/Cole Publishing 
Company, 1969), 101. 
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the respective authors. The source critical method is used to evaluate the verity of the 
facts as well as the credibility and reliability of the sources of the evidence. With regard 
to the interpretive frameworks, the study notes that the works of investigative journalism 
and human rights reporting appeal to International Law as a standard by which to 
interpret the facts and evidence. The scholarly works develop their own concepts 
concerning the killings. This study contextualises their concepts within the broader sub-
field of comparative genocide studies and compares them to the authoritative legal-
teclmical definition of genocide. Furthermore, one scholarly work utilises an identity-
based theory that seeks to provide an explanation of communal conflict. This theory will 
be looked at in relation to other identity-based theories on conflict. The other scholarly 
work requires familiarity with the theoretical construct of gender and gender-based 
theory. The research methodology of this study is explained in greater detail in Chapter 
Two. 
1.5. Research Limitations 
Due to the limited selection of works to be reviewed as well as to budgetary, 
geographical and time constraints, it has not been possible to conduct Oliginal fieldwork 
research in order to ascertain facts and to test the theories presented in the literature. 
Thus, this study can only be viewed as a starting point suggesting what the problems 
might be with regards to the facts, empirical evidence and the interpretive frameworks in 
the broader literature on the Rwandan mass violence of April-July1994. Since it is not 
possible to interact directly with the original evidence, the study relies on other published 
sources and critical reviews to assess problems with facts and evidence within the 
selected work. Where relevant, the study has refen'ed to legal documents which the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has made available to the public on its online 
archive and to Rwandan legislation (also available online). 
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1.6. Works Selected fOI' Critical Review 
The works to be reviewed are arranged first by theme and then in the order of the date of 
their publication. 
aJ Works investigating Mass Civilian Participation in the Mass Killings of April-1/1Z)' 
1994 
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 200 I) 
Mamdani 's work is included as an example of scholarly work seeking to provide a 
theoretical explanation of mass civilian participation in the mass killings of April-July 
1994. His study involved a consideration of empirical evidence on the 1994 mass 
killings, using human rights organisations as his main sources and including a few of his 
own original interviews.s; His study also involved viewing the events of April-July 
within the broader context of Rwandan pre-colonial, colonial and pre-1 994 post-colonial 
history. In the latter regard, Mamdani refen'ed to the empirical research produced by the 
"tiny coterie of Rwanda specialists" among mainly Western scholars {"mostly Belgian, 
French and North American,,)86 
His point of departure is the agreement between the sources and his own observations 
that the mass killings were, overall , perpetrated by members of the Hutu majority group 
within Rwanda 's population overwhelmingly against members of the Tutsi minority 
group87 He claimed that the killing of Tutsi (and not of other possible victims of the 
killing) was 'genocide' .88 He stipulated his own concept of genocide and proposed that in 
order to explain how Hutu came to be pitted against Tutsi in genocidal violence, one must 
understand the historical origin and evolution of Hutu and Tutsi as opposed "political 
S; Mamdani. XIII, 184-233. 
86 Ibid. , xm. 4 I 
"' Ibid .. 3-9. 
" Ibid., 5. 
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identities"B9 This study investigates the verity of the facts and reliability and adequacy of 
the evidence that Mamdani presented in support of the facts about the killings. It then 
investigates the theoretical framework that Mamdani created through his combination of 
his concept of genocide and his theory of political identity. From there, the study 
investigates how Mamdani applied his theoretical framework in his interpretation of the 
historical facts and the facts of mass civilian participation in the mass killings. 
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to M!lrder: the Rwandan Genocide, revised ed. (London: 
Verso, 2006) 
Melvern's book is also included in this study for its contribution to the understanding of 
how the mass civilian participation in the 1994 mass ki llings was made possible. It is an 
example of advocacy-related investigative journalism. Melvern's book introduced 
evidence from the previously unexamined primary documentary sources, namely the 
records of Rwanda's former government and military (the Forces Armees 
RwandaisesfFAR or Rwandan Armed Forces/RAP) in the years and months leading up to 
- and including - the mass killings of April-July 1994.90 The records provide previously 
top-secret information about communications and activities of the military and civilian 
government. Some of these documents have subsequently been added to Melvern's 
archive (which appears to be accessible to scholars and possibly other researchers)."1 
Melvern contended that the killing of the Tutsi constituted genocide and that Hutu mass 
civilian participation in the killing of Tutsis in April-July 1994 was the result of a 
conspiracy to commit genocide within a group of high-level Hutu military and 
government officials9 1 These officials then fonnulated a genocide plan. Melvern claimed 
that documentary sources from the government and the military "included evidence of 
the planning of genocide" and that this new material "gave a unique insight into the 
minds of the conspirators and how they determined that genocide and the racist ideology 
" Ibid., 21-33. 
90 Melvern, Conspiracy to A1url/el'. XIV-:A'VI. Melvern s imply stated that she gained access to these 
records. She did not specify how she gained access 10 them. 
' I Ibid., XIV, A'Vl. 
92 Ibid. 
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that underpinned it should become a pat1 of government policy".93 Making reference to 
some of the trials of high-ranking military and civilian officials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Melvern set out to show that these individuals 
needed to be convicted for their part in the 'conspiracy to commit genocide' against the 
Tutsi group. To underscore that 'genocide' and 'conspiracy to conunit genocide' are 
punishable crimes under International Law, Melvern made reference to the Genocide 
Convention 94 This is a treaty that, as the title proclaims, bound signatory States to 
prevent and punish instances of genocide conunission and conspiracy according to the 
legal-technical definition of genocide found therein. She also included matelials detailing 
the ICTR Prosecution team's building of a genocide conspiracy case against a number of 
high-ranking military officers and infOImed the reader that the evidence produced in one 
trial included some of the military documents she had discovered in Kigali (Rwanda's 
capital city) - which had subsequently become paI1 of her archive95 Melvem asserted 
tllat these trials were of public interest worldwide because "whatever evil may befall any 
group, nation or people" was a matter of concern "for the entire human family.,,96 
There are a number of facts about military activities that Melvern presented from the 
military documentary sources, which may serve as the basis of interpreting the presence 
of a genocide conspiracy. This study limits its examination to Melvern's factual account 
of the creation and expansion of the civil defence programme for the mass training and 
arming of civilians (as outlined in tlle military documents) and her interpretive argument 
tllat this programme constituted pm of a conspiracy and plan to conunit genocide. 
b) Works Investigating Mass Sexual Violence against Females and the Selective Mass 
Killing of Males 
Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 
I'Homme (FIDD), Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and 
" Ibid. , XIII-XIV. 
'M Ibid., Xv. 
'JS Ibid., XIV. See Longman's statement about Melvern collecting useful primary documentary sources at 
the Hugh Owen Library in section 1.2 of this chapter. 
"" Ibid., XV. 
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its A/termath (New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch and Federation lnternationale 
des Ligues des Droits de I 'Homme, 1996).'17 
This report [Tom Human Rights Watch and FIDH is included as and example of 
advocacy-orientated human rights reporting. The report documented cases of rape and 
other acts/forms of sexual violence perpetrated in 1994 predominantly against Tutsi 
women and girls and to a lesser extent against Hutu women and giris." 8 This 
documentation was mainly based on interviews with surviving victims of sexual violence, 
but also included testimonies from medical practitioners and Rwandan women's 
organisations as well as Rwandan government and United Nations reports 99 They argued 
tllat the evidence presented "showed" that rape was systematic and "extremely 
widespread".loo It is the first work to focus on the aspect of sexual violence against 
women 111 Rwanda in 1994 and is commonly cited in secondary analyses on the 
subject. 101 
The report appealed to the ICTR and to the Rwandan government to investigate and 
prosecute sexual violence perpetrated against women in Rwanda. I02 Referring to 
provisions in International Law, the report argued that all the identified acts of sexual 
violence could be prosecuted either as 'genocide', crimes against humanity or 'war 
97 Human Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme (FIDH), 
Shallered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwalldall Genocide lIud its A/iermafh (New York and Paris: 
Human Rights Watch and Federation lntemationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme, 1996), vii. 
Binaifer Nowrojee is the primary writer of the I-Iuman Rights Watch Report under review. She is a scholar 
aflaw and a consultant to the Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project Janet Fleischman and 
Alison Des Forges also contributed to the report's writing. 
" Ibid., 24. 
99 Ibid., vii, 24. 
100 Ibid ., 
101 Hu~'a~' Rights Watch, Shattered Lives, cited in Adam Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda." 
.lol/mal q(Gel/ocide Research 4, no. I (2002), 65,85-86; cited in Lisa Sharlach, "Gender and Genocide in 
Rwanda: Women as Agents and Objects of Genocide," Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 3 (1999): 394-
395; ciled in Clotilde Twagiramariya and Meredeth Turshen, "Favours to Give and Consenting Victims: the 
Sexual Politics of Survival in Rwanda," in What Womell do ill Wartime, eds., Meredeth Turshen and 
Clotilde Twagiramariya (London and New York: Zed Books. 1998), 103, 115. Twaginnariya offered a 
brief analysis of sexual violence against women before the publication of this reporL which does not appear 
as comprehensive ilS the report under review. See Clolilde Twagiramariya, "Women as Victims of Power 
Conflicts: the Case of Rwanda," Association qICollcemed A.fi·icllll Scholars Bulletill, no. 44/45 (1995): 13-
18. 
IO:! Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 8- 10. 
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crimes' - provided that the definitional elements of each crime were met. IOJ The report 
was however, mainly concerned with "showing" that the mass sexual violence of April-
July 1994 that was aimed against Tutsi women constituted genocide. 
This study exammes the facts of sexual violence 'as presented in the repO!i. It also 
examines the generalisation about the widespread nature of sexual violence as well as the 
report 's motivations for the prosecution of acts of sexual violence as 'genocide ', 'crimes 
against humanity' or 'war crimes ' . 
Adam J. Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," Journal of Genocide Research 4, 
no. I (2002): 65-94 . 
.lones's aliicle is included in this study as another example of a scholarly theoretical 
analysis. It is a direct response to the Shattered Lives report, choosing instead to focus 
primarily on the apparently deliberate dispropO!iionate killings ofTutsi males (and some 
Hutu males) in the mass violence of Aptil-.luly 1994.104 The facts about the killing of 
males are gathered from Jones's selection of five human rights reports. lOS Jones argued 
that these killings were "gendercides ": gender-selective killing. 106 Gendercide is a 
theoretical concept attached to a specific gender theory and requiring an explanation of 
gender (an abstract concept) as an analytical tool. 107 The article under this study's review 
is a refinement and further development of his previous work in the conceptualisation of 
Ill) Ibid., 27.3 I. 
JO~ Adam J. Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," Jourl/al afGenocide Researcl14 , no. 1 (2002): 69-
75, 85-87. 
l OS African Rights , Rwanda: Death, Despair alld Defiance (London: African Rights. 1995); African Rights. 
Rwanda - Not So innocent: Women as Killers (London: African Rights, 1995), Human Rights Watch and 
Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de I'Homme. Leave NOlle to Tell the StOJ~f: Genocide in 
Rwanda (New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de 
I'Homme, 1999); Human Rights Watch and Feden:nion lntemationale des Ligues des Oroits de I'Homme. 
Shauered Lilies: Se.xual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide alld its Aftermath (New York and Paris: 
Human Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Dmito; de I'Homme. 1996); 
Organisation of Amcan Unity, imerl1atiollal Panel q{ Emillem Persollalities to illvestigate the 1994 
Gellocide ill Rwallda alld the Surroulldillg Evel1ls, July 7, 2000 [Online]. Available: hup:!lww\V,oau-
Qua,('lr!.!/D('lclImenuipep/ ipep.htl1l ,c ited in Adam Jones, "Gender and Genocide," Joumal a/Gellocide 
Research 4, no. J (2002): 65. 
106 Jones, "Gender and Genocide," 72, 
101 Ibid. , 69-73. 
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gelldercide. IOS Jones understood "gendercide" to be the early or "onset phase" of 
genocide. lo9 His theoretical analysis is meant to explain why males tended to be killed 
first and in larger numbers. This study examines whether the fact of the disproportionate 
killing of males is an agreed upon fact suppOlted by the evidence before taking a closer 
look at the theoretical case made. 
1.7. Basic Background Facts: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and Surrounding 
Events 
On I October 1990, a guerrilla organisation known as the Rwandan Patriotic Army/Front 
(RPF/RPA) launched its first attempted invasion of Rwanda from its base in Uganda. IIO 
Its leadership and soldiers were mostly second generation Rwandan Tutsi refugees from 
the political violence surrounding the 1959 "Social Revolution" against the Tutsi 
monarchy and aristocracy, and subsequent episodes of mass violence against Tutsis 
during the administration of the Rwandan President Gregoire Kayibanda (1962 -1973). III 
A few were relatively recent Hutu political opponents to the regime established by 
President Juvenal Habyarimana since 1973, under the MOllvemellt Revoilltionnaire 
National pour Ie Developpement (MRND).112 Most of the refugees had failed to secure 
full citizenship in their host countries, using invasion to effect their own repatriation and 
to call for multiparty democracy in Rwanda. lll Since Rwanda's independence, Tutsis 
lOR Adam 1. Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide ." Journal C?fGclIocide Research 2. no. 2 (2000): 185-21l. 
cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide," 94. 
lOl) Jones, "Gender and Genocide," 87. 
JIG Mamdani, Whe1l Victims Become Killers, 186; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: the Role of the West 
ill Rwanda's Genocide (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), 28; Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: 
History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Company, 1995),93. 'Rwandan Patriotic Front' and 'Rwandan 
Patriotic Anny' were meant to convey the idea of a political wing and a military wing respectively of the 
same organization. The literature suggesL<; that the distinction was not clear in practice and that the 
organization was predominantly known as the RPF. Since Rwanda is largely a Francophone country, the 
organization - now in government - is known as the Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR). However the 
organization has its origins in an Anglophone countI)' (Uganda) and is still internationally known as the 
RPF. 
J 11 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 160-184; Mironko, "Ibitero, 177, 184;"Catharine Newbury 
and David Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in 
Rwanda," Calladiall JOllmal of AIi'icoll Sll/dies 33. no. 2/3 (1999): 296-299, 302-303. 
112 Ibid; Prunier, 76. 
113 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 29. 
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had been systematically excluded from national government and the anny.114 
Furthennore, discrimination occurred within the Hutu majority, with the Kayibanda 
administration favouring Hutus from Rwanda 's southernpr~rectll,.es over Hutus from the 
north (Kayibanda being a Hutu southerner) and the Habyarimana administration similarly 
favouring Hutu northerners over southerners on the basis of Habyarimana's (and his 
suppOlters') origins. 
The Habyarimana administration responded to the RPF invasion and subsequent military 
advances with massive arrests of suspected RPF collaborators (mostly Tutsis) and mass 
killings of Tutsis. 115 From 1990 to 1993 an estimated 2000-3000 Tutsis of the Bagogwe 
and Bahima sub-groups were killed in operations visibly directed by local authorities and 
carried out by ordinary civilians or martially-trained civilian militias. 116 Responding to 
international cliticism about the refugee problem and human rights abuses in Rwanda, 
Habyarimana hastily began a democratization processes in 1991 and sat at the head of a 
multiparty coalition government by 1992. 11 7 The democratisation process saw the 
fonnation of four major opposition parties, which became part of the multiparty 
government: the Coalition pOllr la Defense de fa Republiqlle (CDR); the Mouvel1lent 
Democratiqlle Republican (MDR); the Parti Liberal (PL); and the Parti Social 
Democrate (PSD).IIS The MRND was "reborn" as the Mouvement Revoflltionl1aire 
114 Newbury and Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali," 299, Peter Uvin, "On Counting, Categorizing and 
Violence in Burundi and Rwanda," in Census alld Idemiry: the Politics of Race, ElllI1iciry and Language ill 
National Census, eds. David 1. Kertzer and Dominique Arel (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 2002). 164. 
lI S Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Talking Peace Gild Waging War, Hllman Rights Si11ce the Ocrober 1990 
Invasion. 27 February 1992: 8-9. In 1991, The Rwandan government eventually admined to arresting 8 
047 persons, while Africa Watch (a division of Human Rights Watch) estimated that 10000 were arrested 
and eventually released in 1991. 
11 6 Human Rights Watch, and FIDH, Leave None to tell tile Story, 70-73; Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers, 192-194, Melvern, COl/spirocvroMlIrder, 17-19, 55-56. 
117 Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: the Perils of Peacemaking," .Joll1'l1al qf Peace Research 35(2)(1998): 
198-205; Al an J. Kupennan, "Provoking Genocide: a Revised History of the Rwandan Patriotic Front," 
.Journal q(Cellocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004): 71-74; Samantha Power, A Problemfi·om Hell: America ill 
the Age o(Gel/ocide (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 345-346. 
'" Isaac Kamola, The Global Coffee Economy and the Production of Genocide in Rwanda," Third World 
QlIarter~Jl28, no. 3 (2007): 585: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 203; Melvern, Conspiracy to 
iHurder, 24. In keeping with the democratic spirit. the MRND was renamed the MRNDD - the Mouvement 
Revolutionnaire National pour Ie Developpemem et la Democratie. The:tvIDR was a re-invention of 
President Kayibanda's party, which had fonned the basis of his totalitarian regime of 1962-1973. 
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Natiollal pOllrle DeveiOppemellt et la Democratic (MRNDD). The CDR was initially the 
only party that was ostensibly against a power-sharing deal with the RPF and its members 
were predominantly defectors from the old MRND party. Its anti-RPF and anti-Tutsi 
stance was matched by the views espoused on the ' hate' radio station Radio-Televisioll 
Libre des Mille Collilles (RTLM) and the newspaper K{l11gllra ll 9 Each party had a 
youth wing that eventually became a martially-trained civilian militia in the face of fierce 
. . I' PO mter-party nva nes. - The most well-known of these was the Izlteraha11lwe of the 
MRNDD and Impllza11l1lgambi of the CDR. Repeated RPF incursions cast suspicion over 
whether the RPF itself was in favour of power-sharing. The biggest RPF offensive, 
staged in February 1993, came at the time of a ceasefire. Intra-party divisions between 
those who supported continued negotiations with the RPF and those who were against the 
RPF became more pronounced. A peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords was 
eventually signed on 4 August of 1993, which gave the RPF representation in the 
govel11ment and made provisions for the incorporation of the RPF soldiers into the 
Rwandan army.121 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda was deployed in 
November 1993 to oversee the implementation of the agreement. 122 
On 6 April 1994, a ground-to-air missile shot Habyarimana's plane on his relul11 from the 
peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania. 123 It was never clear who exactly conducted this 
assassination, but each side of the war blamed the other. Within hours of this incident, 
Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingingiyamana was also assassinated. The mass 
killing of Tutsis commenced thereafter, alongside the killing of Hutu political 
"moderates" and ordinary Hutus who opposed the killings. Implicated in the killings and 
the sexual violence were the Rwandan Armed Forces, civilian militias of every political 
119 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 190; Mel vern, COllspiracy to Atfurder, 49-54. The argument us 
that some of the shareholders of the RTLM were CDR and l\1R.NDD members who were in government or 
the anny. 
120 Kamala, "The Global Coffee Economy," 585; Melvern, COllspiracv 10 Mllrder, 36-38. 54-55 . Melvern 
argued that most of this violence was actually committed by members of tile MRNDD and CDR or 
individuals otherwise closely aligned to the two parties with the purpose of spreading suspicion and 
division among the parties. Later it wou ld be used to attempt to unify the parties againsllhe RPF 
121 Clapham, uThe Perils of Peacemaking," 102-204; Mamdani, Whell Victims Become Killers, 199. The 
CDR was the only major party left out of the proposed trnns itional coalition government. 
122 Ibid. 
123Ibid., 216. The President of Burundi was also on board. 
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party, civilians trained within the State's civil defence programme and ordinary Hutu 
civiliansI24 The killings ended with the RPFIRPA's military victory in mid-July. There 
are claims and some evidence that the RP A engaged in the mass killings of Hutu civilians 
around this time. 125 The RP A-perpetrated killings are beyond the scope of this study. 
1.8. Chapter Organisation 
The study is organised into five chapters including the current one. Chapter Two provides 
a more detailed outlining of the research methodology to be used in examining the 
selected works. Chapter Three provides an examination of the issues raised with regard to 
the works of Mamdani and Melvern. Chapter Four provides an examination of the issues 
raised with regard to tlle Shattered Lives report and Jones ' s article. Chapter Five contains 
the study's closing reflections. 
1 2~ Human Rights Watch and FIDH. Rwanda. Shattered Lives, 12: Melvern, Conspiracy fa A/lirder, 252 
'" Human Righls Walch, " Leave None to Tell the Story," 540, 553: Philip Verwimp, "Testing the Double-
Genocide Thesis for Central and Southern Rwanda," .10111"J1al OfC01!jlic/ Reso/I/tioll 47, no. 4 (2003): 423. 
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Chapter Two: Research Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
The study has posed the question of whether the main points of concern, cIiticism or 
dispute coming from the literature on the Rwandan mass violence of ApIiI-July 1994 are 
regarding the basic facts and evidence presented within the literature or regarding the 
interpretive frameworks used to "process" those facts. The study proposes that the answer 
lies in first assessing the research priOIities and objectives behind advocacy-related, 
advocacy-orientated and scholarly literature. This probe uncovers the preferred methods 
of evidence-gatheIing and interpretive frameworks of the "literary genres" specified. This 
chapter of the study further discusses the methods to be used to assess the facts. evidence 
and the "genre-relevant" interpretive frameworks. It begins with a basic introduction to 
source criticism, the method used for probing the facts and evidence. It then moves on to 
a very bIief discussion of how generalisations are made from the evidence. The chapter 
looks at how mass killings and mass sexual violence may be interpreted under 
International Law, which is the framework proposed by Melvern and Human Rights 
Watch/FIDH. The legal approach is contrasted with the social-scientific approach 
adopted in the subfield of comparative genocide studies, which has some relevance to 
understanding lones's and Mamdani ' s conceptualisations of gendercide and genocide 
respectively. The chapter ends with a discussion of theoIies of communal identities and 
with an introduction to how the theoretical construct 'gender' may be used as an 
analytical tool. 
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2.2. Basic Facts, Empirical Evidence and Interpretive Frameworks 
2.2.1. Source Criticism as a Method of Investigating Basic Facts and Empirical Evidence 
about Mass Killings and Sexual Violence 
Source criticism is associated with a "documentary" or "objectivist" model oflmowledge, 
whose basis of research is the search for facts about things, events or phenomena. 126 The 
objective of the researcher is to find out as many details as is possible about past events 
through a critical review of the fragmentary evidence presented by a number of sources, 
and to thereby uncover the factual inaccuracies and misrepresentations garnered from the 
sources. 127 Scholars are required to critically evaluate the quality of the both their sources 
and the evidence they glean from them in the same way that the courts, humans rights 
organisations and journalists are required to evaluate their evidence. 12H Using the 
"he1TI1eneutics of suspicion,,129 the researcher considers: the authenticity and proof of 
authorship of a documentary source; the credibility of an info1TI1antiwitness (that is, the 
12(, Dominic LaCapra, History Gild Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 18; Joseph M. 
Bryant, "On Sources and Narrative in Historical Social Science: a Realist Critique of Positivist and 
Postmodemist Epistemologies," British Journal of Sociologv 51, no. 3 (2000): 497-498, 502. 
127 Daniel Mathewson, "A Critical Binarism: Source Criticism and Deconstructive Criticism," Journalfor 
the Slll(~V q(tlIe Old Testament 98 (2002): 13. Source criticism, as method of obtaining the 'real story' 
about past events/phenomena, has itself been subject to fierce epistemological debates. One example of 
such debates is that around the work of Leopold von Ranke, the Gennan historian who introduced source 
criticism to the historical studies. Ranke is remembered for having said that the historian's task was not to 
sit in judgement of the past but only to show "how it actually was" (wie es eigentlich gewesen). On this 
basis, Braw argues that some have mistakenly placed Ranke as a positivist. However, Braw's re-
interpretation of von Ranke places the historian as a historicist who was aware of his own socia-cultural 
influences and who attempted to view the past in its relative socia-cultural contest. Leopold von Ranke, 
Geschic/uen der romollischell 111ld germallisc/lell Volker von 1494 his 1514, 3rd ed. (Sammtliche Werke, 
vol. 33)(Liepzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1885), VII, quoted and cited in J.D. Braw, "Vision as Revision: 
Ranke and the Beginning of Modem History," History alld Theme 46, no. 4 (2007): 46-47, 48. 
128Diane F. Orentlicher, "Bearing Witness: the Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding," Han'ard 
Hllmall Rigills JOllrnal 3 (1990): 1 09-121 [Electronic]. Available from HeinOnline at: 
http: //www.lib.ucLac.za.ezoroxv.llcl.ac.zaiindex.php?htm I=/libs/dhases/platfonns. I1t01& I ibid=8S [2009, 
April 16]; David Yau Fai Ho, Rainbow Tin Hung Ho, and Siu Man Ng, "Investigative Research as a 
Knowledge-Generation Method: Discovering and Uncovering." .Iol/malfor Theory of Social Behaviour 36, 
no. 1 (2006): 23-24 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHost at: 
http://www.lib.uct.ac.za.ezprox v.uct.ac.za/ index . ohp"!ht1111=/l i bs/dbaseslpl atf0n11s.lllm& 1 ibid=88 [2009, 
April 16]. Ho. Ho and Ng write of investigative journalism/reporting as one of two '·truth-seeking traditions 
within what is broadly tenned "investigative research." See also: The Prosecutor versus Protais 
Zigimllyimzo, Case No.ICTR-OI-73-T, Judgement, 18 December 2008. paragraphs 89-94 [Online]. 
Available: http: //www .unic[r.or!!lPonals/O/Case/En!!1 ish/Zi!!iranvirazol.lud!!e11lent/OS 1 '") 1 Be.odr [20 I 0, 
January 10]. 
129 Mathewson, 13. 
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extemal aspects of the source); as well as thefactual accuracy of the evidence presented 
by the source (intemai aspects).130 With regard to factual accuracy the researcher 
considers two components: the internal component, which refers to the ability of the 
evidence to stand on its own in terms of its "directness, coherence and logical 
consistency"; the external component, which refers to the extent of correspondence or 
agreement between one source and other independent sources on the facts.13I In 
principle, primary sources are considered to be more reliable than secondary sources 
because of their proximity to the event in question. 132 Among the works to be reviewed, 
those of Melvern and Human Rights WatchlFlDH are secondary sources in the historical 
sense. The works of Mamdani and .Tones are teliiary sources. However one keeps in mind 
that the authors' claim to credibility may be that they are trained observers who are 
expected to critically sift through evidence - regardless of whether the evidence was 
received directly from the primary sources (as is largely the case with Melvern and 
Human Rights WatchlFlDH) or from secondary sources (as is largely the case with 
Mamdani and Jones). 
2.2.2. Making Generalisations about Mass Killings and Sexual Violence 
Human rights investigators and social scientists seek not only to verify individual cases 
of violence but also to make generalisations about the extent of tl1e violence, "the nature 
of government (and where relevant, insurgent) responsibility for the abuses, and the 
significance of apparent trends" within a given time period. 133 They have a responsibility 
to guard against selection procedures that would produce a distorted picture of the 
general patterns of violence in a country. 134 To minimise the evidentiary distortions that 
may be presented by one particular source, they need to review a broad range of sources 
in order to identify potential witnesses for interviewing purposes. 135 Investigators need to 
collect testimonies from a broad range of witnesses from different pmis of the area under 
130 Bryant, 508; Francis Stuart Chapin, Field rVork und Social Research (New York: The Century Co., 
1920).37; Ho, Ho and Ng, 23; 
131 Ho. Ho and Ng, 23-24. 
m. La Capra, 18. 
m Orentlicher. 95 
134 Ibid 110 
[35 1bid:: 110: 112. 
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investigation which, when viewed as a whole, would provide a representative picture of 
patterns of abuse in that area. 136 If investigators are unable to get a sample of testimonies 
that are representative of patterns of abuse in the whole area because other parts of the 
area are (for whatever reason) inaccessible to the investigator or witnesses in this area are 
unwilling/unable to give testimony, then investigators must convey the effect of the 
constraints on the final conclusions presented in the report. 137 
2.2.3. Mass Killings, Mass Sexual Violence and In/emotional Law 
As advocacy-related and advocacy-orientated literary genres, investigative journalism 
and human rights investigation are essentially driven by moral concerns or moral 
principles, that is, the 'alleviation' of 'human suffering' or the public exposure of 
'wrongdoings,.13S However sceptics of such 'humanitarian' concerns have argued that 
moral principles are not universal and conceptions of 'human suffering' are both 
culturally-detelIDined and era-specific. 139 To counter challenges to their claim of 
objectivity, writers within the two genres use a strategy described by some observers as 
the "objectification of moral standards" by which they locate some "empilically 
detelIDined standard" by which to demonstrate the transgression and haIID done. 1411 
Human rights reporters use the provisions found in International Human Rights Law, 
13(, Ibid., 110. 
m Ibid., 112. 
13 8 Ron Dudai, "Advocacy with Footnotes: the Human Rights Report as a Literary Genre," review of 
Throllgh No FaIllt of17teir OW1l: Pll1litive HOllse Demolitiolls During the al-Aqsa Im((ada by B'Tselem, 
the Israeli lnfonnation Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Tenitories, Huma11 Rights Quarterly 6, 
no.3 (2006): 783-784, 789 [Electronic]. Available from HeinOnline at: 
Imp:1 iwww.Jih.uct.ac.za.ezproxv.uct.ac.za/i odex. php?html=/1 ibs/dbaseslpl mfonns.ium& I i bid=R R [2009, 
May 15]; Theordore L. Glasser and James S. Ettema, "Investigative Journalism and the Moral Order," 
Critical Studies iu Mass Comnulllication 6, no. I (I989): 10 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHost at: 
11 ttp: //w\\'w.l ib. LlCl.ac .za. eznrox \'. uct.ac .za/ i ndex .ph p?h t1111 =/1 ibs/dbases/n 1 atforms. ht m& I ibid=8 ~ [2009, 
April 16]; D.C. Hallin, "The American News Media: a Critical Theory Perspective," in Critical Tileory alld 
Public Life, ed. 1. Forester (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985), 129, cited 
Glasser and Enema, 5. 
13'1Ibid.; Bhikhu Parekh, "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention," International Political Science Reviell' 
18, no. I (1997): 54-56, cited in Nicholas 1. Wheeler and Alex 1. Bellamy, "Humanitarian Intervention and 
World Politics," in The Globali=atiol1 of World Politics: wlintroductioll10 I11lemational Relations , eds. 
10hn Baylis and Steve Smith, 2'" ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 472. An example given of 
the historical-cultural construction of what is considered 'condemnable human suffering' is the practice of 
slavery, which was \,./ide1y practiced in past historical epochs but is now condemned under the provisions of 
International Human Rights Law and under the moral principles of some societies. 
J-IU Dudai, 784: Glasser and Ettema, 2, 10. 
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International Humanitarian Law and other international standards (and to a lesser extent 
domestic law) to interpret instances of violence. 141 Investigative journalists have a range 
of 'objective' standards, rules or guidelines by which to interpret events; but they appear 
to favour the law as a principle instrument of interpretation. 142 
Melvern, the investigative journalist, claimed to show that the creation of the Rwandan 
civil defence programme was the manifestation of a conspiracy and plan to commit 
genocide against the Tutsi group.143 The Human Rights Watch/FlDH authors advocated 
the investigation and prosecution of rape and other acts/forms of mass sexual violence 
perpetrated in April-July 1994 "where applicable" as "genocide," "crimes against 
humanity" and "war crimes",144 even though the main focus of the repmi was showing 
how mass sexual violence against Tutsi women in this period met the definitional 
elements of the crime of genocide. 
Both works have either explicitly expressed or implied that ' genocide', ' crimes against 
humanity' and 'war crimes' are crimes in International Law, but both have generally 
avoided explaining under what sub-division of International Law the crimes belong. 145 
They may have had good reason: the literature produced by law scholar-practitioners has 
referred to all three crimes as being subsumed either under International Humanitarian 
Law or under International Criminal Law, leading to possible confusion among non-
. [. 146 
specIa IStS. By this study's understanding, the three crimes constitute both serious 
violations of International Humanitarian Law and crimes under International Criminal 
14' Dudai, 784. 
l.j ::! Glasser ilnd Etterna, 10. 
1-13 Linda Melvern, COllspira,:l' to All/rder: The RIVallda1l Genocide, revised ed . (London: Verso, 2006), 20-
21. 
144 Human Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme (FIDH), 
Shauered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its .I~[iermal" (New York and Paris: 
Human Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme, 1996), 9.28-36. 
145 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 27, 28: Melvern, COl1spiracy to Nfl/rder, )"''V. It is 
noted that in Shattered Lives, the authors referred to International Humanitarian Law in relation to 'war 
crimes 
1-16 See: Rhonda Copelan, "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into 
International Criminal Law," McGill Lall'Jolll'llal46, no. I (2000): 220; Allison Marston Danner, 
"Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing,'- Virgillia Law Review 87 , 
no. 3 (2001): 417. 
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Law. 147 Serious violations of Intemational Humanitarian Law are those acts committed in 
situations of armed conflict/war in contravention of the laws and customs of war. 148 
Intemational Criminal Law encompasses a broader range of intemationally punishable 
crimes, both "crimes of war" and crimes that are not necessarily tied to the context of 
armed conflict (for example torture, slavery, piracy and teITOrism).149 Genocide and 
crimes against humanity are recognised as crimes in armed conflict/war and in times of 
peace. 150 Intemational Criminal Law involves the practice of holding individuals 
responsible for committing intemational crimes through criminal prosecution and the 
establishment of precedents emanating fi'om intemational criminal prosecution. lSI Thus 
Intemational Criminal Law may be usefully understood as encompassing the "penal 
aspects of Intemational Humanitmian Law". 152 
Both authors fi'amed their agendas in the context of ongoing and expected trials at the 
Intemational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (lCTR), which has jurisdiction over crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II ('war crimes' pertaining to a civil war 
context).15] Article 2 of the fCTR Statute is taken directly from the Genocide Convention, 
defining genocide as: 
"'any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical. racial 
or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.,,154 
147 Danner. 4 I 7. 
148 Ibid. 
'''Ibid. 
150 Ibid.; William Schabas, "Crimes against Humanity," in Encyclopedia o/Genocide a1ld Crimes against 
Humanily, vol. I, ed. Dinah L. Shelton (Farmington Hills: Thomson Gale, 2005), 209 . 
151 Colin Warbrick" "'International Criminal Law," Th e illtcmatiollal and Comparative Law Qllaner~v, 44, 
no. 2 (1995): 466-467 
152 Danner, 417. 
'''Swllle q{ Ihe III/emalional Criminal T,.ihllllUl fO,. RIVanda, Resolution 955 (1994) Adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3454'" Meeting on 8 November 1994 UN Doc S/RES/955 (8 November 1994), 
[ Online). A vai lable: http://\\',,,\\, .un iClr.()nifPona IslO/Ell!! I ishfLetw lIT ribunal/En!!1 ish12007 .pd r [2010, 
OClober 17] 
154i CTR Sfatllfe, Article 2(2); COJlVemiol1/or the PrevcmioJl alld PlIlIishmem qfthe Crime qfGel1ocide, 
Approved and Proposed for Signature and Ratification or Accession by General Assembly Resolution 260 
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Article 2 of ICTR Statute further elaborates that genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide 
and complicity in genocide. ISS 
Drawing from and modifying the precedent definition of climes against humanity as laid 
out in Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tlibunal and Control Council Law 
Number 10 (both w1itten in 1945 in the context of post World War II trials to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of International Humanitalian Law), Article 3 
of the ICTR Statute defines crimes against ilumanity as: 
..... the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: a) Murder; b) Extennination; c} 
Enslavement; e) Deportation; f) Imprisonment; g) Torture; h) Rape~ i) Persecutions on political , racial, or 
religious grounds; j) Other humane acts.,,]S6 
Article 4 of the ICTR Statl/te fuses the provisions provided by the Geneva Canventions 
and the second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol II) 
in order to determine war climes in the Rwandan context. The four Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols are treaties that layout prohibited conduct in arnled 
conflicts. J57 Only Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
A (III) of 9 December 1948, Entry in.o force January 1951 , in Accordance wi.h Anicle XIll, Aniele 2 
[Online]. Available: http://www.lInhchr.ch/lnml/menu3/b/p oenoci.h.m [2007, November 28]. 
155 ferR Slawte, Article 2(3); Genocide Convention, Article 3. 
156 ICTR Slaw/e, Article 3. Schabas, 211-213. From Schabas one sees that the definition of crimes against 
humanity has evolved from 1945. Whereas the Nuremberg Charter held that crimes against humanity were 
committed in pursuit of aggressive war or crimes against peace, the ICTR Statute has removed this nexus 
with aggressive war. 
151 The four Geneva Conventions are as follows: Convention (1)101' tlte Amelioralion olthe Condition o.{the 
Wounded alld Sick ill Armell Forces ill the Field. includillg Anllex 1, 12 August 1949,75 UNTS 31; 
COllvelltion (II) for the Amelioration q{the Wounded. Sick alld Shipwrecked At/embers q{ Armed Forces at 
Sea, 75 UNfS 85; COllvelllion (III) Relative to tlte Treatmellf q{ Prisoners of War, including AIlIle.;'(es I-fl/ , 
12 Augus.1949, 75 UNTS 135. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenLJ3/hfC)l.htm [2009, June 10]: COllVemiOll (IV) Relative to tile PrOlecfiOl/ 
olCivilian Persons ill Time o.{Wa,.. ineluding Annexes 1-111, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. The 
Additional Protocols are as follows: Protocol AdditiO/wllo tile Geneva COllventiolls q{ 12 August 1949. 
amI Relating /0 tlze PrOlectioll of Victims qf imerl1atiollal Armed COI!f/icts (Protocol 1) , 8 June 1977. 1125 
UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978; Protocol Addilional to the Genella COllvellliolls 0112 AlIgusI 
1949. and Relatillg 10 tlte Proteclioll o.{ NOll-IllIematiollal Armed COI!f/icIs (PrOlocol Jl). 8 June 1977, 1125 
UNTS 609, en.ered in.o force 7 December 1978. [Online]. Available: 
www.un.Of!.!/arabic/prevent!.!enocide/rwundaltex{-ima!!es/Genevn Protoco12.ndf - :2007-1 :::!-:::! 1 [2009, June 
10]. All Conventions and Protocols are cited in Ntombizozuko Dyani, "Protocol on the Rights of Women 
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II are applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 158 Article 4 of the ICTR Statllte 
states that the following acts are punishable under the ICTR's jurisdiction as Violations 
of Al1icle 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II: 
a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as 
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation and any form of cOIporal punishment; b) Collective 
Punishments; c) Taking of hostages; d) ACL.;; of terrorism; e) Outrages on personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; f) 
Pillage; g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement passed 
by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilised peoples; h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts."1 51J 
Both Melvern and the Human Rights WatchlFIDH authors expressed confidence that the 
acts and activities that they documented were clearly prosecutable under the provisions 
outlined above, because the provisions made explicit reference to acts of 'killing' and 
'rape' .'60 Furthermore, the Human Rights Watch/FIDH authors were confident that the 
wording of some of the provisions listed above was open to interpretation (especially in 
the definition of genocide), thereby allowing for the consideration of acts and forms of 
sexual violence that were not explicitly enumerated. '6' However, one observer of human 
rights reporting warned that the law is a "plastic medium of discourse, capable of varied, 
though certainly not infinite interpretations.",62 He warned that those accused of 
transgressions/violations had three options: literal denial (nothing happened); intelpretive 
denial (for example: something happened, but it was not, genocide or conspiracy to 
commit genocide); and implicatol)1 denial (what happened was justified). 163 He 
suggested that most disagreements between alleged perpetrators of violence and their 
critics (human rights reporters and others) are at the level of interpretation. 
in Africa: Protection of Women fTom Sexual Violence during Armed Conflict," Afdean Human Rights Law 
.1ourl/ol 6. no. 1 (2006): 172. 
15 8 Dyani, 173. 
159 ICTR Statllfe, Article 4. 
16U Melvern, Conspiracy to AtJurder, XV; Human Rights Watch and FIDH. Shattered Lives, 27-36. 
161 Human Rights Watch and FIDK Shollered Lives, 30, 35. 
162 Cohen, 526. 
163 Cohen, 522. 
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2. 2.4. The Social Sciel1tific Study of Mass Killil1g al1d Mass Sexual Violel1ce il1 
Comparative Gel10cide Studies 
Social scientists within the cross-disciplinary sub-field of comparative genocide studies 
are broadly concerned with the same basic facts (explal1al1dum): mass killing, sexual 
violence and other violence against members of a group "that is differentiated from other 
groups along one or more dimensions."I 64 The mass killing is conceived to be canied out 
by "individuals who are acting as members or representatives of a group." 165 The social 
scientists' professional claim is that they study different cases of mass killing for the 
purpose of defining and outlining the "boundaries of a set of cases which they want to 
study for the purpose of discovering their common elements and analysing the processes 
that brought them about".166 In the case of comparative genocide studies the specific 
objective is "to identify cases of genocide (or mass killing) and use qualitative, country-
case compa1isons to isolate commonalities across time and space.,,1 67 Part of the task 
entails the scholars' distinguishing between those cases that they would classify as 
'genocide' from those they would classify, for example, as 'gel1dercide '. 168 
Social scientists in comparative genocide studies have a conflicted relationship with the 
technical tern1 of 'genocide' , which demarcates an international crime. On the one hand 
'genocide ' is a teffi1 suited for legally-based analyses such as those carned out by legal 
scholars/practitioners (lawyers) and human rights reporters/activists. Social scientist are 
not typically involved in the legal task of regulating international crimes such as genocide 
and are not strictly bound to the use of technical teffi1S in the way that legal 
scholar/practitioners and human rights repOlters are. Nevertheless, the comparative 
genocide studies sub-field is historically tied to the juridical OIigins of the teffi1 
'genocide': from the coinage of the teffi1 by thejUlist Lemkin in the context of the Jewish 
IU4Stein, 41 . 
16 ' Ibid. 
1f>6 Frank Chalk, "Redefining Genocide," in Genocide: Conceptual alld Historical Dimensions, ed., George 
Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: Universi ty of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 47. 
1(,7 Scott Straus, "Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide," World Politics 59, no. 53 
(2007).77. 
16R Stein, 39. 
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Holocaust and its aftermath; 160 to the inter-State acceptance of a common definition of 
genocide at the inception of the Genocide Convention in 1948. 170 Thus, it may not come 
as a surprise that the most influential authorities in comparative genocide studies have 
shown themselves to be heavily influenced by the jUlidicallhuman perspective in their 
concern with the detection and prevention of the mass killing of civilians. 171 It would 
appear that for the most part, social scientists are caught between intl'oducing entirely 
new analytical definitions of genocide and keeping the essential 'spirit' of the legal 
definition (that is, the spilit of international protection for human groups against 
organised mass violence). 
The requirement that there be an "intent to destroy" a gl'OUp and the reshiction of victim 
groups to racial, national, ethnical and religious groups are the defining markers of the 
legal definition of genocide. Lemkin originally defined genocide as "the destruction of a 
nation or of an ethnic group.,,172 The telm genocide is constructed from the ancient Greek 
derivative 'gel1os' (meaning 'race' or 'tribe') and the Latin derivative 'cide' (meaning 
'ki lling,).173 Subsequently, social scientists have had the option of using the term 
'genocide' to designate any mass killing that targets groups on any single or combination 
of dimensions and of abandoning the requirement of intent articulated in Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention. 174 In the place of the requirement of intent, social scientists might 
choose to focus on the consequences of the killing. 175 However because social scientists 
can formulate their own conceptualisations of genocide, authors in the sub-field lack 
169 Samantha Power, A Problem/rom Hell: America ill the Age q(Gcnocide (New York: Harper Perennial, 
2007), 31-61. 
170 Refer to subsection 1.6 in Chapter One. 
J71 Frank Chalk and Kurt lonassohn, Th e History Gnd Sociology of Genocide: Ana(l'ses ami Case Studies 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), cited in Stein, 45; Leo Kuper, Genocide: Irs 
Political Use ill the Twel1tieth CCllllll)1 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), cited in 
Stein, 45; Helen Fein, Accounting!or Genocide: National RCjpoflSCS alld Jewish Victimization during Ihe 
Holocallsr (New York and London: The Free Press and Collin Macmillan Publishers, 1979), cited in Stein, 
45. 
172 Raphael Lemkin, Axis rule ill Ocel/piet/ Europe: Laws a/Occupation. AI/tl~vsis a/Government. 
ProposalsJor Redress (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944),79. 
173 Ibid. See also Power, 42. Power further explained that the Latin deri va ti ve dde is taken from the 
infinitive caedere (meaning 'to kill'), 
174 Stein, 48; Beth van Schaak, "The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's 
Blind Spot," The Yale La", .lollmal1 06, 110. 7 (1997): 2261-2265. 
115 Stein, 48. 
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agreement on what genocide is and what genocide is not. 176 One surveyor of the subfield 
commented that "one author's genocide is another's state terrorism". 177 Whereas scholars 
are typically expected to give accounts of the works of other genocide scholars in their 
own analyses, this study uses the legal-teclmical definition of genocide as the definition 
by which to compare Mamdani and Jones's respective conceptualisations of genocide (as 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five). It was earlier noted that within the Rwanda case 
study, Jones considered gendercide to be a component of genocide; but in his earlier 
work, Jones expressed that gendercide might be usefully understood as a type of genocide 
(this is discussed further in Chapter Five). J78 
2.2.5. Understanding Victims and PelpetratOl:\' of Mass Killing mul Mass Sexual 
Violence as Members of Communal Groups 
To understand a strategy of genocide, one must grasp how the perpetrators choose the 
designated victim group and how the perpetrators differentiate themselves from the 
victim group.179 The United Nations member States who contributed to the formulation 
of the Genocide Convention argued that an individual's membership in a racial, ethnic, 
religious or national group was usually hereditary and the distinctive features of these 
groups were permanent; thus distinguishing these groups from those where membership 
was supposedly voluntary (for example political groups) and whose distinctive features 
were impermanent. 180 Yet nothing in their argument explained why genocide might be 
perpetrated against the identified groups. 
'" Ibid., 40-41. 
171 Ibid., 41. See for example: Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr. ''Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and 
Politicides: Identification and Measurement of eases Since 1945." llllemat;onal Swc!ies QUGrerzr 32, no. 3 
(1988): 360 [Electronic]. Available from JSTOR at huo:iiww\\'. jslororo [2005, October 24]. 
Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide Gild Slate Power (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Books, 1982), 1; Schaak. 2261-2265. 
17l! Adam J. Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide," JOllma! q{Gcnodde Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 200. 
17q Mahmood Mamdani , Wlt en Victims Become Killers : Colonialism. Nativism and the Genocide ill 
Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 1),9; Stein, 4l. 
ISU Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use ill the Twel1lieth Cemll1~' (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1981). 26: Mauhew Lippman, "The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," Bostoll Ulliversity Imerllatiollal Lall' Journal 3, no. 1 
(1985):30. This was the argument of Iran, Soviet Union. Poland and Venezuela. the latter three arguing that 
protection of political groups in particular, would mean that efforts to combat domestic subversion would 
be labelled genocide. The ICTR maintained the views of the original drafters of the Genocide Convention 
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There are at least two complementary bodies of social-scientific scholarship (with some 
overlap in their concern with mass violence) to which one can refer in attempts to fill this 
explanatory lacuna. The first is the already mentioned subfield of comparative genocide 
research, which is responsible for the generation of explanations of why and how 
genocides (and other comparable schemes of human mass killing/elimination occur).'8' 
The second is what one may refer to (in perhaps very broad and oversimplified terms) as 
the scholarship on ethnicity or the study of the basis of communal group differentiation 
and identity.'82 The latter body of scholarship extends to encompass (among other 
concerns) the study of ethnicity/communal group differentiation as a factor or cause of 
mass violence, of which armed conflicts/wars and genocide are but a few 
manifestations. 183 An independent, extensive, critical and cross-disciplinary survey of the 
discussions and debates on the available theories of genocide and ethnicity (specifically 
etlmicity and inter-group violence) within the literature would have been desirable; yet 
such an endeavour is impossible given the limited scope of this minor dissertation. This 
sub-section is only a starting point to understanding some of the issues around both 
bodies of scholarship and serves as an introduction to Mamdani ' s effort to fuse to his 
theory of political identity (which entails a rethinking of "ethnicity") with his theory of 
genocide in order to explain why the Rwandan genocide of 1994 occUlTed. 184 
Scott Straus, a political scientist and expelt in comparative genocide research, has 
provided a review article that serves as a brief history of social-scientific scholarship on 
genocide: from the "first-generation" pioneering genocide scholars of the 1970s and 
about the protection of permanent groups whose membership was primarily hereditary. See The Prosecutor 
ver,HlS .Jean-Paul Akayesi/, section 6.3.1., paragraphs 511-516. 
I HI Straus, "Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide," 479. Straus's reference to genocide as 
a "topic of study", rather than a "sub field" (as used in the minor dissertation), is noted. 
IR2 G. Carter Bentley, "Ethnicity and Practice," ComparaTive Studies ;11 Society and History 29, no. 1 
(1987). 24-25; Sheldon Stryker and Peter 1. Burke, "The Past, Presenl and Future of an 1dentity Theory," 
Social Psvchological Quorterlv 63, no. 4 (2000): 284 [Electronic]. Available from .lSTOR at 
htlp: //w\\'w.islOr.OI"!l [2005, November 12J. 
lH ) Randall 1. Blimes, "The 1ndirect Effect of Etlmic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset," 
Joumol qfColIf/ict ResollItiolI 50, no.4 (2006): 536-547; Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: 
Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1987," JOllmol of COIlf/icr ResollItiolI 
41 , no. 5 (1997): 649-668. 
I M-I Refer to Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.2 under point h. 
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1980s to the "second-generations of the post Cold-War era. IS5 While he has noted that 
neither generation of genocide scholars has thus far succeeded in producing a commonly 
accepted concept of genocide,lsn his review has highlighted that each generation has 
within itself a few commonly-shared main theoretical perspectives and has highlighted 
the points of departure between the generations with regards to their respective proposals 
on the factors leading to genocide. A very limited discussion of his general findings is 
offered here. Three main claims are identified as being central to first-generation 
genocide scholarship. The first claim is that "deep social divisions ", including cultures 
of prejudice and entrenched practices of discrimination, are structural causes of 
genocide.,,187 The second claim is that genocide is a feature of authoritarian regime 
types. IS8 The third claim is that genocide is a response to deprivation and social stress 
caused by such factors as economic crisis or defeat in war. ISQ Second-generation 
185 Straus, "Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide,"476-501. Straus cited the following 
works as belonging to first-generation genocide scholarship, among others: Chalk and Jonassohn, The 
History alld Sociology of Gellocide Genocide; Kuper. Genodde; Fein, Accollntillg lor Genocide; Irving 
Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Alass Nlurder (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction 
Books, 1976); Ervin Staub, The Roots q{ Evil: The Origins oj Genocide alld Other Group Violence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski, eds., 
Genocide and the Alodem Age: Etiology alld Case Sllldies ofAlass Death (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1987). Kuper, Fein. Chalk and Jonassohn, Horowitz and Walliman are/were socioJogists~ Staub is a 
psychologist; and Dobkowski is a historian. Straus cited the following as works belonging to second-
generation genocide scholarship: Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1, The 
Meal/il/g orGel/ocide (London: I.B. Taurius, 2005); Mark Levene, Gel/ocide iI/ the Age of the Natiol/ State, 
vol. 2, Tlte Rise of tile West and the Comi1lg of Genocide (London: LB. Taurius, 2005); Michael Mann, The 
Dark Side Democracy: E.'plail1ing Ethnic Clea1lsing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)~ 
Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth CellIury (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Jacques Semelin, Pur(fier et detmire: Usages politiques des massacres genocides 
(Paris: Seuil, 2005); Benjamin A. Valentino, Fillal Solwions: lv/ass KiIIi11g and Genocide ill the TlI'e11Iieth 
Celll11ry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Eric D. Weitz. A Century of Genocide: Utopias Q( Race 
and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Most of the second-generation genocide scholars 
reviewed by Straus are political scientists, the exceptions being Weitz (a historian) and Mann (a 
sociologist). 
186 Straus, "Second-Generation Comparative Research on Genocide," 494-495. 
187 Ibid. , 480. For examples. Straus quoted/cited arguments from the following (no page references): Israel 
Chamy, Hall' Ca11 We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide, the Human Cancer (Boulder Colorado: 
Westveiw Press, 1982); Fein, Accountingfor Genocide; Kuper, Genocide, 
188 Straus, ""Second-Generation Comparatve Research on Genocide," 481. Straus quoted/cited arguments 
from the following: Horowitz. Taking Lives, 36; Rudolph Rummel, Death by Government (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 1994), 1. 
18'1 Straus, "Second-Generation Research on Genocide," 482, Straus cited arguments from the following 
works (no page references): Barbara Harff, "The Etiology of Genocide." in Genocide alld the lIiodem Age: 
Etiology alld Case Studies of AI ass Death, eds, Isidor Walliman and Michael Dobkowski (Westport: 
Greenwood Press. 1987).; Staub, The Roots of Evi/, With speci fic reference to how this first-generation 
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genocide scholars reject all these claims, mainly on the following bases: social-cultural 
divisions, authoritarian regimes and socio-economic crises are relatively ubiquitous 
compared to genocide (which is relatively rare) and therefore none of the three afore-
mentioned conditions is sufficient or necessary to cause genocide; arguments attributing 
genocide to any of the three afore-mentioned conditions cannot explain the timing of 
genocide; there were cases where genocides were perpetrated in areas where the three 
afore-mentioned conditions did not necessarily apply. IOU 
Straus identified three overlapping explanatory paradigms from the books he reviewed: 
idealism, political developmellt, and state interest. 191 Idealism posits that genocide is the 
result of leaders ' efforts to achieve an ideal society by removing groups (identified by the 
leaders as being different from the leaders' groups on ethnic, national , racial or other 
identity-based dimension) who do not fit into this ideal society.191 The political 
developmelll paradigm posits that genocide is the result of "mainstream quests to 
establish modem democratic and competitive states" by removing the nations, ethnic, 
racial and other groups that leaders perceive (for various reasons) to be obstacles to 
'progress,.19) The state illlerests paradigm posits that genocide is the result of leaders' 
schemes to pursue/protect "raisons d 'etm - the interests of state leaders to survive, win 
wars, and implement their fundamental goals", usually as an emotional or rational 
response to certain events or conditions such as wartime losses and clashes over 
land/living space. 194 A potential strength of second-generation genocide scholarship is its 
aim to analyse genocide as one type of outcome out of a number of other possible 
outcomes and "to use the tools of comparative historical analysis to understand why the 
thinking has been applied to the Rwandan case study, Straus referred to Peter Uvin, Aidiug Violellce: Th e 
DClIclopmclIf Emelprise ill Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998) . 
190 Straus, "Second-Generation Research on Genocide," 480-483. 
I'll Ibid., 489. 
192 Ibid. Straus cited the following authors as the main exemplars of this paradigm: Weitz, A CClIlliry qI 
Genocide; Semel in, Purifier ct detruire. 
193 Straus, "'Second-Generation Research on Genocide," 490. Straus ciled the following authors as the 
main exemplars of this paradigm: Mann, Th e Dark Side of Democrac.:v: Levene, Genocide 111 the Age of lhe 
Natioll Stare. 
1'}4 Straus, "Second-Generation Research on Genocide," 491. Straus cited the following authors as the 
main exemplars of this paradigm: Valentino, Filla/ SO/lIlions; Midlarsky, The Killing Trap. 
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phenomenon happens.,, 195 Straus had a number of criticisms concerning each paradigm. 
One of the main problems he identified with these paradigms as a whole is that they 
contained the some of the same central weaknesses identified within the claims of the 
first-generation genocide scholarship: idealistic leaders, states seeking to modernise, 
leaders in pursuit/protection of "raiSOI1S d 'elell" and many of the other conditions 
specified were ubiquitous relative to genocide and mass killing; some case studies of 
genocide and mass killing did not conform to the conditions posited by the paradigms. 196 
It is impOitant to stress that Straus's review is mentioned here as a relatively good 
starting point to understanding the overall histol)' of comparative genocide scholarship, 
the intention is not to portray it as the fmal or only word on the development of theories 
of genocide within the comparative genocide sub field. Those who want to pursue a 
serious study of genocide theories would need to look at other reviews and search for 
specific scholars to concentrate on. 
On its own, the subfield of comparative genocide studies may not be able to adequately 
address the question of the conceptualisation of ethnic, national, racial and other groups. 
This is where the body of scholarship and etlmicity and identity may be useful. 197 
Attempts within this study to find a recent review article on the history of social-scientific 
scholarship on ethnicity and identity have been less successful than was the case with 
comparative genocide studies. A relatively old article by G. Carter Bentley offers a brief 
histol)' of the anthropological study of ethnicity. 19B Bentley stated that "ethnicity emerged 
as a key problem in anthropology" when Edmund Leach challenged the then 
conventional assumption that societies and cultures co-val)' to such an extent that the two 
19; Straus, "Second-Generation Research on Genocide," 478. 
,% Ibid .. 488-492. 
J97 A po"tentially useful reference is: Stryker and Burke, "The Past, Present and Future of an Identity 
Theory," 284. Social psychoiogisis Stryker and Burke identified three usages of the tenn ' identity'. The 
first refers to the culture of a people and makes no distinction between identity and ethnicity, for example. 
The second refers to a common identification with a collectivity or social category, as in social identi ty 
theory or in contemporary work, which creates a common culture among participants. The third refers to 
the parts of the self, made up of the meanings that individuals attach to the multiple roles they play in 
"highly differentiated contemporary societies" 
'98 Bentley, 24-55. 
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tenns can be used interchangeably. 199 Leach contended that members of a social group do 
not necessarily share distinctive cultural traits and that social units are the result of 
"subjective processes of categorical ascription" that are not necessarily related to "the 
observers' perceptions of cultural discontinuities.,,20o Leach thus opened the debate on 
whether analytical units should be based on observer's criteria or on indigenous social 
distinctions, which (with increasing contributions from other scholars) evolved into a 
debate over whether "analytically useful units can be inferred from observed distributions 
of culture traits.,,20I 
Debates over ethnicity have subsequently been broadly divided into two major schools 
of thought: primordialislII and ills/l'lImelltalism?02 While this study has not been able to 
pinpoint the moment at which other social scientists (besides anthropologists) entered 
into the study of ethnicity, a look at Bentley's review and other reviews suggests that the 
"primordialist-instmmentalist dichotomy" cuts across social-scientific disciplines?03 
Primordialists contend that "subjective claims to ethnic identity" are "derived from the 
affective potency of primordial attachments" (such as shared histories, languages e/ 
cetera),204 and propose that nations and ethnic groups are naturally-occurring units that 
have always divided the human species as basically as sex or geography?05 The 
191) Edmund Leach, Political Sy.\'tems o/High/and Burma (London: G. Bell and Sons, 954), cited in Bentley_ 
24. 
'"0 Ibid. 
201 Bentley, 24. Bentley also mentioned that this debate "reached its apogee in an exchange between 
Michael Moemmn and Raoul Narcl!. See Michael Moennan, "Ethnic Identity in a Complex Civilization: 
Who are the Lue?" Amerieoll Allthropologist 67, no. 5 (1965): 1215-1230; Michael Moerman, "Being Lue: 
Uses and Abuses of Ethnic Identification," in Essays 011 the Problem qfTrihe, ed. June Helm (Seattle: 
University of Washington, 1968), 153-169; Raoul Narall, "On Ethnic Unil Classification," Cttrrelll 
Allthropology 5, no. 4 (1964), 283-291, 306-312; Raoul Narall, "Who the Lue AIe," in Essays Oil Ihe 
Problem of Tribe, ed. June Helm (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968),72-79. 
202 Bentley, 25. See also: Blimes, 537; Henderson, 655. 
20~ One notices, for example. Bentley's citations of Immanuel Wallerstein (an international relations 
scholar/world systems analyst, sociologist and historical social sc ientist) and Crawford Young (an expert in 
comparative politics) alongside citations of prominent anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz. See 
Bentley, 25. Immanuel Wallerstein, UEthnicity and National Integration." Callier,\' d'ellldes afhcailles 1, no. 
3 (1960): 129-39; See also the literature surveys of the following: Blimes, 536-547; Henderson, 649-688. 
20'; See for example: Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial SentimenL<.; and Civil Politics 
in the New States," in Old Societies {[lid Nell' States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963), 
105-157, cited in Bentley, 25; Harold P. Isaacs. Idols of th e Tribe: Group Idemity alld Polieical Change 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), cited in Bentley, 25. 
20'See: Anthony Smith, The Elhltic Origilts q(Natiolts (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwel l, 1986), 12; 
Blimes, 537; Henderson, 655. 
] 
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primordialist argument appears to be in line with the argument made by the United 
Nations member States, as specified at the beginning of this subsection. Instrumentalists 
share the position that certain political, economic and other material interests drive the 
fonnation of ethnic and other groups. Some instrumentalists contend that subjective 
claims to ethnic identity are derived from the "manipulation of culture in service of 
collective political and economic interests" and that ethnic groups (and nations) exist as a 
vehicle for the "pursuit of collective advantage20b Other instrumentalists contend that 
ethnic and national units are the outcome of elite manipulation in the elites' struggle for 
wealth, power and prestige,107 proposing that etlmic and national membership is "a fiction 
constructed by leaders and sold to their impressionable followers.,,10R While conceding 
the appealing simplicity of the general positions under these two schools of thought, 
Leach was not convinced tllat either school explained how individual people come to 
recognise the "commonalities" (and differences) underlying claims to common (and 
separate) identity.20o Although social psychologists Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke 
did not necessarily seek to resolve the problem tlmt Leach identified with primordialism 
and instrumentalism, they were similarly concerned with the problem of identity at the 
level of the individua1.210 They posited that individuals have multiple identities and that 
the key question is that of identity salience, which is a question of "the probability that an 
identity will be invoked across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a 
. . . ,,211 given sltuatJon. 
The primordial sit and instrumentalist schools of thought have dominated what political 
scientist Errol Henderson refelTed to as "a cottage industry ... around studies of etlmic 
206 Immanuel Wallerstein, UEthnicity and National Integration," Calliers d'erudes (lfNcaines 1, no. 3 
(1960): 129- 13 9, cited in Bentley, 25; Leo A. Despres, eli/fItful Pluralism alld Natiollalist Politics il1 
Brirish Guialla (Chicago: Rand McNally. 1967), ciled in Bentley, 25; Abner Cohen, CIISTOIIl alld Polilics ill 
Urban I~fi'ica: Hausa A1igralIls ill Yoruba TOIVIlS (Berkley: University of California Press. 1969); Crawford 
Young. "The Temple ofEthnicity," World Politics 35, no. 4 (1983): 652-662, quoted in Bentley, 25. 
207 Mamdani, 15; Smith, 8; Blimes, 537; Henderson, 656. 
201\ Paul R. Brass, Langllage. Religion. and Politics ;11 North india (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1974), cited in Bentley, 26. 
",., Bentley, 26. 
"0 Stryker and Burke, 284, 286. 
211 Ibid. , 286. 
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conflict.,,212 Primordialists argue that "ancient hatreds" or socio-biological differences 
between groups are the cause of violent conflict between them.213 Instrumentalists argue 
that campaigns of violence between groups are strategies by which group elites pursued 
their interests.214 
Mamdani argued that racial and ethnic groups need to be considered as political 
idelltities.215 Political identities are created by the State, which allocates rights and 
privileges to certain groups and not others.216 Mamdani offered his political identity 
theory as an explicit challenge to primordialist and instrumentalist propositions about the 
constituents of etlmic difference21 7 He also wanted to discuss the issue of race, which he 
identified as a remarkable silence in studies on African politics; in contrast to the 
relatively vigorous debate on ethnicity218 Exactly how Mamdani linked political identities 
to political violence and genocide - in order to explain the Rwandan mass killings of 
1994 - is explored in Chapter Three. 
2.2.6. Gender as an Analytical tool for Studying Mass Killing alld Sexual Violellce 
This study seeks to intelTogate how .Iones used gender, a theoretical construct, as an 
analytical tool in his development of the concept of "gendercide" to classify and to 
explain the killing of Tutsi males. The study also notes that the Human Rights 
WatchlFIDH report claimed that "women and girls are often targeted for sexual abuse on 
the basis of their gender" and used the telms "sexual violence" and "gender-based 
Climes" interchangeably;21 9 but the report only offered rudimentary explanations of 
gender and no sustained theoretical gender analysis. 
212 Henderson, 651. 
'" Ibid. , 655-657, Blimes. 537. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Mamdani, 20. 
21b Ibid ?? 
211 Ibid:: 15: 
218 Ibid. 
Wl Human Rights 'Walch and Federation lmernationale des Ligues des DroilS de L 'Homme (FIDH), 
Shattered Lives: Sc.;'(ua/ Violence Dllring {he RWllndan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York and Paris: 
Human Rights Watch and Federation lntemationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme, 1996). 1,25. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
44 
Generally speaking, theoretical knowledge of how gender operates is underdeveloped; 
but there are several schools of thought (mostly feminist) who have inconsistently tried to 
use gender as a "central category of analysis.,,22o At a minimum, these schools of thought 
have tried to achieve a unanimously agreed-upon distinction between sex and gender, 
with sex meant to refer to the basic biological differences between men and women and 
gender referring to the various social beliefs about these biological differences.221 In 
practice, these schools are divided between those who focus exclusively on the 
distinction as a dichotomy (socio-cultural or constructivist approach) and those who posit 
that the overlap/interplay between 'bodies' and 'beliefs' is greater than the distinction 
(socio-biological approach).222 There is a middle ground on the matter; one that holds that 
while the dichotomy between "bodies" and "beliefs" is false, the distinction between sex 
and gender is analytically necessary for operationalising the twO.223 
In line with this middle ground, the CUITent investigation elaborates the distinction 
between the two. Sex is a reference to the biological classification of ' male' and ' female ' 
as anatomically and physiologically different entities (in this context the entities are 
constituent of the human species). Sex can usually be observed directly with little 
controversy.224 When observing an instance of mass violence, one can deteITnine 
n" J. Ann Tickner, Gellderillg World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 200 I), 5, quoted in 
R. Charli Carpenter, "Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions ofa Nonfeminist Standpoint," 
iwcmatiollal Studies Associatiol1 (2002): 155. 
221Jan Jindy Pett01an, "Gender Issues," The Globalization a/World Politics: GllimrodlictiolllO 
/lIlemaliollal RelaliollS, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2"" ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
587. 
222 Joshua Goldstein, H'ar aud Gender: How Gender Affects ,he War System and Vice Versa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001),2, cited in Carpenter, "Gender Theory," 161 ; John Money, "The 
Concept of Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood and Adolescence after 39 Years," ./0111'1101 q{Sex alld 
Marilal Th erapy 2(1 994): 163-177. 
:12:\ Carpenter. "Gender Theory," 161. 
224 There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is the existence of "inter-sexed" or hennaphroditic 
individuals who display some or all the sexual/reproductive organs of both males and females. The second 
exception is the medical condition known as "Gender Identity Disorder" (in reference to "transgendered 
people"). Recent neurological research has revealed that there are dimorphisms in tenns of the brains of 
males and females. People with male reproductive organs typically have 'male-coded' brains and the same 
applies to females. People with Gender Identity Disorder have male-coded brains have female reproductive 
organs or vice versa. For social scientific gender studies. the term Gender Identity Disorder is problematic 
because it is a medical/biological condition, whereas 'gender' pertains to sociall y-learned/determined 
behaviours. On inter-sexed individuals, see R.K. Williamson, "The Blessed Curse: Spirituality and Sexual 
Difference as viewed by Euro-American and Native-American Cultures," Th e College News, 17, no. 4 
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whether: the victims are males only (men and/or boys); the victims are females only 
(women and/or girls); whether the victim group consists of equal numbers of males and 
females; whether the victim groups consist of different numbers of males and females. 
Gender is loosely understood as a social construction consisting of shared beliefs about 
how men and women should behave and how they should present themselves (in tenTIS of 
dress code, et cetera) in order to be considered socially-acceptable men and women (that 
is, masculine and fenlinine respectively).225 The same 'gendered' social beliefs also 
prescribe, among other things, socially-accepted divisions of labour between the sexes. 226 
Inter-sex and intra-sex interactions are regulated by these social beliefs and the social 
institutions created through these beliefs. One cannot observe gender directly; one can 
only observe the sex-based outcomes that may be a result of"gendered" beliefs. 
It is an analytical error to assume that' gender' is a factor in instances where victims are 
exclusively or predominantly of one sex227 Likewise, it is an analytical en'or to assume 
that gender is not a factor in instances where both sexes are equally represented in a 
victim group.228 To invoke gender in explanations of mass violence, one has to show how 
social beliefs about men and women have led to such outcomes.229 For this study's 
purposes, Carpenter' s theoretical framework of gender is borrowed. Gel1der idel1tities 
work at the inter-related levels of individual self-perception (personal identity) and 
societal perception (social identity), both of which concern beliefs and expectations about 
what 'sOli' of 'man' or 'woman' an individual is and regulate how he/she should behave 
in a given situation. 230 Gel1der discollrses "ascribe celiain attributes to men and women 
respectively (men are aggressive, women are nurturing)" and generate "principled gender 
ideologies" consisting of sets of prescriptions (as well as proscriptions) for the behaviour 
of men and women respectively ("men should be soldiers, women should be 
(1995), adapted and reproduced in Haviland, 442-445 . On "gender identity disorder" or " transgendered" 
individuals see Money, "The Concept of Gender Identity Disorder," 163-1 77. 
225 Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 80; Pettman, 587. 
22fl Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 80. 
m Ibid. , 78 
22R Ibid. 
221) Ibid. 
230 Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 80; Pettman, 588 . 
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mothers,,).231 Gender discourses also consist of gender norms such as 'spare women and 
children', which may inform celtain actions and policy decisions. Gender discourses 
direct attention to gender identities, resulting in empirical outcomes that are either be sex-
selective (intentionally targeting people of one sex) or sex-distinctive (intentional and 
direct targeting people of both sexes, but in different ways or in different propOltions).232 
Gender structures come into being through the socially-determined channelling of men 
and women into different institutions, such as the military for men or the care-
giving/caretaking professions of the nurse, housewife or domestic servant for women. 
Gender structures may originate from overt gender discourse, but over time the presence 
of men and women in these institutions "naturalises the supposed masculinity (or 
femininity) of the institutions themselves. ,,233 The empirical outcomes of gender 
structures are sex-specific, since individuals are targeted not on the basis of individual or 
collective gender identities as such, but rather on the basis of their membership of gender 
structures that have come to be predominantly male or pr dominantly female. 
In order to qualify his assertion that the killing of Tutsi men was gender-selective (that is, 
with a sex-selective outcome), Jones will have to show how Tutsi men were killed on the 
basis of perpetrators' beliefs and discourses about their gender identities, as opposed to 
being targeted on the basis of their belonging to gender structures in which men 
predominate. 234 Likewise, while human rights reports are not typically strong on theory, 
one might still expect the Human Rights Watch/FIDH authors to give some indication of 
the social beliefs that made the targeting of women for sexual violence possible. 
23 ' Carpenter. "Beyond Gendercide," 80-8J. 
m Ibid., 78, 90. 
m Ibid 81 
2J4 Ibid:: 78: 
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Chapter Three: Mamdani and Melvern: Mass Civilian Mobilisation and 
Participation in the Rwandan Mass Killings of April-July 1994 
3.1. Introduction 
The books of Mamdani and Melvem are examined in this chapter as examples of 
scholar(v GIlG(vsis and of advocacy-related illvestigative jOllmalism respectively.235 They 
provide two different approaches and perspectives to the investigation of mass civilian 
participation in the mass killings of April-July 1994. While Mamdani's book is the older 
publication, it is a secondary analysis that is primarily dependent on the limited empirical 
data collected by other researchers as the basis for applying a specific theoretical 
framework to explain what Mamdani saw as the popular agency of those who 
participated or otherwise condoned the killing of Tutsis and suspected Tutsi 
sympathisers. Melvem's work appears to be the hallmark of groundbreaking investigative 
joumalism, given the author's opening statement about her introduction of previously 
inaccessible sources to provide new details about the Rwandan govemment's war 
strategies against the invading Rwandan PatIiotic FrontiAnny (RPNRPF) from 1990 up 
to the outbreak of the mass killings in April 1994. She also apparently made use of 
previously published literature. Melvem's work sought to show how certain civilian and 
military autllOrities were responsible for mass civilian participation in the 1994 mass 
killings. But beyond a factual description of events, Melvern sought to show that the 
authorities in question had committed intemational crimes for which they ought to be 
punished. In focusing on the activities of the mentioned authorities from the start of the 
civil war and to the commencement of the 1994 and in refening to both International 
Law provisions and the arguments of tlle Prosecution in key cases at the Intemational 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Melvern professed to show that there had been a 
"conspiracy to commit genocide". 
:!JS Mahmood Mamdani, Wizen Victims Become Killers: Colollialism, Nativism alld the Genocide ill 
RlVanda (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2001); Linda Melvern, CowJpiracy to A1l1rder: 17lc 
Rwandan Gellocide, revised ed. (London: Verso, 2006). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
48 
3.2. Mamdani: "Popular Agency" as the Driving Force of Mass Participation in the 
Mass Killings of April-July 1994 
3.2.1. The Facts to be Explained 
It is an undisputed fact that, even though the exact numbers are unknown, the Tutsis were 
the predominant targets and victims of the April-July 1994 killings236 It is also beyond 
dispute that Hutu civilians participated in the killings that were instigated by Hutu 
extremist or genocidaires within government, the army and civil society. 237 The 
category of 'civilian' included: members of "youth wings" or "militias that were directly 
linked to Rwanda 's political parties with paramilitary training (such as the infamous 
Intera/I{[mwe of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie Developpement et la 
Democratie or MRNDD); civilians who were trained and aImed under the civil defence 
programme; and untrained ordinary civilians. There is however, uncertainty about the 
exact quantity of this "popular" mass participation. Around the time of the publication of 
Mamdani 's book. the prevalent assumption among scholars and others was that there had 
been overwhelming popular paIticipation from the Hutu?38 These assumptions seemed to 
be fed in part by speculation from surviving victims and by statements made by 
representatives of RPF-led government about having to face "a criminal population".2J9 
Drawing from these earlier published works and sources, Mamdani strongly asserted that 
236 Human Rights Watch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme, Slwttered 
Lives: Sc.:tllal Viole1lce dllri1lg lit e Rwandan Genocide and its f~{termath (New York: Human Rights Watch 
and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L'Homme, 1996), 12-13; Human Rights Watch, 
Leave NOli e 10 Tell (Ile Story: Th e Rwalldan Genocide (New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch and 
Federation International des Ligues des Droit, de L"Homme, 1999), 6. 11-14 , 17 [Online]. Available: 
hlQ):I/www.!.mmdsi::lcs.nel/docl131 7.pdf [2009. August 25]; Adam Jones, "Gender and Genocide in 
Rwanda," .Iollmal o[Gel/ocide Research 4, no. I (2002): 67-80. Alan 1. Kupenman, Th e Limits o[ 
Humallila,-janimen1emioll: Gel/oci(le ill Rwanda (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 19-
20; Mamdani, 5-6, 206; Melvern, COll.spiracy 10 Murder, 20-21 , 252-253; Scott Straus, "How Many 
Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide'? An Estimate." .Iournal ofGel1ocide Research 6, no. I 
(2004): 85, 88; Marijke Verpoorten, "The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis of the 
Gikongoro Province," Poplliatiol/ 60, no. 4 (2005): 331-333. 
2) 7 Ibid. 
238 Timothy Longman and Scott Straus provided a literature survey of authors who have made this 
assumption ofa high level of popular participation in the 1994 killings, apparently withoUl solid evidence. 
Timothy Longman, "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide," .Iol11'Jl(l1 
ofGeJ1ocide Research 6, no. I (2004 ): 35. Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan 
Genocide." 85. 
OJ" Ibid.; Mamdani, 6, 224-225, 266-267. 
l 
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the mass-scale participation of the civilian Hutu population is the primary weapon that 
made it possible for the Hutu extremists to achieve the killing ofTutsi on a massive scale. 
He supported this assertion with evidence that is either incomplete or that he had misread, 
and with some sources of questionable credibility. 
a) T7,e Number of Victims Killed, by Etllllie Group 
While Mamdani acknowledged that the exact number of victims was not known (and 
may never be known), Mamdani cited that estimates of Tutsis killed varied between 
500,000 to a million and that estimates of Hutus killed varied between ten and fifty 
thousand.240 He provided neither commentary nor separate referencing on the Hutu death 
toll, creating uncertainty about the sources of his information. While he provided some 
commentary and detailing of the sources providing the various estimates of the Tutsi 
death toll, he gave no indication of which source he found more reliable241 Nevertheless, 
two sources do stand out. The first is the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, 
the lUling party), a source whose credibility and reliability Mamdani has questioned due 
to perceived political bias and motives (elaborated in his discussion of perpetrator 
estimates). Mamdani vaguely mentioned that the estimate of one million Tutsis killed "is 
often heard of in the media and in RPF statements.,,242 It is unclear whether Mamdani 
was implying that this estimate was mere propaganda. The second source is the joint 
Human Rights Watch and Federation International des Ligues des Droits de I'Homme 
report written in 1999 by Alison Des Forges, a report widely regarded as reliable and 
whose author is regarded as an authority on Rwanda?43 In an unfortunate misreading of 
the latter source, Mamdani saw an inconsistency in the Human Rights Watch repOli's 
claim that at least half a million people (read: Tutsi) had died in the killings and had then 
later cited demographer William Seltzer's estimate of 657, 000 Tutsis perished244 
24U Mamdani , 5. 
241 Ibid. , 283. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Longman, 34; Melvern, Compiracy to AIIlrder, 277; Tlte Prosecutor verslls ProtaLs ZigiralIyira:::o, Case 
No. ICTR-01-73-T, Judgement (18 December 2008), paragraph 103 [Online]. Available: 
http: //w\V\V.unictr.of!:!/PonalsIOICase/En!..!lishlZi !..!inmviraz{1J.luci!!emenl/OS 121 Re.pdf [2010, January 10]. 
244 Ibid. 
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Mamdani, went on to state that the figure of 657,000 was an extrapolation based on the 
1991 Rwandan census data and is rejected by some experts as problematic. 
Upon closer investigation of the report itself, it is clear that both the figure of 500,000 
and 657,000 are from Seltzer245 The figure of 657,000 was thought to be the size of the 
total Rwandan Tutsi population in 1994 prior to the killings, based on statistical 
calculations applied to the size of the total Tutsi population as reported in the 1991 
national census. It was never suggested as an estimate of the Tutsis killed. The figure of 
500, 000 was Seltzer's estimate of Tutsi deaths in 1994. It is unclear how he reached this 
figure. However, Des Forges showed that a similar figure (507,000) was produced when 
the number of recorded Tutsi survivors (150,000) was subtracted from the extrapolated 
figure (657,000). It must be stressed again that Des Forges did not claim the figure of 
"half a million" Tutsi as the definitive death toll but that she claimed that the available 
data suggested that a minimum of half a million Tutsi were killed. Des Forges herself 
pointed out that the figure 657,000 was possibly an unreliable base from which to 
calculate an estimate of the Tutsi death toll, in view of the fact that celiain critics 
(unnamed) had suggested that the Hutu-dominated MRND government had deliberately 
underrepOlied the Tutsi population in order to "minimise the importance of the Tutsi in 
the population,,?46 She stated that there was no documentary evidence to support the 
critics' assertions; nevertheless, she claimed that the Tutsi popUlation was undelTeported 
in the records because there were Tutsi who registered as Hutu "to avoid discrimination 
and harassment. ,,247 Unfortunately, she was only able to provide anecdotal evidence to 
support this claim.24R Whereas Longman suggested that secondary works simply rehashed 
245 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave NOlie to Tell the Story, 6, 17. Please note that there are page 
differences in the hard copy and the electronic copy of the report. The basic content of both copies is 
exactly the same. Mamdani quoted from the hard copy, in which the relevant death estimates appeared in 
rages I and 15. 
_46 Ibid., 17. See also Kuperman, 19; Verpoorten, 334. The exaCI allegation was thaI the MRND (later 
MRNDD) government had fixed the Tutsi popUlation at 8.4 percent in order to peg Tutsi participation in 
the civil administration (on the basis of proportional representation) and to peg Tutsi school enrolments 
Uustified as 'proportional representation'). 
247 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leallc None to Tcll the Slory, 17. 
248 Ibid. See also: Service National de Recensement, Repuhlique Rwandaise, Recellsemelll General de la 
Population et de I 'Habitat all 15 Ami' 1991: Resll!rats Dejinit{{s (Kigali: Service National de 
Recensement, Republique Rwandaise, December 1994), 114, quoted in Verpoorten, 335. The report on the 
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"the inaccuracies from earlier accounts on Rwanda," Mamdani ' s misreading of a source 
suggests that at times the problem might possibly be that the information from previous 
accounts is recorded inaccurate! y in subsequent works24Q 
As is later discussed, Mamdani's concept of genocide is partly defined on the basis of the 
success of the perpetrators to realise their intention to destroy a specific group. Getting as 
close as possible to an accurate estimate of the number of Tutsis killed is necessary for 
working out the proportion of Tutsis killed out of the entire Tutsi population. Since the 
publication of both Mamdani work and Des Forges' report, it appears there has been at 
least one promising development in this regard. By exammmg the local population 
registers of communes (districts) within Gikongoro Prefecture (a province) in the 
southwest of Rwanda and comparing them with the data presented in the 1991 national 
census, Marijke Verpoorten has found evidence that the national cenSUS underreported 
the number of Tutsis in Gikongoro.25o More local leve! empirical research of this nature 
across Rwanda may lead to more accurate estimates of the number of Tutsi that were 
alive prior to 1994 killings and enable a more accurate calculation of how many Tutsis 
perished in the killings. 
b) The Number of Pe/petrators of the Killing 
Mamdani asserted that the mass killings of 1994 were "executed' with the slash of the 
machete" .25I Since "the machete had to be wielded by a single pair of hands", many 
hands were required to execute the killings (as opposed to teclmology that enabled a few 
to kill many, for example the Nazi gas chambers).252 He stated that since killing a person 
with a machete was hard work, "there were often several killers for every single 
victim".253 He claimed that the killings were canied out "by hundreds of thousands, 
perhaps even more", the latter pru1 of the statement implying that the number of 
Rwandan census of 1991 also suggested that the proponion ofHutu miglH have been falsely inflated, due to 
some Tutsis reporting themselves to be Hutu. 
::!.j') Longman, 29. 
250 Verpoorten, 331-367. 
2jl Mamdani. 5. 
'so Ibid., 5-6. 
'" Ibid. , 6. 
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perpetrators could have run into the millions254 To support his claims, Mamdani quoted a 
number of Rwandan PatIiotic Front (RPF) officials whom he had either spoken to 
personally or who had made public speeches about the ApIiI-July 1994 killings in July 
1995. One source was an unnamed political commissar in the police (of the RPF-Ied 
government) who asserted that "there were killers in every locality - from ministers to ' 
peasants - for it to happen in so short a time and on such a large scale."m A second 
source was President Pasteur Bizimungu (a Hutu in an othelwise Tutsi-dominated RPF 
leadership and predecessor to current Tutsi President Paul Kagame),~56 who is quoted as 
stating in a speech that there were "hundreds of thousands of cIiminals" spread evenly 
across the land257 A third source was an unnamed political commissar in the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA), who claimed that the RPA had faced "a criminal population" upon 
their capture of J(jgali.158 Without any consideration of the sources ' possible political 
bias, Mamdani used these sources in the first chapter of his book as the pIimary grounds 
to identify the success of a "tiny group" of genocidaires to "convince the majority to kill, 
or acquiesce in the killing of, the minoIity".259 Mamdani envisioned that his task was to 
provide an explanation as to 'why the Hutu majoIity killed or acquiesced in killing, not to 
investigate whether the majoIity had actually done so. 
In his book's last chapter, Mamdani indicated that subsequent to his 1995 inquiIies, he 
had asked other (RPF) govemment ministers and officials how many perpetrators they 
thought had taken part in the ApIiI-July 1994 killings."6u He claimed that· while most 
government officials questioned in 1995 had estimated that 3-4 million Hutus perpetrated 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 See Jeremy Sarkin, "The Tension between Justice and Reconci liation in Rwanda: Politics, Human 
Rights, Due Process and the role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide," Journal of A/i-ican 
Lalli 45, no. 2 (2001): 151-152. Sarkin wrote of how a number of high-ranking Butu officials in the RPF-
led coalition government - including RPF members such as Pasteur Bizirnungu - had eventually resigned 
or were compelled to resign and sometimes flee the country over disagreements with the Tutsi leadership. 
257 Mamdani, 6. 
251( Ibid. , 6. Straus also noted, with a measure of incredulity, that Mamdani had quoted an RPF commissar 
as evidence of mass participation without independent corroboration. See Straus, "How Many Perpetrators 
were in the Rwandan Genocide," 95. 
25<) Mamdani, 7. 
260 Ibid., 266. 
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the killings (out of a total Rwandan population of about 7.5-7.8 million),261 government 
officials questioned in 1997 estimated that there had been 4-5 million killers262 From a 
position of uncritical acceptance of the assessments of certain RPF sources, Mamdani 
now claimed that he was not so much interested in the verity of the claims but rather in 
the political implications and uses of the growing estimates. He then explained that 
although the RPF-Ied government avoided using 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as "political 
identities" (as discussed in the subsection to follow) , it had managed to organise post-
1994 Rwandan society in such a way that Tutsis who lived through the civil war and 
mass killings (1990-1994) are classified as survivors (meaning those entitled to State aid) 
while all living Hutu are presumed to be perpetrators263 Mamdani's argument appears to 
be that the RPF officials of 1995 were relatively more reliable than the officials of 1997 
because the officials of 1997 were more aware that the maintenance of Tutsi dominance 
depended on the socio-political condemnation and the moral justification of the 
suppression or marginalisation of the Hutu majority.264 Yet the fact remains that no RPF 
source could ever have been considered as an impartial source, and this needed to be 
pointed out as acknowledgement that independent sources were needed for corroboration 
so as to counter presumptions about the RPF sources' lack of credibility.265 
Mamdani also used witness/survivor and (less often) perpetrator testimonies as evidence 
to support his assertion of mass participation. A handful of these were gathered through 
06' Kupennan, 19; David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide," Africall SlIIdies Rel'iell' 41, no. 1 (1998): 
78; Service National de Recensement , 124, cited in Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan 
Genocide," 96. 
Z(j2 Mamdani, 266. 
263 Ibid., 266-267; [Republic of Rwanda] Orgallic Law No. 0811996 qf31 AlIgIIsl1996 ollihe Orgallisatioll 
oj Prosecution of Offellces COJlSlillltil1g the Crime q( Genocide or Crimes against Humanity since 1 
October 1990 (I September 1996), Anicle I [Online] . Available: 
htl]l: //www.unhcr.or0 refworld/docid!3ae6b4f64.html[2010. May 23]. Mamdani explained that the RPF-
led government recognises both Tutsis and Hutus killed as victims: Tutsis as victims of genocide and Hutus 
as victims ofpoliticaJ killings related to the Tutsi genocide. It is important 10 keep in mind that where as 
scholars, journalists and human rights organisations consider that the genocide occurred between April and 
July 1994, the Rwandan government stipulates thai the genocide began in OClober 1990. 
:!(J.f See also Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan Genocide," 85. 
265 Diane F. Orentlicher, "Bearing Witness: the Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding," Harvard 
Humall Rig/liS .Iol//'Ila/ 3 (1990): 120[Electronic]. Available from HeinOnline at: 
1m p://www.lih.ucLac.za.ezproxv.lIct.ac.za!i ndex.php?htm I=/I ibs/dhasesmiar fmms.lllm& I i bi<i=S8 (2009, 
April 16). 
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Mamdani's own original interviews."66 Most are testimonies gathered and assessed by 
others, ostensibly the human rights organisation African Rights - a source that some 
observers have simultaneously praised for giving one of the most detailed early 
descriptions of the 1994 killings and criticised for showing signs of being heavily 
influenced by RPF propaganda?67 The problem with relying on these testimonies is that 
they do not come from observers trained in data collection and few were in a position to 
count the exact number of killers in their own locations, much less make broader 
assessments about the level of civilian-perpetrated killing in the country268 Likewise, 
from the citations of Mamdani, the authors for African Rights do not appear to have 
undertaken a systematic attempt to quantify the perpetrators. Examples of individual 
doctors and other professionals who assumed leading roles as killers of accomplices are 
followed by assessments such as, "the percentage of doctors who became 'killers par 
excellence' was very high"; but there are either no estimates provided or no attempts to 
show how estimates were reached.269 
Mamdani's willingness to endorse evidence that is either incomplete or possibly 
manipulated for political ends also seems to be based on his own assumptions about how 
26(' See for example: Mamdani, 4-5,221-225. 
267 Ibid., 201. For critical reviews of African RighL'i see: Villia Jefremovas, review of Rwanda: Death. 
De,pair alld Dqfiallce, by African Rights. Aji-ica Magazille (22 March 2000) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.access l1wlibrarv.comiarticle-lGl-64698533/rw<.mdn-dcath-despair-and.html[2009. October 
21 J: Rene Lemarchand, "Rwanda: The Slate of Research." Online Encyclopedia of Alass Violence (4 
November 2007) [Online J. Available: hltp:II\V\V\\".massviolence.OJ"o/Rwallda-The-Stale-of-
Researc h?anpaee=4 [2010, July 28J; Longman, 33. JefTemovas (an anthropologist) and Lemarchand (a 
historian) have lengthy experience in Rwandan history and politics and the mass killings of 1994, 
constituting (like Longman) pan of the small body of "'Rwanda experts" pre-dating the war and mass 
killings. 
268 See for example, the testimony ofMectilde in Mamdani. 224. Mectilde, a Tutsi surviving victim told 
Mamdani that or the Hutu population: "ten percent helped; 30 percent were forced to kill; 20 percent; killed 
reluctantly; 40 percent killed enthusiastically." Mamdani then stated that his citation ofMectilde's 
estimates was not an endorsement thereof. but rather a demonstration of the poinl thai from the perspective 
of the Tutsi minority, the Hum majority is guilty "either of killing, or condoning or, or just looking 
elsewhere while the killing happened. See also Straus, 89. Straus explained that survivors of the 1994 
killings typically survived by hiding and were therefore usually not in a position to have "direct and 
detailed knowledge about the size and makeup of the groups that attacked them." 
26'1 African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London: African Rights, 1995),3-4, cited in 
Mamdani, 227. 
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the killings were 'implemented'. His statements that the machete was a labour-intensive 
tool for killing and that several killers were often required to kill one victim imply 
(intentionally or unintentionally) that he assumed that the number of killers must have 
equalled or exceeded the number of victims. There is certainly some correspondence 
between the range of victim estimates and Mamdani's 'hundreds-of-thousands-or more' 
claim. Yet this too exposes another set of untested assumptions: that the vast majority of 
victims were killed by machete and that all killings perpetrated by machete were 
perpetrated by civilians. Independent and trained observers had not yet collected this kind 
of data at the time of Mamdani's book's publication?70 There was however a release of 
the preliminary results of a nationwide government study of the killings in the same year 
of the book's publication, which found that a small majority of victims were killed by 
machete (37,9 percent) as opposed to those killed by clubs (16.8 percent), firearms (14.8 
'7[ percent) and other methods.- The accuracy of these estimates has not been 
independently verified271 Mamdani's assumption that the vast majority of killings were 
perpetrated by machete is somewhat at odds with his claims that the civil defence units -
which "fOImed the civilian core of the machinery that came to carry out the genocide" -
were armed (or were supposed to be anned) with firearrns/guns.273 Furthermore, while he 
acknowledged the role of the army, he gave little attention to how many killings could 
have been perpetrated by it.274 
Local level quantitative and qualitative empirical research on the confessed perpetrators 
of the genocide has posed some serious challenges to some of Mamdani's assumptions 
about mass popular participation from ordinary civilians. Straus's study of perpetrators 
suggested that the killings were perpetrated by a minority of Hutu civilians (about 
270 Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan Genocide," 88. 
271 Ministt.~re de l'Administration locale, de I'Information et des Affaires socials, RepuhJique Rwandaise, 
Dellombremellt des Victims du Gimocide: Rapport pnHi11linaire (Kigali: Ministere de 1 'Administration 
locale, de I'lnfonnation el des Affaires sociales, Republic Rwandaise, Decembre 2001), 26, cited in 
Melvern, 252; Ministere de l'Administration locale, de I'Infomlation el des Affaires socials, Repuhlique 
Rwandaise. DCllombremell1 des Victims dll Genocide: Rappol'tjillol (Kigali: Ministere de J'Administration 
locale, de l'Infonnation et des Affaires sociales, Republic Rwandaise, Novcmbre 2002), 26, cited in Straus, 
"How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan Genocide," 88. 
:!7:! Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan Genocide," 88. 
27) Mamdani, 206. 
m Ibid. , 206,207. 
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200,000, a much lower range of the 'hundreds of thousands' than Mamdani seems to 
have had in mind) and that there were varying degrees of participation in the killings: 
ordinary civilians seemed to have killed less people than those who were part of the 
party-based civilian militias and the civil defence units.275 Straus urged that the category 
of perpetrators be disaggregated and investigated as such.276 Similarly, .lean Hatzfeld's 
interviews with confessed perpetrators in Nyamata Commune in Kigali Prefecture 
(eastern Rwanda) challenge to a certain degree Mamdani' s assumptions about the 
universal patticipation of Hutu civilians across age, sex and class divides?77 Perpetrators 
in Nyamata asserted that killing was 'men's work' and that women's participation in 
killing was proscribed (even though some did want to kill and some did kill, supporting 
the fact that there was some Hutu approval of the killings).278 Mamdani claimed that "a 
disproportionate number of the educated played a leading role" in the killing of Tutsi ; 
Hatzfeld's interviews revealed that some members of the educated middle class paid for 
the privilege of not having to kill or paid servants "so as not to dirty themselves.,,279 
3.2.2. Explaining "Popular" Agency: The Role of Political Identity in the Pe/petratian of 
"Genocide" and other Mass Killings 
Mamdani's contention was that Hutu civilian masses killed the Tutsi and the Hutu 
perceived to be their accomplices out of feat· of what they believed the Tutsi to be280 To 
understand the conversion of the Tutsi from an etlmic ' neighbour' of the Hutu to a group 
whose extennination was deemed vital, Mamdani asserted that one needed to understand 
how the categories of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' were constructed as opposing political identities 
during Rwanda's colonial era (1894-1961), the Hutu "Social Revolution" (1959-1962) 
:m Straus, "How Many Perpetrators were in the Rwandan Genocide, 95 
27CJ Ibid. 
277 Mamdani, 225. The evidence presented by Mamdani did suggest that the panicipation of women and 
children (both girls and boys) over seven years was lower relative to the participation ofHutu adult men. 
211i Jean Hatzfeld, A Tinze/or A1aclzetes: Tile Rwandan GelIocide: The Killers Speak, translated from the 
French by Linda Coverdale (London: Serpent's Tail, 2008), 10 I, 103. Women were allowed or even 
expected to carry out the looting of the possessions of the dead, meaning that there was a division of labour 
of sorts. 
'" Testimony of Marie-Chantal, quoted in Hatzfe ld, 67. 
280 Mamdani, 14, 191 . Mamdani stressed that the Hutu masses acted out of fear and not out of hatred for 
the Tutsi. Thus, Longman's assessment that Mamdani was among the authors who believed "that ethnic 
hatred was the primary force motivating the genocide" was incorrect. Longman. 36. 
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and during the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994).281 This requires the reader to first grasp 
Mamdani's theoretical framework concerning genocide and political identity. 
a) Tile Intersectioll qf Mamdani 's Concept qf Genocide and TileOl)' of Political Identity 
The Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide on the basis of the perpetrators 
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such. ,,2S2 For Mamdani, genocide is both the intention and the partial or complete 
fulfilment of the intention to extinguish a specific population group identified for killing 
purposes as a race.2S3 Thus the distinction between the killing of Tutsi and Hutu in 1994 
was both the greater number of Tutsis killed and the branding of the Tutsi as a race 
group, whereas the Hutus were killed as individual Tutsi "accomplices,,284 Mamdani 
asserted that it was the mass participation of ordinary civilians that made the difference 
between "a suing of massacres perpetrated by death squads" and genocide2ss The 
implication is that the difference between a massacre and a genocide is in the numbers 
killed;2s6 and yet he gives no clear indication of what number of deaths would constitute 
a massacre and how many massacres would constitute genocide. 
The bulk of Mamdani' s attention was dedicated to explaining how and why the 
perpetrators would define a group as an enemy race whose extermination was 
necessary.287 This explanation is relayed through the theory of political identities. In 
advancing the theory of political identity, he implicitly or explicitly rejected or other wise 
rethought a number of ideas about how human beings are organised into racial, ethnic or 
28' Mamdani, 14, 70-71. 
2R2COllllClltioll!or,he PrCl1elllioll und Punishment a/the Crime o.(Gellocide. Approved and Proposed for 
Signature and Ratification or Accession by General Assembly Resolution 260 A (Ill) of9 December 1948. 
Entry into force January 1951 , in Accordance with Article X1I1, Article 2 [Online]. Available: 
hnp:/lwww.unhchr.ch/html /menu3/b/p!!elloci.htm [2007, November 28]. 
2113 Mamdani. 5, 13, 14,225. 
'" Ibid., 5. 
'" Ibid., 225. 
lU, Elisa G. von Joeden-Forgey, review of When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism al1d the 
Genocide il1 Rwanda, by Mahmood Mamdani, H-Gel1ocide H-Nc( Reviews (June 2002): 8 [Online]. 
Available: Imp: l/www.h-net.or!.!ireviews/showrev.php?id=6365 [2009, April 2]. 
::!H7 Mamdani, 9. 
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national groups288 He neither accepted nor rejected the validity of the claims of some in 
the natural sciences that race was a "technical biological" concept and that human racial 
dimensions could be scientifically measured; 289 rather his theory of political identities is 
more concerned with how the State would use supposed racial differences as the basis of 
organising its citizens or subjects into hierarchies. He rejected the ideas that were put 
fOlward by social scientists within the two major schools of thought about ethnicity: 
primordialism and instrumentalism. He rej ected the primordialist proposal that nations 
and etlmic groups are naturally-occurring units that have always divided the human 
species as definitively as sex or geography.29o He therefore rejected the primordialist 
argument that "ancient hatreds" or socio-biological differences between groups were the 
reason why extreme political violence occun'ed between communal groups - of which 
genocide is one manifestation. Similarly, he rejected the instmmentalist proposal that 
ethnic and national units are an outcome of elite manipulation in the elites' struggle for 
wealth, power and prestige.291 Therefore, he rejected the argument that extreme political 
violence between groups was a str'ategy by which group elites pursued their interests. 
Mamdani argued that racial and ethnic groups need to be considered as political 
identities?92 Political identities are the result of the history of state formation. 293 In the 
modem state, political identities are inscribed in law and are thus legally enforced. Those 
that the law recognises as members of an ethnic group become ethnic beings legally and 
those that the state recognises as members of an ethnic group become ethnic beings 
institutionally. Those whom the law recognises as members of a racial group have a 
relationship to the state and other legally defined groups that is mediated tlu'ough the law 
m Ibid., 15. 
289 Mamdani, 41-50. See also: William A. Haviland, Anthropology, glh ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt 
Publishers, 2000), 348-355; J Milton Yinger, "Ethnicity," Allllllal Review oiSociologv 11 (1985): 159. 
[Electronic]. Available from JSTOR at hlip:l/lVwlV.jslOr.orc [2005 , October 31]. Yinger supported the idea 
that geneticists can measure the dimensions of race with "sophisticated instruments", while Haviland 
argued that efforts to biologically group humans into separate races have been futile. 
2
l
JUMamdani, 15; Anthony Smith, The Eth1lic Origins aINations (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell , 
1986), 12; Randall J. Blimes, "The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War 
Onset," .lollmal of'Collf/icl Resollllioll 50, no.4 (2006): 537; Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: 
Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States. and the Onset of War, 1820-1987," Journal qf Conflict Resollltion 
41, no. 5 (1997): 655. 
2lJlMamrlani, 15; Smith, 8: Blimes. 537; Henderson. 656. 
292 Ibid. , 20. 
293 Ibid., 22. 
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and the state.294 When the law defines one's inclusion and exclusion from a regime of 
rights or entitlements - including one's participation in state-organised institutional and 
political life - on the basis of one's race or ethnic group, then it becomes a central 
defining fact for one as an individual and for one's designated group.295 Mamdani further 
stated that political identities demarcate the parameters of the political community (hence 
distinguishing between those who belong and those who do not), which in the modem 
state has meant the differentiation between the aliens/settlers/non-natives and the 
natives/indigenous people.296 The distinctions of race or ethnicity on the one hand and 
native or settler on the other hand are mutually reinforcing and it is usually some 
combination of the two constructs that is the basis of group allocation of rights and 
privileges as well as the basis of inter-group violence297 For Mamdani, there are only 
two kinds of genocide: a settler's genocide entailing an alien race's extermination of a 
native race in the process of the alien race's settlement on the native race's land; and a 
native's genocide entailing a native race's extermination of an alien race of settlers298 
There were some objections to Mamdani's theoretical framework. One revIewer saw 
Mamdani's definition of genocide "on the basis of the effectiveness of the perpetrators in 
carrying out annihilation" as being 'dangerous' .299 At the same time, Mamdani did not 
provide any indication of how he assessed the "effectiveness" of the annihilation. 
Another reviewer pointed out that Mamdani's discussion of genocide did not include 
references to the major pioneering scholars on genocide and rejected the argument that 
genocide can only happen where the victim group has been constructed as an alien race 
(and not when the victim group is constructed as an ethnic group)300 Overall, the real 
2'14 Ibid. 
2'l5 Ibid. 
29" Ibid., 23-24, 27-31 
2'17 See Marndani 's discussion of the citizenship crisis in Uganda involving the descendants of the Rwandan 
Tutsi refugees: Mamdani, 170-184. See also: Anthony D. Smith, The Nation ill History: His/Or;ograp!rical 
Debates abolll EI/Iflicirv alld Noliollo/ism (Cambridge and Oxford: Historical Society of Israel, 2000), 6. 
"" Ibid. , 10-14. 
2'll) Von Joeden-Forgey, 8. 
300 Rene Lemarchand, UA History of Genoc ide in Rwanda," review of When Victims Become Killers: 
Colonialism. Nativism alld 'h e Genocide ill Rwanda, by Mahmood Mamdani, .Jollmal of 1{{ricQII History 
43,no. 2(2002): 307,3 10. 
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question was to what extent Mamdani's theoretical framework was applicable to the 
"Rwandan genocide" against the Tutsi in 1994. 
b) The Rwandan Conlext 
Mamdani argued that the "Rwandan genocide" was a native's genocide30] In order to 
understand how the Hutus had come to identify themselves as natives and to target the 
Tutsi as an alien race of settlers, one had to trace the development of the 'Hutu' and 
'Tutsi ' identities through the history of the formation and evolution of the Rwandan 
State.302 In this regard, Mamdani utilised a broad range of literature on the history of the 
Rwandan people. Sources included race-centred colonial scholarship of the colonial and 
the 'more balanced' post-colonial scholarship of reputable Rwanda scholars such as 
Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, Rene Lemarchand and others.103 Mamdani 
explained that, for a little over a century prior to German and Belgian colonisation, the 
Tutsi had been a privileged stratum of Rwandan society on the basis of having a common 
ethnic political identity as the Tutsi monarchy and mistocracy· of the Rwandan pre-
colonial state304 European colonial administrators and historians conceived of the Tutsi 
as Hamites, that is, black-skinned 'aliens' of Semitic and/or Caucasian origin who had 
conquered the Hutu 'Negroid' masses and whose civilising influence had brought about 
the centralised Rwandan kingdom305 This classification of the Tutsi was the basis for the 
justification of the creation of a Tutsi middle class with a minor share in the colonial 
~Ol Mamdani, 14. 
)02 Ibid. 
)03 Mamdani, xm. I list only a few examples here from Mamdani's endnotes: Colonial/early post~colonial 
scholarship: Jacques J. Maquel, The Premise q( iuequaliry ill Ruanda: A Study oj Political Relatiolls ill a 
Celllral;!/i"icoll Killgdom (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), ciled in Mamdani, 290; A Pages, Au 
Rwanda, sur Ie bard du Lac Kivu (Congo Beige): Un Royaume Hamile au centre de l'Afrique (Brussels: 
IRCB, 1933) ciled in Mamdani. 302. Post-colonial scholarship: Calharine Newbury, The Cohesioll of 
Oppression: Clielllsliip (Iud Etlmicity il1 Rwanda, 1860-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989), Mamdani, 294; David Newbury, David Newbury, "The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical 
Hypothesis," }~fi"ica 5, no. 4 cited in Mamdani. 290. Rene Lemarchand, Rwa11da and Burundi (New York: 
Praeger, 1970), ciled in Mamdani, 293. 
"" Mamdani, 63-71. 
305 Ibid., 79-80, 87-88. 
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administration, while the Hutu became the serf-like servants/labourers of both Europeans 
and the Tutsis. 306 
Given that legal definitions frame power-enforced political identities that are defined 
"from above" and constitute the starting point of identities forged "from below", the Hutu 
call for independence from European colonial rule and struggle against Tutsi feudal - type 
subjugation began with the recognition that the Hutu majority were the recognised racial 
and etlmic natives of Rwanda and the rightful heirs to the postcolonial state.307 Mamdani 
asserted that the 1959 Hutu 'social revolution ' and surrounding events were the means by 
which the emerging Hutu counter-elite and the Hutu peasant masses finally rejected both 
the privileged Tutsi classes (monarchy, aristocracy and professional middle class) and 
ordinary Tutsis as a race of alien settlers who were to be denied rights and privileges in 
the postcolonial Rwandan State.30B In the ensuing violence (1959-1962) the Tutsi 
monarchy was ejected and Tutsis were either killed or forced to flee Rwanda3 09 Within 
the first Hutu Republic (under President Gregoire Kayibanda) the remaining Tutsi 
population was allowed to remain as an alien minority with no citizenship rights, 
subjected to reprisal killings each time the Tutsi exiles attempted to return to Rwanda 
(1963-1964}.31O 
Under the Second Republic, President Juvenal Habyarimana redefined the Tutsi as an 
indigenous/native group entitled to the rights and privileges that were deemed to be 
proportional to their umber as an ethnic minority.3I1 However, his policy did not solve 
tlle problem of the descendants of the Tutsi exiles and refugees of the 1960s, who were 
denied citizenship in the neighbouring Afiican States where their parents had sought 
refuge.312 11 was within the context of this African citizenship crisis that tlle RPFfRPA 
was created and within this context that the RPF launched an attack which would he the 
"" Ibid .• 71. 
' 07 Ibid., 14, 13, 103-104, 116-119. 
' D< Ibid. 
' 09 Ibid., 123 
31 . Ibid., 126-131. 
J II Ibid. 189. 
m Ibid., 155-157. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
62 
means by which the Tutsi refugees could 'return' to Rwanda, their 'ancestral land,]13 
The RPF invasion gave the Hutu extremists in and around government and the army who 
were opposed to Habyarimana 's ethnic reconciliation policy an opportunity to bring back 
to the fore of the public imagination the idea of Tutsis as an invading alien race whose 
objective was to subject all Hutus to servitude. These Hutu extremists used the mass 
media to reach the masses, namely in the form of the radio station Radio-Television Libre 
des Mille Col/ines (RTLM) and the newspaper Kangllra.314 The Hutu civilian masses 
voluntarily killed the Tutsis out of fear that the Tutsi RPF would force them into 
servitude just as the Tutsi monarchy and aJistocracy had done in the pre-colonial and 
colonial era.315 This fear was especially fuelled by a major RPFIRPA offensive in 1993 
and was then ignited by the killing of President Habyarimana, which Hutu extremists 
attributed to the RPF. 316 Hutu individuals (both the political moderates and others 
opposed to the killing of Tutsis) were killed as suspected collaborators in the alleged 
Tutsi domination plan. It appears then, that Mamdani located popular agency in the 
collective self-identification of the Hutu as natives who saw their mission "as one of 
clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence" embodied by the Tutsi group.317 
Critics of Mamdani's work have claimed that the applicability of Mamdani's theoretical 
framework to the Rwandan context is questionable.318 Lemarchand asselted that the 
native/settler divide was not a feature of the 1959 "Social Revolution", which 
Lemarchand claimed was aimed at the Tutsi monarchy and aristocracy rather than at the 
Tutsi as a group.319 Lemarchand further asserted that Mamdani's concentration on the 
argument that the Hutus 'as natives' attacked the Tutsis 'as an alien race of settlers 
underplayed the fact that the killings were a Hutu extremist tactic to abort the Arusha 
3IJ Ibid. , 159-184. 
314 Ibid. , 190-191,209,212, 222. 
315 Ibid., 191. 
'16 Mamdani, 203-204. 
311 Ibid .. 14. 
31 8 Lem~rchand, review of Wh en Victims Become Killers , 308; Longman, 36; Charles K. Mironko, "Ibitero: 
Means and Motive in the Rwandan Genocide," JvJacmillall Celller Genocide SllIdies Pape/:\' 23(2004): 174-
175. [Online] . Available: http://I 2 ~.36.D6.77/\Vorkp,,per/pdr'!GS"9.pdf [2007. December I]. 
3 19 Lemarchand, review of When Victims Become Killers, 308. See also Johan Pottier, who makes the same 
argument as Lemarchand: lohan Pottier" Re-imagillil1g Rwanda: COJ!flict, SlIn1ival (Illd DisiJ!(ormatioll ill 
'he Late Twentieth Ce11tury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 124. 
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peace agreement between the Rwandan coalition government and the RPF.320 Charles 
Mironko argued that Mamdani over-estimated the role of the individual agency of the 
Hutu civilians who killed, ignoring the role of built-in coercive structures within 
Rwandan communities that made it difficult for ordinary people to refuse to partake in 
the killings.32J Although Hatzfeld was not a critic of Mamdani 's work, his original 
empirical research also revealed that - in some localities - there were very real penalties 
for males who did not participate.322 For Longman the problem was that even if the Hutu 
extremist organisers of the Tutsi genocide had "sought to demonize Tutsi as alien 
interlopers, it is unclear how widely the general population accepted these 
characterisations.,,323 Overall, Mamdani's theory required that the extent of Hutu civilian 
participation be established and that the acceptance of Hutu extremist propaganda at the 
grassroots level be investigated. This is where original empirical research on Mamdani's 
part was most needed. 
3.3. Melvern: The Rwandan Civil Defence Programme and the Genocide 
Conspiracy 
In the preface of her book, Melvern introduced her central argument (which also alluded 
to in the book title): the Rwandan genocide of 1994 had been the result of a longstanding 
genocide conspiracy among a segment of Rwanda' s Hutu elite within the government and 
the army324 She had new information and material that "shed new light on how tile 
genocide was planned ... " and how the "conspirators .... determined that genocide and the 
racist ideology that underpinned it should become a part of government policy."n; The 
new material consisted of: a melange of documents from the Rwandan army and 
government (the Hutu regime preceding the Tutsi dominated RPF-Ied administration of 
32(J Lemarchund, review of When Victims Become Killers, 309. 
'" Mironko, 174-175; 192-195. 
322 Hatzfeld. 65-70. The perpetrators interviewed in Hatzfeld 's study spoke mostly of heavy fines and much 
less of death as punishment (although this did occasionally occur). The importance of monetary fines must 
be assessed in the context of widespread poverty among the Hutu peasants, as pointed out by the 
perpetrators who claimed that the rich had no problem paying the fines. 
32J Longman 36. 
324 Melvern, Conspiracy to A4ul'dcr, Xill-XIV. 
325 Ibid. 
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Rwanda), which were abandoned in Kigali when the army and government fled from the 
advancing RPA to the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire); 
and the evidence submitted by the office of the Prosecution in a number of high-profile 
cases at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), particularly the MilitclI), 
Olle Ttial of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and other high ranking military officers (also 
known in the abbreviated form ' the Prosecutor versus Bagosora el al. ,).326 Melvern 
further added that some of the documents she had gathered in Kigali were submitted as 
evidence in court (specifically the Military One trial).327 
Since the publication of Melvern ' s book, the ICTR has concluded many of its major 
cases and the judgements are publicly available from the ICTR's website. The 
Prosecution has not been successful in proving a genocide conspiracy in the cases of the 
two individuals that Melvern argued were the kingpins of the "Akazu" (Hutu extremist) 
plan of genocide: Colonel Bagasora (former directeur de cabillel in the Rwandan 
Ministry of Defence) and Protais Zigiranyirazo. 328 In both cases, the respective Chambers 
noted that the charge of ' conspiracy to commit genocide' was largely based on 
circumstantial evidence and ruled that a genocide conspiracy was not the only reasonable 
conclusion that could be inferred from the evidence. 329 The Prosecution had therefore 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were involved in a genocide 
conspiracy.33o The availability of the judgements presents this review of Melvern 's 
32& Ibid. , XlV, 280-281. See also: Th e Proseclilor versus Tlu}ol1eslc Bagosora. Graljell Kabiligi. Aloys 
Ntaball1/ze and AHatole Nscngiyul1lva, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, ludgement and Sentence (18 December 
2008) [Online]. Available: 
hnp:llwwww .unictr.or!!/Portals/OfCase/Enuiish/Ba£!osoraJ.lud!!ementiOS 121 S.ndf [2010, January 10] . 
327 Melvem, Conspiracy 10 All/rder, XlV: Linda Melvern, "Biography", Li1lda !vle/verll , investigative 
JOllmalist, (2006). [Online]. Available: htlp://ww\\'. lindamelvem.com/bio.lllm [2008, May 6]. Melvem is 
not explicit about her involvement in the Military One trial, but on her website. it is specified that she was a 
consultant to the Military One Prosecution teem 
328 Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 22-23 , 29, 30, 31 , 33, 11 8, 124, 280-2 84. "Akazu" is the name that 
prosecution witnesses have used to refer to the small group ofHutu extremisL~ who allegedly conspired and 
r:lanned to commit the TUlsi genocide. See Proseclllor versus ZigiralIyirazo, paragraphs 98-103. 
::! !) ProsecllIor versl/s Bagosora et ai. , paragraphs 2110-2113; Prosecllfor versus Zigiral1yirazo, paragraphs 
388-395. 
330 See also: The ProseClilor verslls Pr01a;s Z;g;rG1~virlCo. Case No. ICTR-01-73-A, Appeal Judgement (1 6 
November 2009), paragraphs 63-74 [Online J. Available: 
hltp :l!ww\\'. lInic lr.o r~p{lrtalslO/Case/E lu!1 ish/Zi!!iranvirazoidec isions!09 1 I 16.pdf [2010, January 24]. 
Having initially been found guilty of genocide and not guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, 
Zigiranyirazo has since been acquitted of all charges due to certain errors in the Trial Chamber's 
consideration of exculpatory evidence. 
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argument of a genocide conspiracy with a disadvantage and advantage. On the one hand, 
it may be argued that the reviewer has a retrospective bias against the book because the 
outcomes are now largely known]31 On the other hand, the ICTR judgements provide an 
extemal source by which to assess Melvern's evidence and arguments. In order to 
balance out the retrospective bias, this study has consulted some critical reviews written 
shortly after the book's first and second editions were published (in 2005 and 2007 
respectively). 331 
Straus (mentioned in the Mamdani review above), an experienced scholar in the study of 
the 1994 Rwandan mass killings, appreciated the book's first edition for its "fresh details, 
anecdotes and evidence about the fateful months just prior to ... the genocide."m He 
criticised the book for making claims about a genocide conspiracy that were not 
developed within the body of the book. Lars Waldorf, with a background in journalism 
and International Human Rights Law, similarly expressed that the revised edition was not 
successful in showing a genocide conspiracy.334 He conceded that the lCTR had not yet 
proved a conspiracy either and pointed out that the high-level trials were ongoing; 
perhaps implying that Melvern's role was limited to reporting the ICTR Prosecution's 
arguments. Both voiced concerns about her seemingly uncritical reliance on the lCTR 
Prosecution's witness testimonies and documentary evidence, in view of general 
concerns about source credibility in the Rwandan context of violence. The latter 
criticisms about Melvern's evidence raise important questions about what is expected 
from a journalistic account. While it is clear that critical source evaluation is a critical 
33 1 This minor dissertation was meant to be finished some months before the judgements were made, but 
there were unforeseen delays. 
332 There are minor differences between the two editions. The 2006 edition has a preface and an extra 
chapter entitled "Judgements", which contains infommlion about the progress of the ICTR cases. The 2004 
edition has a chapter entitled "Ten Years Later." 
333 Scott Straus, review of COl1jpiracy to Afllrder: the Rwandan Genocide, by Linda Melvern, Political 
Sciellce Quarter!v 120. no. 2 (2005): 349 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHoSI at: 
hup:liwww.lib.uct.ac.za.czpro.\ v.ucLac.za/i ndex.php?h 1m 1=/1 i bs/dbases/plat forms. ill m& lib id=8 S [2009, 
October 6]. 
334 Lars Waldorf. review of C01lspiracy to A1I1l'del': Tire Rwanda1l Genocide, by Linda Melvern, l~rl'icall 
Studies Review 50, no. 1 (2007): 145-147 [Online]. Available: 
hllo:/lfindal1icles.com/oial1ic1es/mi 0"410n/is 200704/ai 1121278694 [2009, OClOber 7]; York School of 
Law, "Lars WaldorF," U"iversity q(York, (last updaled 19 November 2009) [Online]. Available: 
hUp: //www. \lork.rIc .1lk/law/s Lnfrls laffprofile(~;!:;OL V/ .hlin [2010, January 16]. 
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part of an investigative journalist's work, it is unclear to what extent the journalist has a 
duty to show how she/he evaluated her sources within the finished product (be it an 
article, book or broadcast)3J5 Nevertheless, it would have been to the book's benefit for 
Melvern to demonstrate the credibility and/or authenticity of her evidence in some way. 
With both the ICTR judgements and the critical views in mind. this study suggests that 
both the lCTR Prosecution and Melvel11's arguments failed for the same reason: a 
genocide conspiracy was not the only or primary reasonable inference to be drawn from 
the circumstantial evidence and the facts. It further suggests that with the symbiotic 
relationship of mutual information-sharing between the Prosecution and Melvern makes 
it very difficult to distinguish between their respective arguments. Both the Prosecution's 
case and Melvern 's genocide conspiracy argument consist of several complex parts. It is 
impossible to scrutinise every part within the length limits of this study; however a 
detailed investigation of all parts is a worthwhile future project. Thus only one of these 
parts is examined in this study, a part which also stands as a self-contained argument of a 
genocide conspiracy: Melvern's discussion of the creation of the "civil defence 
programme".336 
A superficial glance at Melvel11 's end notes does seem to suggest that Melvel11 's 
'genocide conspiracy' claim relies more on the ICTR testimonies she gathered than on 
the military and govemment documents that she "gained access to", possibly raising 
doubts about the book being a hallmark of investigative journalism. However, the limited 
scope of this review on Melvel11's book allows one to see the small but significant 
contributions that the military and govemment documents have made in providing 
335Theordore L. Glasser and lames S. Ettema, "Investigative Journalism and the Mornl Order," Critical 
Smdies ill J\1ass Communication 6, no. 1 (1989): 10 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHost at: 
Im p:/lw\Vw. 1 ib .ucl .ac.zu.ezprox v. lICt. Lie .zalindex.php?html=/1 ibs/dbasesiplatfolln~ . Itt m& I ib id=8 S [2009. 
April 16]; Murray Levine, "Investigative Reporting as a Research Method: An Analysis ofBemstein and 
Woodward 's All the President Men," Alllerican Psychologist 35, no. 7 (1980): 627, 629, 633 [Electronic] . 
Available from EbscoHost at: 
http://www. lib.tlel-ae.zLl.ezproxv.llc\.<lc.za/ indcx.php .? htll1l=/ libs/dbases/nlmlorms.htm& 1 ibid=R S (2009. 
April 16); David Yau Fai Ho, Rainbow Tin.Hung Ho, and Siu Man Ng, "Investigative Research as a 
Knowledge-Generation Method: Discovering and Uncovering," Journallor rheory q( Social Behaviour 36, 
no. I (2006): 23-24 [Electronic]. Available from EbscoHost at: 
hrto:! Iww\\' .1 ib .lI ce .<lc.za.ezorox v. uct. riC .Z<l/ i ndex. php?htm 1=/1 ihs/dbases/pJ atf onllS .he m& I i hid=88 [2009, 
April 16]. 
3J6 Melvern, Conspiracy 10 A1urder, 20. 
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infonnation about the proposed martial training and anmng of the State-created civil 
defence units prior to the implication of civil defence-trained civilians in the mass killing 
of unanned civilians in 1994.337 Furthernlore, Melvern's appm'ent success in finding 
ICTR officials who "broke convention" and "took the risk" of providing her with a copy 
of convicted fonner Rwandllil Prime Minister Jean Kambanda's "sealed I, 800-page 
inten-ogation" (which she used in documenting the details of the creation and expllilsion 
of the civil defence programme)33R could also be viewed as a spectacular journalistic feat: 
it means that she was the first to get the 'inside story,.339 It also raises some potentially 
serious legal and ethical concerns about how she received the evidence and whether she 
was protecting her sources by being vague about the details of how she acquired the 
evidence. 34u All the same, this review attempts to show that the presentation of 'fresh' 
evidence alone is insufficient to make an argument of genocide conspiracy. 
There is no dispute on any side that civilians anned and trained under the State-created 
civil defence programme were among the civilian militias that can-ied out "genocide" 
against Tutsi and killings against other unanned civilians in April-July 1994, even though 
there are important gaps in the infOlmation about the extent of the implementation of the 
programme and there is acknowledgement of the difficulty of empirically distinguishing 
civil defence members from the party-controlled militias such as the Inlerahamwe.34 I 
There is also no dispute that Bagosora and other military officers were involved in the 
creation of this programme.342 The point of dispute (as far as arguments of the presence 
or absence of a genocide conspiracy are concerned) is whether the programme was 
337 Please pay attention to the footnotes in the discussion to follow, particularly under subsection 3.3.1, 
points a and c. 
338 Again, please pay attention to the footnotes in subsection 3.3.1. 
339 Melvern, Conspiracy to 1vlurder, 357. 
340 See Murray Levine, "Investigating Reporting as a Research Method: An Analysis of Bemstein and 
Woodward," American PSl'cilO/Ogisl 35, no. 7 (1980): 627; Laurence B. Alexander. "Looking Out for the 
Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest 
Need of Protection for Sources and Infonnation." Yale Law and Policy Review 20, no. 97 (2002): 103. 
341 Ibid., 240-241; ProseclIlor versus Bagosora et al., paragraphs 458-459, 488-492. See also: Mamdani, 
206; Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave Nalle 10 Tell Ihe SIO/)', 11-14; Human Rights Watch and 
FIDH, Shallered Lives, 12-13. 
342 Prosecutor versus Bagosora et aI., paragraphs 454-455, 494-495: Melvern, COllspiracy to AIarder, 282. 
As seen in Melvern's account and the details of the Bagosora et al. case, under the charge of genocide the 
Accused generally denied that the civil defence members and civilian militias were acting under the 
authority of the Rwandan military in killing T utsis and other civilians in April-July 1994. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
68 
created with the intention to kill unarmed civilians, particularly to carry out a genocide 
against the Tutsi group343 The facts and evidence that Melvern presented about the civil 
defence programme are, for the most part, not the major problem in Melvern's account. 
However, her inferences that the programme was created with the intention of killing 
unanned civilians - particularly, of calTying out a "genocide" - are questionable. 
3.3.1. The Civil Defelice Programme 
aJ Origill and Expansion of the Civil Defence Programme 
The civil defence programme was created after the RPF invasion in October 1990.344 
Melvern claimed that "by all accounts plans were being laid in Rwanda for mass murder 
on a countrywide scale towards the end of 1990 just after the RPF invaded. ,,345 The idea 
of perpetrating genocide against the Tutsi as a response to invasion by the Tutsi-
dominated RPF "was spread in a series of secret meetings starting at the end of October, 
most of them taking place in Gisenyi prefecture" where the extremist Hutu elite (or 
"Akazu") were from. 346 Details concerning these secret meetings are scant within 
Melvern ' s account. Nevertheless, Melvern maintained that "it was clear to the planners 
that they would require many more people than just the police and army personnel.,,347 
She went on to claim that the civil defence programme was the means by which Rwandan 
society was militarised, which in turn "contributed to the speed of the killing in 1994.,,348 
Melvern's introduction suggests that the civil defence programme was designed 
specifically to help the extremists to carry out a genocide. However, the facts and 
'" Ibid. 
) 4-1 ICTR transcript., Interrogation of Jean Kambanda. cited in Melvern. Conspiracy to A111rder, 2, 21 , 288; 
Prosecutor versus Bagosora. paragraph 460. Jean Kambanda was the Prime Minister of Rwanda's interim 
government. Jean Kambanda confessed his pan in the interim government's implementation of the policy 
of genocide. 
)45 Melvern, Conspiracy to Nlllrder. 20. There is no direct citation provided, therefore it is unclear which 
accounts Melvern was talking about. 
:w, ICTR Prosecution testimony, Military One, Witness One, Witness ZF, cited in Meivem, COlljpira,:v ro 
Mllrder, 20, 288. 
J.t7 Meivem, COllspiracy to Ail/rder, 20. 
"" Ibid. 
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evidence she presented about the origins and expansion of the programme predominantly 
suggest that it was a legitimate response to RPFIRP A military onslaught by augmenting a 
weak Rwandan army with civilian forces349 The Rwandan ambassador to Zaire had 
recommended the programme in 1989, after completing an investigation that suggested 
that elements within the Tutsi diaspora were intending to attack Rwanda and that the 
Rwandan army was ill-prepared to meet tlus attack35() The recommendation came under 
serious government consideration only after the RPFIRPA attack in 1990. Melvern's 
account merely states that this was a programme to arm (and train) peasants in each cell, 
the smallest administrative division in Rwanda35\ Melvern did not clarify what number 
of peasants was to be armed in each cell and how many people a cell entailed. 
Contradictory evidence is then presented. On the one hand, there is documentation tlmt 
Colonel Agustin Ndindiliyirnana (then Minister of Defence) .submitted a proposal to 
President Habyarimana in 1991 to implement nationwide military training of civilians 
under the civil defence programme as soon as finances were available. J52 The evidence of 
an intention to implement a nationwide civil defence programme is supported in pmt by a 
similar nationwide civil defence plan outlined in 1993 within Colonel Bagosora's 
diary.353 However the plan in Bagosora 's diary was only drawn up following the renewed 
RPF onslaught in 1993 and seems to be a response to tills attack, rather than the mere 
following of a schedule. Other evidence suggests that the civil defence programme was 
initially intended to be of limited geographical scope. A witness is cited as claiming the 
existence of documentation detailing a plan for a civil defence· programme in which the 
capital city (Kigali) would receive the best protection; but "nothing had been provided for 
the parts of the country where the war with the RPF was not expected to take place.,,354 
This meant that the programme was meant to be confined to the northern prefectures tlmt 
bordered Uganda, from which the RPF IRP A had launched its attack. FUlther evidence 
' " Ibid. 
". Ibid. 
'" Ibid. 
H :! Rwandan Republic , Note to His Excellellcy the Presidellf. Subject: SlIIdy aIlhe AleclIls Necessaryfor 
Dqfellce alld to Allow the PoplI/(l{ioll to COIl11fer any Attack/rom Illside or Owside the COlllll,.y, undated. 
Col. Augustin Ndindiliyimana. Author's archive, cited in Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, 21,288. 
JS3 Melvern, COJ1!Jpiracy to ~fllrder, 44. 
354 ICTR transcript, Interrogation of Jean Kambanda, cited in Melvern, Conspiracy 10 All/reier, 48. 
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strongly suggests that the civil defence programme was a legitimate (though confidential) 
State project, rather than the well-kept secret of a few Hutu extremists. One reads, for 
example that as Rwanda went from a one-party government under the MRND/MRNDD 
to a multiparty coalition government (between 1991 and 1992), ministers from the 
MRNDD's opposition parties were also actively involved in civil defence strategising 
(after the 1993 RPFIRP A attack).355 Most strikingly, there is nothing in the evidence 
produced about the civil defence programme that unambiguously states that Tutsis 
residing in Rwanda were to be excluded. 
Melvern presented evidence that some Interailamwe members received military training, 
apparently using State resources and certain army personnel. J56 She further presented 
evidence that Interailamwe members were involved in the mass killing of Tutsi in 
Murambi Commune (east of Kigali) four months after Ndindiliyimana submitted his civil 
defence proposal in 1991 357 Other mass killings of Tutsis in other locations followed. 
Melvern appears to have been implying that the Interailamwe were trained under the civil 
defence programme and that the Inlera!lOlIlwe had used this training to kill the Tutsis in 
Murambi, as practice for the "genocide" that finally unfolded in 1994. However, there is 
no real evidence that the training and arming of Interailamwe was done under the State-
created civil defence programme. Neither is it proved that the killing of Tutsis in these 
pre-1994 instances were State-sanctioned, as such. It is with this understanding of the 
separation of the State from the party that one understands the Bagosora Defence's 
distinction between "the legitimate civilian self-defence system" and political party 
militias such as the Inlerailamwe. J58 It could be alternatively argued that the training of 
lnterahamwe was possibly the MRNDD's unsanctioned abuse of State resources, owing 
to the Party' s privileged access to the State sources.J59 
JSS Rwanda Republic, Ministry of Defence, National Gendannerie. Account of Meeting ofNmional 
Gendarmerie, Kigali, 27 March 1993, Author's Archive ciled in Melvern, Couspiracy 10 A/lirder, 43, 292 
356 ICTR Prosecution witness statement, KL. cited in Melvern, COllspirac.:v (0 Alurder. 26, 289; ICTR 
Prosecution Testimony, Military One. Omar Serushago, cited in Melvern, Conspiracy to Ail/reier, 26, 289. 
357 Andre Guichaoua, ed. , Les Crises Politiqlle,v au Burundi all Rwanda (1993-1994), Universite des 
Sciences el Technologies de Lille (Paris: Karthala, 1995).26,289, cited in Melvern, COl/spirac)' 10 MI/I'del', 
26. 
lSK The Proscclllor versus Bagosora el a/., paragraph 455. 
359 See Mamdani, 193. Mamdani made a similar argument, stating that it makes sense to see the pre-1994 
killing of TUlsis not as projects of the government itself, but of some Hutu extremisL<; within government. 
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b) The Definition o.fthe Enemy as sel Ollt in the Enemy Commission Report 
While the anny and government had already envisaged the civil defence programme 
by1990, the [onnal definition of the enemy of the state only occuned after the 
deliberations of the "Enemy Commission" in 4-20 December 1991360 Bagosora (who 
was involved in the civil defence programme) chaired the commission consisted of both 
of alleged 'extremist' ( "Akazu ") and 'moderate' high-ranking military officers. 361 The 
commission produced a report, of which only a few passages have been recovered to be 
admitted as prosecution evidence. 361 The passage containing the definition of the enemy 
was retrieved and is enough to convince Melvern that all Tutsi were branded as enemies 
and made genocide against them a feasible war strategy. The Enemy DocumentlReport is 
the central piece that grounds the other components of Melvern' s genocide conspiracy 
argument - induding civil defence. She also mentioned that the ICTR (Prosecution) 
traced the conspiracy's roots to it363 
The key 'enemy definition ' passage is quoted in Melvem's account as: 
"The principle enemy is the TUlsi ins ide or outside the country, extremist and nostalg ic for power and who 
has never recognised and wi ll never recognise the realities of the social revolution of 1959 and who want 
their power back by any means, including weapons.,,364 
The same passage appears somewhat differently in the Militw), One judge~enl, 
beginning with: "The principle enemy are the extremist [my emphasis] Tutsi inside or 
Still , rather than seeing the killings as practice for genocide, Mamdani saw the Tutsi as a hostage 
popUlation whose members were killed as a means to force concessions from the RPF/RPA o n the 
batt lefield and at the negOliation table. Genocide became an option once the extremists failed to get these 
concessions See also Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave NOlie to Tell the Story, 9. For Des Forges of 
Human Rights Watch, the civil defence programme was a means of recruiting young men for killing using 
administrative - rather than party - channels. The fear was that the Imeralllll1llVe militia was tainted by 
partisan riva lry. 
360 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave NOlie to Tel! the Story, 62, cited in Melvern, Conspiracy to 
A1urder, 23, 289; Prosecllfor versus Bagosora e[ al., paragraph 198. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Melvern, Conspiracy [0 .Murder, 23; The authenticity and authorship of tile document were 
acknowledged by the accused. See ProseClflor versus Bagllsora et al., paragraph 201. 
363 Melvern, Compiracy to At/lirc/cr, 23 . 
36-1 Venuste Nshimiyimana, Prelude du Genocide Rwandais. Enquete sur les Circonstances Politiques et 
Militaires du Meutre du President Habyarimana (Paris: Quorum, 1995), quoted in Melvern. COl1spiracy to 
At/urder, 23 . 
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outside the country ... ,,365 The positioning of the qualifying adjective "extremist" makes a 
difference in the meaning of the passage. Whereas Melvern 's citation implies that all 
Tutsis were State enemies as 'power-nostalgic extremists', the Militmy aile judgement 
citation implies that the Enemy Commission only identified extremist Tutsis as being the 
enemy. The Militw)' aile Trial Chamber therefore reasonably rejected the Prosecution 's 
argument that the passage implied that all Tutsis were extremists366 Viewed from the 
Chamber's clarification, the formal definition of the enemy was in appearance a 
legitimate military exercise to identify the predominantly Tutsi armed forces and possible 
collaborators who were attacking Rwanda at that point. It fails as evidence of a 
conspiracy to kill the Tutsi group as such. 
One fact appears to account for the discrepancy between the Chamber's and Melvern's 
citations: the original Enemy Document was written in French, and subsequently gave 
rise to different English translations.367 The Chamber pointed out that the Defence had 
criticised the Prosecution's translation of the definition of the enemy within its 
Indictments of the Accused found in the Indictments, following which the Prosecution 
submitted a corrected translation with the French original exhibit.368 One notes that 
Melvern quoted from a secondary source. One also notes that the enemy definition 
quoted by Melvern more closely resembles the Indictment tTanslation than it does the 
corrected translation quoted in the Chamber's judgement.369 
c) Th e Purchase of Machetes for ti,e Pwposes of Arming Civilians under the Civil 
Defence Programme 
365 Prosecution Exhibit 13.1 (Definition of the Enemy Document), quoted in Proseclltor verSllS Bagosora 
et al.. paragraph 202. 
366 Prosecutor verSliS Bagosora el al., paragraph 203. 
367 Ibid., footnote 232. 
]68 Ib id. 
]61) The Proseclltor agai11s! Theollesfc Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7-1, Amended Indictment (12 August 
1999). paragraph 5.6 [Online]. Available: 
http ://www ,uniclLof!:! /Ponals/OIC<ls(;"/En!! lish/Ba!!osoralindictlllcnt/ index.pd f [2011, January 30]. 
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Under a 1991 civil defence proposal, an estimated 87,000 guns were required to arm 
civilians under the civil defence programme. 370 The US$lOO million that government 
spent on military weapons between 1990 and 1993 was meant to meet this target. 
Melvern was suspicious of the plans to distribute firearms among civilians. She was even 
more suspicious of a ' "project" undertaken in 1993 by some unnamed Rwandan 
companies to import large quantities of agricultural tools such as: machetes, razor blades, 
nails, hoes, axes, screwdrivers, scythes, saws, spades, knives, pliers, pincers, scissors, 
hammers and shears.371 While she stated that these companies were not usually 
associated with agriculture, she showed no direct link between these companies, the civil 
defence programme and its creators.372 The only link she was able to show was that the 
owner of one of the companies was a shareholder in the ' hate radio' RTLM, much like 
Bagosora and some other high ranking military officers.373 Furthermore the fact that these 
individuals were shareholders in the radio station did not necessarily mean that they 
communicated with each other or that they "had a role in the shaping [the radio station's] 
broadcasts.,,374 She stated that through this agricultural import project, there was one new 
machete for every third male in the country by 1993. While there is no di spute that 
machetes were eventually used to kill Tutsi civilians in 1994, the evidence that Melvern 
presented about their acquisition is insufficient to draw the conclusion that these tools 
were Oliginally bought to kill civilians. The Prosecution 's expel1 witnesses (in the 
Military One case) similarly argued that the purchase of "traditional bladed weapons" for 
the civil defence programme indicated that the target was civilian rather than military.375 
The Defence's expert witness (an authority on civil defence programmes in Europe) 
asserted in a report that the use of traditional weapons reflected "the government's 
limited resources, the risks of having too many automatic weapons in circulation, and the 
need to discourage these forces from engaging better trained troopS.,,376 He claimed that 
370 Rwandan Republic, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet Minister to President, Sll~iec{: Arms/or the AlIlo-
D~rence of'he Population, Kigali (1 8 November 199 1), signed Colonel L. Rusatia, Aulhor's Archive. cited 
in Melvern, COIupiracy to All/rder, 57. 
371 Melvern. Conspiracy to lvfl/rder, 56. Melvern provided no source for this infommtion. 
312 Ibid. 
m Ibid. 
374 ProseCl/lor verSliS Bagosora, paragraph 642 . 
:m The Prosecutor versus Bagosora ct al., paragraph 484. 
376 Ibid., paragraph 486. 
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the role of civil defence units was typically to "focus on infiltrators, accomplices and 
looters. ,,377 The Chamber was satisfied that this assessment cast reasonable doubt on the 
argument that "traditional bladed weapons" were meant to be used to kill civilians, 
especially in view of one of the Prosecution witnesses' concession that not all people who 
were involved in the civil defence programme understood it as a scheme to kill Tutsis or 
h d· . '1' 378 ot er or mary CIVI Jans. 
3.3.2. Genocide clIld Conspiracy to Commit Genocide 
Melvern used the legal-technical definition of genocide as the objective standard by 
which to ground her argument of the presence of a longstanding genocide conspiracy by 
Hutu extremists against Rwanda's Tutsi group.379 If genocide is "the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" (through killing 
and other harmful acts against members of the target group), then a conspiracy to commit 
genocide is a secret agreement between two or more people regarding their shared 
intention to destroy the target group and "requiring a concerted plan of action" to bring 
about its destruction.38o In a strictly legal context, an argument of a genocide conspiracy 
that is supported with circumstantial evidence (evidence of people working together, 
suggesting an agreement amongst them to reach a common goal) rather tllan direct 
evidence (for example, proof of explicit statements from the accused of an agreement to 
commit genocide) must be able to show that genocide conspiracy is the only reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from the evidence.381 However, since Melvern 's work is a 
journalistic account rather than a legal argument and it is ultimately up to the readers to 
make up their own minds, it may be sufficient for Melvern to have shown that a genocide 
conspiracy is the strongest or primary inference to be drawn from the evidence she 
l17 Ibid. 
378 Ibid., paragraph 490. 
379 Melvern, Compiracy to AI/urder, A'V. A copy of the Genocide Convention is included as an appendix in 
the book. 
380 lbid. See also: the Prosec//lor verslis Bagasora et al., paragraph 2087-2088 . The judegement on this 
case contains a more precise and detailed legal-technical consideration of a conspiracy to commit genocide, 
which includes an explanation of the actus rells (criminal act perpetrated) and mens rea (criminal mental 
intent) of the crime. 
'" Ibid. , paragraph 2088. 
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presented. Since it has not been possible to analyse all the evidence that Melvern has 
presented in support of her argument of genocide conspiracy, it is only possible to make 
an assessment of the genocide conspiracy argument in relation to the establishment of the 
civil defence programme. 
The evidence that Melvern presented concerning the creation and expansion of the civil 
defence programme is entirely circumstantial. Melvern failed to show that the creators of 
the civil defence programme created it on the basis of an agreement that it would be used 
to perpetrate genocide against the Tutsis as a groupJH2 
3.4. Conclusion 
Mamdani and Melvern provided different approaches to the study of the Rwandan mass 
killings of April-July 1994. Mamdani's theoretical framework of genocide and identity-
driven violence was applied to evidence largely acquired from others. By examining 
Mamdani's work, it has been possible to identify the disadvantages of relying on the 
research of others and on an empirical record that is limited or compromised by the 
political motives of certain sources. Critics generally shared the view that Mamdani's 
work would have been more convincing had he attempted extensive original empirical 
research on the level of civilian participation in the killings. Mamdani's theoretical 
framework for explaining political agency and genocide has been questioned. Critical 
reviews furt.Jler suggest that his theoretical explanation would have been more persuasive 
had he attempted to test it - through local level empirical research - against competing 
theOJies on civilian pmiicipation. In contrast, Melvern's work is based on the discovery 
of new evidence about the early fonnation of the civil defence programme. Her attempts 
to infer that the creation and expansion of a civil defence progranmle signalled the 
development of a genocide conspiracy were unsuccessful because a genocide conspiracy 
was not the only - or the primary - inference that could be drawn from the presented 
evidence. 
'" See also Ibid., paragraph 2102 (v). 
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Chapter 4: Human Rights Watch/FIDH and Jones: Mass Sexual Violence against 
Women and Girls and the Mass Killing of Men and Boys in Rwanda during April-
July 1994 
4.1. Introduction 
Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and the Aftermath 
(hereinafter referred to as Shattered Lives)383 is among the first works to inquire into the 
incidence of the mass rape of Rwandan women during the April-July period of mass 
ki llingJ84 Together with Adam Jones's article "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda",385 it is 
among the few works that focus primarily on sex-selective or sex-specific violence in 
Rwanda that occurred during the outlined period. Each work is an example of advocacy-
orientated human rights reporting and scholarly analysis respectively. 
Slwttered Lives is based largely on empirical evidence collected through original 
empirical research, mainly testimonies of surviving victims. While its authors fulfilled 
the task of documenting incidents of sexual violence, it was not solely meant to be a 
descriptive account: like other human rights repolts, it came attached to urgent policy 
concerns peltaining to Rwandan women in the aftermath of the civil war and the violence 
perpetrated in the pursuit of genocide against the Tutsis. Chief among these concerns was 
advocacy for the investigation and prosecution of these crimes at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as within the Rwandan criminal justice 
383 Human Rights Watch and Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L 'Homme (FIDH) , 
Shattered Live,\'.' Sexual Violence dlIring the RWGndGil Gellodde (New York and Paris: Human Rights 
Walch and Federation Intemationale des Ligues des Droi ts de L'Homme, 1996),2-6. The report was 
written primari ly by Binaifer Nowrojee (main writer), Janel Fleischman (contributor) and Alison Des 
Forges (contributor) of Human Rights Watch using the resources of both Human Rights Watch and FIDH . 
38-1 Cynthia Enloe, "Crucial Reporting: Human Rights Reports and Why We Should All be Reading Them," 
review of Shattered Lives: Se'tua/ Violence dllri1lg the Rwandan Genocide; Leave None to Tell the Story: 
Genocide ill Rwanda; Hopes Betrayed: Th e TrajJicl...illg ofWomcn and Girls (0 Post-Conflict Bo.mia alld 
Herzegovinalor Forced Prostitution; Killing You is a Vel)! Easy Thing/or Us: Human Rig/us Abuses ill 
SOlltheast ;tfg/wnistan, by Human Right ... Watch, The Womeu's Review of Book'i 22, no. 5 (2004): 12. 
3~S Adam 1. Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," .Jollr1la/ qlGellocide Research 4, no. 1 (2002): 65-
94. 
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system. This entailed explaining the provIsIons In International Law and Rwandan 
Criminal Law that would make such prosecutions possible. 
The starting point of Jones's article is his recognition of the basic fact that, although 
exact numbers are not known, more males than females were killed in the April-July 
1994 campaign of genocide and other mass killing. Jones engaged in a polemical attack 
against Human Rights Watch, suggesting that the Shattered Lives authors had 
downplayed the significance of the mass killings of males (predominantly from the Tutsi 
group), even while the authors presented estimates that supported the assertion that males 
were overwhelmingly represented among the dead.3"" Neveltheless, there is basic 
agreement between both the Human Rights Watch and Jones 's accounts that men tended 
to be killed more frequently than women in 1994, a fact that is generally supported by 
surviving-victim testimonies found in both works. That said, it is noted that the 
testimonies on which Jones's analysis relies were collected through tlle original empirical 
research of otllers. Jones's efforts then, were not to produce 'new facts' or 'new empirical 
evidence' but to bring a new perspective into the interpretation of the existing evidence. 
Jones pointed out that gender analyses tend to be limited to violence against females, 
leading to the danger of gender being equated with females and assumptions that violence 
against men was gender-neutral.3•7 Jones introduced tl1e theoretical concept 'gendercide ' 
into scholarly discourse on the Rwandan mass killings of April-July 1994, developing the 
argument that the targeting of men and boys was deliberate and that the reasons for tins 
)R(, Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 2, cited in Jones, "'Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 
85. Human Rights Watch had claimed that the post-I994 Rwandan population was "70 percent female". 
The figure was based on a post-war Rwandan government census and was widely accepted as being 
relatively accurate for some time. The estimate, as written in Shattered Lives was quoted by both Jones and 
myself in our respective earlier works. In the light of subsequent government records, the re-appearance of 
Tutsi men assumed dead and the return ofHutu refugees, this estimate is outdated. In any event, I was 
unable to find a direct claim in the Shattered Lives report that the skewed demographic pattern was due to 
the killings alone, which is what Jones suggested was meant by the SliatIered Lives authors. See: Heather 
B. Hamilton, "Rwanda's Women: The Key to Reconstruct ion," Journal of Huma11itarian Assistance 
(2000): I , cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide," 85; Adam Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide," Jot//'llal 
o/Gel/ocide Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 189; Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi, " Indigenous Justice 
or Political Instrument? The Modem Gacaca Courts of Rwanda," in Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of 
Transitional Justice in Africa, eds., Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Scottsville: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), 309-310. 
J!!7 Jones , "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 87. 
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targeting could be traced to 'gendered' social beliefs about males .388 .lones's project 
began with the article "Gendercide and Genocide"JSO The article "Gender and 
Genocide" is meant to be an improvement on this previous work. 
4.2. Human Rights WatchIFIDH: Mass Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in 
Rwanda, April-July 1994 
4.2.1. Sexual Violence: Basic Facts, Empirical Evidence and Generalisations 
The authors introduced three terms that apparently refer to three distinct acts or forms of 
sexual violence: 'rape', 'sexual slave/}", and 'sexual mutilation ,.390 Within the report, 
these terms served simultaneously as empirical categories by which the authors organised 
surviving victim's testimonies as well as terms that referred to specific sexual violence 
crimes. The legal-technical status of these terms is discussed in subsection 4.2.2. In this 
subsection the discussion is limited to the consideration of the basic acts and 
circumstances represented under these empirical categories and generalisations about the 
widespread nature of these acts. 
a) Basic Facts alld Empirical Evidellce 
The authors explained that within the timeframe of April-July 1994, Hutu militiamen and 
soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF/FAR) perpetrated sexual violence against 
Tutsi women and girls on a massive scale.30 ] Some Hutu women and girls were similarly 
attacked, but on a much lesser scale. 392 Comparative estimates of the number of Tutsi and 
Hutu females subjected to sexual violence were unavailable. The only attempt to estimate 
the overall level of sexual violence was determined through statistical extrapolations 
based on the recorded number of pregnancies that doctors confirmed or suspected to have 
been the result of rape. On the determination that every hundred cases of rape result in 
388 R. Charli Carpenter, "Beyond 'Gendercide': Incorporating Gender into Comparative Genocide Studies," 
The Jlllel"lla/iollal.1olll"llol ~r HlIll/all Righls 6, no. 4 (2002): 78; Stuart D. Stein, "Geno- and Other Cides: A 
Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation,'" Journal a/Genocide Research 4, no. 1 (2002): 39. 
389 Adam J. Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide," .Iourl1al afGenocide Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 185-211. 
390 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Slwuercd Lilies, I 
)0 ' Ibid., 18 
J92 Ibid. , 65. 
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one pregnancy and given that the rape-produced pregnancies were estimated to be 
between 2,000 and 5,000, it was calculated that the number of rape cases was between 
250,000 and 500,000.393 However these estimates did not give any detail on the 
"principle and types of rape" (and, presumably, other forms of sexual violence)394 
No definition of rape was provided in the report. Instead what was offered is a list of 
different types of rape: individual rape (denoting the rape of one woman or girl by one 
man or boy); gang-rape (denoting the rape of one woman by a number of men); and rape 
with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun ban·els.395 Though hardly explicit, the 
general thrust of surviving witness testimonies within the report attested to fact that rape 
entailed some sort of penetrative sexual interaction inflicted by the perpetrator on the 
victim through physical force or through the threat of force or death against the victim or 
a third party (most notably, the victim's children)396 What the authors call "rape with 
objects" is the introduction of sharpened objects into the vagina of the victim, which was 
apparently done either to kill the victim (impalement) or as a tOlturoUS simulation of 
sexual intercourse wherein the sharp object is used in lieu of a penis. 397 What the authors 
termed 'sexual slavery', was essentially perpetual rape under conditions of prolonged 
confinement. 398 There were two kinds of sexual slavery: collective sexual slavery and 
individual sexual slavery. Collective sexlial slavel), was described as the militiamen's 
393United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report 011 the SiIllGt;Ol1 of 
Human Rig/us in Rwanda Submitted by /IIfr R. Degni- Segui, Special Rapponeur q(lite Commissioll 011 
Hlllllall Rig/lis IIlIder paragraph 20 a/the resoilitioll S-3/ l 0/25 May 1994, UN Doc. ElCN.411 996/68,( 29 
January 1996), paragraph 16 [Online]. Available: 
http: //w\vw.unhchr.ch/I-Iuridoccia/H u ridoea. nsf/Of aee~ ffRncl005e2 f680'l 5116 G0040a 9 5a,? Opendllcument 
[2010, June 20], quoted in Human Righls Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives , 24. 
39-1 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 24 
395 Ibid., 30-34. 
3911 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 44, 46, 65 . See for example the testimony of 
"Perpetue" who begged not to be raped but was nevertheless beaten and raped. See also the testimony of 
"Marie-Claire" who stated that to "survive, you had to let yourself be raped." See also the testimony of 
"Christine" who was threatened with death if she did not submit sexually but who ultimately submitted to 
save her children. Her children, like those of "'Marie Claire" were killed nevertheless. 
397 See the testimonies of"Perpetue" and "Jane", in Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives, 44, 64. For a 
more graphic detailing of 'rape with objects' as forced simulation of sexual intercourse. see The ProseclIIor 
verslls Lallrelll Semellza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgemenl and Senlence (15 May 2003), paragraph 253 
[Online]. Available: htto:liww\\'. iCLr.orf.!IENGL1SH/cast's/Semanzai jud!..!em C' J1I/6. hLm#6d [2010. February 
23] , cited in Catharine A. Mackinnon, "Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu," 
Columbia .loul'1Ial of TransnatioJlal Law 44, no. 3 (2006): 952. 
3')8 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives. 1. 
] 
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practice of confining groups of women and girls to ensure their continued sexual 
availability to the militiamen for periods ranging from a number of days to the duration 
of the entire April-July 1994 period of mass killing.J99 Individual sexual SlaVel)1 or 
"forced marriage", as it was commonly known, was the practice of individual Hutu 
militia men confming women individually for the purpose of forced sexual service and 
forced domestic labour for periods of time ranging from a number of days to periods 
extending beyond the original April-July time frame.400 Sexual Muti/atioll was described 
as the perpetrator's deliberate infliction of physical injury into what would usefull y be 
divided into the female victim's primaty and secondary characteristics: victim's genitals, 
internal reproductive organs, pelvic area and breasts. 401 Injury was inflicted with 
instruments such as machetes, knives, sticks, boiling water and acid. Sexual mutilations 
were often performed after the perpetration of rape. 
There appears to be no major reason to doubt the verity of the individual victim 
testimonies, mostly because of the considerable risks posed to the surviving victims' 
personal safety and social standing by speaking of their experiences. There were two or 
three accounts taken from victims from communes in the prefectures of Gitarama and 
Butare (both in the south of tlle country), that conflicted with the more general accounts 
on the matter of tlle timing of the start of the mass killings and other violence in those 
prefectures. Accounts of the 1994 killings generally agree tlmt tlle killings and other 
violence against Tutsis in these southern pr~rectures began in mid-April 1994 (between 
18 and 21 April 1994).401 Two or three surviving victims stated much earlier dates as the 
starting point of violence in their respective communes, suggesting either that there were 
errors in the victims' memOlies or in the autllOrs' recordings or serving as further support 
39'1 Ibid. , 1,52-53. 
~on Ibid" I, j6. The original Kinyarwanda ternl for forced marriage is not provided. 
401 Ibid. , 1, 62. 
402 Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits qf Hllmauitarian imen'em;oll: Genocide ill Rwanda (Washington D.C. : 
Brookings Institution Press, 2001),122; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism lind 'he Genocide i1l RlVanda (Princeton, New Jersey: PrincelOn University Press, 2001), 219; 
Linda Melvern, Compiracy to j\1urdcr: Tlte Rwandan Gellocide, 2nd ed. (London: Verso Books, 2006), 
193; 198-199, 212-213. See also Human Righls Watch and Federation International des Ligues des Droits 
de L 'Homme, Leave NOlie to Tell th e Story: Genocide ill Rwallda (New York and Paris: Human Rights 
Watch and Federation International des Ligues des Droits de L'Homrne, 1999),213 [Online]. Available: 
Available: hup://www.orandslacs.neJldocI13 17.pdf [2009, August 25] (written by Alison DcsForges). 
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that more local-level research is needed.403 Besides these few exceptions, the basic facts 
of the individual testimonies were relatively unproblematic. 
b) Gelleraiisatiol1s 
The authors asserted that sexual violence against Tutsi women and girls was 
"widespread".404 This assertion was apparently based on the authors' interviews with 
surviving victims/witnesses from six of the 11 prefectures of Rwanda405 However, the 
overwhelming majority of interviewees were residents of communes in the prefectures of 
Butare, Gitarama and Kigali; and were attacked there. Surviving-victim testimonies are 
scattered throughout the report, making the tracking of each one a difficult and time-
consuming endeavour. There is a section of the report where the authors arranged some 
of the collected testimonies under the relevant category of sexual violence.406 In this 
particular section of the report, 26 interviewees are accounted for. Of the 26 interviewees 
(21 Tutsis and 5 Hutus):407 11 were attacked in Butare (far southern Rwanda) ; eight were 
attacked in Gitarama central-southern Rwanda); five were attacked in Kigali (central-
eastern Rwanda); one was attacked in Gikongoro (southwestern Rwanda) and one was 
attacked in Kibungo (southeastern Rwanda). One individual - originally from Gitarama -
was attacked in a number of communes in Gitarama before she fled to Gisenyi (far 
40~ See the Teslimony or"Bemadette", "Perpetue", and "Liberman in Human Rights Watch and FIDH. 
Shaltered Lives, 42, 44, 49. See also: Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave NOli e to Tell the Story, 340; 
The Prosecwor versus .leaH-Pail! Ak(~veSlf Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ludgement and Sentence (2 September 
1998), paragraphs 183-193, 294. [Online]. Available: 
http: //www .unictLrmdPonals/OICaselEnglish/Akavesu/jucl!!cment/akavO01 _pel r [2010, January 10]. Both 
Liberata and Perpetue were attacked in Taba commune, Gitarama Prefecture. Liberata claimed that militias 
first arrived in Taba commune on 12 April 1994. Perpetue claimed she lVas captured on 9 April 1994 by 
militia in an already fully active campaign against TUlsi in the same commune. It is possible that the date 
quoted from Perpetue is a typing error: a footnote reveals that Perpetue was interviewed on 9 April 1996. 
Testimony from the IeTR case of the bourgrnestre (mayor) ofTaba, confirms that widespread killings only 
started after 18 April 1994. Liberata claimed her family was killed at her home in Rusatira commune, 
Butare three days after the killing of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Liberata did not state that the 
killings were widespread at that point. These killings might have been among the relatively isolated early 
killings instigated by soldiers in Butare on 7 April 1994. Killings became widespread in that prefecture on 
21 April 1994, as detailed in the Human Rights Watch and FIDH Report, Leave NOlie to Tell the StO/~" 
40-1 Human Riuhts Watch and FIDH. Shallered Lives, 18 . 
'0; Ibid., 6. -
'Ob Ibid .. 42-68. 
407 One Hutu woman was erroneously included under the "Rape ofTutsi women" section, under the 
category "individual sexual slavery. See Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 62. 
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northwestern Rwanda), where she was attacked again.408 This Gitarama native provided 
the only testimony of sexual violence perpetrated in the northern region of tile country.409 
An observer of Human Right Watch/FIDH explained that the report focused on Gitarama 
as part of a major international human rights campaign to have charges of sexual violence 
included in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's (ICTR) indictment of Jean-
Paul Akayesu, the mayor of Tab a commune in Gitarama (the ICTR's first case).410 
The report thus raises many questions about how representative this sample of interviews 
was and how widespread rape really was in other communes. There is little indication of 
where rape and/or sexual slavery were used more systematically or where rape and/or 
sexual slavery were more common411 The authors made a distinction between singular 
cases of rape and cases of sexual slavery, but there is a great deal of overlap in the cases 
categorised either simply as rape or as the more complex sexual slavery arrangements. 
And while it is clear that some Tutsi women and girls were killed after being subjected to 
sexual violence and others were spared, the authors were unable to give a clear 
explanation as to why celtain groups of Tutsi women or girls were left alive or killed 
immediately after the perpetration of sexual violence. Judging by the age range of the 
victims (the youngest being II years old and the eldest four women being 38 years 
old),412 age is one of the factors implicitly suggested as determining whether Tutsi 
females were killed immediately without the subjection to rape and sexual slavery; older 
women (possibly those past middle age) and very young children (pre-pubescent children 
and infants) were possibly killed immediately upon discovery. 
'"< See the testimony of Perpet"e in Ibid., 43-45. 
409 It is recalled that the RPF had occupied Byumba prefecture in northwestern Rwanda before the eruption 
oflhe killings in April. See: Melvern, COllspirac!' 10 Mllrder, 193. 
-1 \0 Rhonda Copelon. "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women imo International 
Criminal Law," McGill Law .1011/'llo/46, no. I (2000): 224. 
411 Timothy Longman, "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide," 
.101//'110/ Or Gellocide Research 6, no. I (2004): 35. 
m Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shollered Lives, 46, 47, 51, 52, 58. 
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4.2.2. The Problem (jfthe Lack (jf Legal-Tee/mical D~fillitions.for Se;'(ual Violence lInder 
Intemational Law and Rwandan Criminal Law 
One of the most helpful recommendations that authors made to the Rwandan government 
was to suggest that investigators of sexual violence needed to be individuals with training 
on the issue of sexual violence and that Rwandan inspectors should have lmowledge of 
the status of sexually violent acts as crimes punishable by law4 ]J It was the staz1ing point 
to building awareness that sexual violence is not necessarily self-evident. However, the 
rep0l1 itself was written with the explicit - and incorrect - assumption that the law itself 
was unproblematic. The authors stated that international failure to investigate and 
prosecute incidences of wartime or systematic sexual violence lay "not in the absence of 
adequate legal prohibitions, but in the international community' s willingness to tolerate 
sexual abuse against wornen.',4]4 The authors also strongly suggested that while Rwandan 
Criminal Law had penal provisions to deal with cases of sexual violence, the Rwandan 
government lacked the "political will" to investigate sexual violence crimes4 ]5 The 
authors may have made a valid point 111 asserting that the lack of investigation of 
"genocide" and armed conflict-related violence in Rwanda was the result of lack of 
political will. However, the authors overstated the adequacy of the legal prohibitions on 
sexual violence and understated the fact that International Humanitarian Law and 
Rwandan Criminal Law provide extremely limited 'sexual violence' conceptual 
frameworks both in ternlS of the different sexual violence crimes explicitly listed and the 
definitions for those crimes. Furthermore, prior to the establislU11ent of the ICTR and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the FOlmer Yugoslavia (lCTY), t11ere were no Case-
Law precedents in International Criminal Law from which definitions of 'rape' and 
similar sexual crimes could be derived4 ]6 
'" Ibid., 8. 
414 Ibid., 28. 
41 5 Ibid. , 36-38, 88-89. 
41 6 Jennifer Green, Rhonda Cope ion, Patrick Cotter and Beth Stephens, "Affecting the Rules for the 
Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the lnternational Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia," Hastings Womell 's Law .!ollrllal 5, no. 2 (1994): 189. 
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The authors specifically addressed the ICTR, the ad-hoc body that was established to 
prosecute and punish the chief planners and organisers of the crime of genocide and other 
serious violations of Intemational Humanitarian Law.41 7 With regard to sexual violence. 
this meant that the ICTR mainly had jurisdiction over authorities who were individually 
responsible for directing subordinates/civilians to perpetrate acts of sexual violence or 
authorities who bore superior responsibility for their subordinates' perpetration of these 
acts (a fact that is not emphasised in the Shattered Lives repOlt).4 1S They recommended 
that the ICTR recogmse and prosecute "rape, sexual slavery and sexual 
mutilation ... where appropriate, as crimes against humanity. genocide crimes, or war 
crimes.,,419 The authors concentrated mainly on the argument that all three forms of 
sexual violence could be subsumed under some of the acts specified in the legal technical 
definition of genocide - as specified in the Gellocide Convention and the ICTR Statute 
respectively - in as far as they were perpetrated against Tutsi women as members of the 
Tutsi ' ethnic' group.420 Slightly less attention was paid to discussing the explicit and 
implicit provisions for the recognition of sexual violence as war crimes and as crimes 
against humanity. Of the three acts or forms of sexual violence specified in the report, 
only 'rape' is explicitly enumerated as a war crime in tl,e fOUrtil Gelleva COl1ventioll , 
Protocols I and II Additional to the Gel1eva COllvel1liol1S and the ICTR Statllle at the time 
of the report's wliting.421 'Rape', which had not been consistently enumerated as a crime 
4 17 Statute of lite IllIematioJJal Criminal Tribu1Iallor Rwanda. Resolution 955 (1994) Adopted by the 
Security Counci l at its 3454" Meeting on 8 November 1994 UN Doc SIRES/955 (8 November 1994), 
[On I i ne]. A vai lable: http://www.unictr.oruiPonals/O/En"lishiLeu" IIT ribulla IIEnul ishl"OO 7 .od r [2010, 
October 17] . 
41 11 This does not mean that the chief planners and Organisers always refrained from carrying out acts of 
sexual vio lence themselves. ICTR accused Alfred Musema was himself found to have personally forced a 
Tutsi woman to have sexual intercourse with him. He was found gUilty of rape as a crime of genoc ide and 
as a crime against humanity. See The Prosecutor verSllS A (fred Jvlusema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 
Judgement and Sentence (27 January 2000), pargraphs 849·851,933,965-967 [Online]. Available: 
hup://www .unictr.or0 PonaislO/Case/En!!iis i1/Muscmaijud!.!emellt/OOO 1 77 .pdf [20 11 . January 12]. 
4 11.1 Human Rights Watch, Shattered Live ..... 9. 
420 Ibid. , 34. 
421 Ibid., 29. Geneva COHVellliol1 (fll') Relative to th e Protection q/Civilian Persons ill Tim e a/War. 
illcllldillg Allllexes I-III, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 28 7. Article 27 [Online]. Available from the 
International Committee of the Red Cross at: 
htlp: /I\\'ww. icrc.oru/ihl .nsfl3R5ecOS2b509c 76c41256 739003e636d/6 756482dR61 40898c 125041 e004003c5 
[2010, June 16]; Protocol Adeliliolla/co th e Gelleva C01l1'elllioll .... qf J 2 August 1949. alld Relating /0 'he 
Pro/ectioll of Victims of Jlllel'l1ariona/ Armed COI!f/icls (Pr%co/I). 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, entered 
into force 7 December 1978. Article 76(1) [Online]. Avai lable from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross at: http: //www. icrc.()1.!!/ihl.nsfl\\/ ebART 14 70-7500C)~?ODt:I1Doc ul1l ent [2010, June 16]; Protocol 
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against humanity in the statutes of past international criminal tribunals, was explicitly 
recognised as such in the ICTR Slal1lle422 
The Rwandan courts were (and are) responsible for the prosecution of lower-level leaders 
and the ordinary civilians accused of perpetrating acts of sexual violence and other 
criminal acts during the April-July 1994 period:23 Thus. the authors urged the Rwandan 
government to ensure that "the sexual violence that took place during the genocide ... be 
fully investigated and where possible, prosecuted and punished.,,424 They noted that 
'rape' (,Ie viol ') is enumerated as a crime under Article 360 of the Rwanda Penal Code of 
1977.425 They further noted that the Rwandan government had passed legislation to 
facilitate the prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity between 30 October 
1990 and 31 December 1994.426 This legislation recognised 'sexual torture' as an act of 
genocide and as a crime against humanity under "Category One", which is the category 
Additiollalto the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 011(/ Relating to the Protection ~lNoll­
Imemoriol/al Armed COI!f/icls (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 
1978, Article 4(2){e), [Online]. Available from the International Comminee of the Red Cross at: 
Intp:llwww.icrc.or!!li hJ.nsf/FULLl475'?OpenDocument [2010, June 16]; ICTR Slalllte, Article 4{e). 
'" ICrR Slalllla, Article 3{g); Human Rights Watch and FIDH. Shallered Lives, 29. 
42] ICrR Slatule, Resolution 955(1994). 
424 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shattered Lives, 8. 
m Ibid., 36; [Republic of Rwanda] Decrel-Loi No. 21177 du 18 oO/il 1977: Code Pel/aI, Article 360 
[OnlineJ. Available: 
hUn:ilwww.amate!!eko.netldispJa v rubrigue.olm,?AcID0=ShowArt&lnfonllatioll ID=947&Pnrcnt 10=307 
OMO&tvDe-puhlic&Laneue lD- FI'&l'ublD- 306913 I 5!1306QJ3 15 [2010, October 25J . Priorto the advent 
of the RPF-Ied government, Rwandan law was wrinen exclusively in French. Subsequent legislation passed 
by the current Rwandan administration is written in three official languages: Kinyarwanda, English and 
French. On the language of Rwandan legislation see: William A. Schabas, "Prosecuting International 
Crime: Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda, Searching for Solutions to Impossible 
Problems," Criminal Law Fortl11l 7, no. 3 (1996): 532. 
no Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shallered Lives, 36-38; [Republic of RwandaJ Organic Law No. 
0811996 of31 August 1996 on the Organisation of Prosecution of Offences Constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes against Humanity since I October 1990 (I September 1996), Article 2 [Online]. 
Available: htlp:l/www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4r6-t.lllml [20] 0, May 23]. See also Organic Law 
No. 13/2008 of 19 May 2008 Modifying and Complementing Organic Law No. 1612004 of 19 June 2004 
Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting 
and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and other Crimes against Humanity, Committed 
between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as Modified and Complemented to Date, Article 6 
[Online]. Available: httD:llwww.inkilw~ 
!!ncnca.gO\· .rwipdl'lL.O%20Nt%1013.200S'!·~,20VERSION%20F[N.A.LE.odr[201 0, May 23]. Where Organic 
Law No. 081 I 996 refers only to sexual torture, Organic Law No. 1312008 refers to both rape and sexual 
torture, which is translated into the French as "Infractions de viol et de torture sexuelle" (Offences of rape 
and sexual torture) and into Kinyarwanda as "Ibyaha byo gusambanya ku gahato no kwangiza imyanya 
ndangabitsana", rape being "gusambanya ku gahato" and sexual torture being "k\vangiza imyanya 
ndangabitsina". 
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enumerating the most serious offences out of a total of four categories. While expressing 
certainty that many rape cases would fall under Category 1 as 'sexual torture' , the authors 
were uncertain of whether sexual torture would be "interpreted to include all acts of rape 
or only those with certain characteristics.,,427 
To the report's detriment, the authors failed to acknowledge that 'rape' is a legal-
teclmical term for a crime recognised almost universally in domestic climinal law 
systems worldwide.m Domestic jurisdictions typically have their own definitions of the 
crime of rape and other sexual assaults. While the crime of 'rape' was explicitly named 
both in Rwandan Criminal Law and in International Law; neither International Law nor 
Rwandan Law provided any defmition of rape or any other comparable sexual assault 
('sexual violence crime') at the time of the writing of the report.429 In legal proceedings it 
is necessary to determine a legal-technical definition of rape (or any other sexual assault) 
before any assessment can be made of whether rape constitutes genocide, or a crime 
against humanity or a 'war crime' .430 The authors' failure to engage with the issue of the 
absence of standard legal-teclmical defmitions of sexual assaults in International Law and 
Rwandan Law is especially problematic in view of 'rape-law refornl' literature 
suggesting that there have been controversies and fierce disputes regarding the definition 
of different sexual assaults within domestic jurisdictions worldwide.43I Given the length 
0127 Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Shaltered Lives, 38. 
428 David John Frank, Tarn Hardinge and Kassin Wosick-Correa, "The Global Dimensions of Rape-Law 
Refonn: A Cross-Nalional Study of Policy Outcomes," Alllericoll Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 
275-276; William Schab as, "Crimes against Humanity," Encyclopedia afGenocide and Crimes against 
HIIIIIOllifY, ed., Dinah Shehon (Fannington Hills, Michigan: Thomson Gale. 2005), 211. 
429 Prosecllfor versus AkayeslI, paragraph 686; The Prm'cclIIor versus Ama FUr/mdiija, Case No. IT-95-
1711-T. Judgement (10 December 1998), paragraph 175 [Online]. Available: 
huo :/iwww.1I11.or~/ictv/ fun.lndz iia/trialc21j 1ldt!emeJ1l! fur-[i9g 121 Oe.pdf [2010, January 10]; Catharine 
MacKinnon, "Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu," Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 44, no. 3 (2006): 942. The rape definition from the Akl~vesll case was the first 
international definition of rape . 
.00 ProseCHfor versus AkayeslI, paragraph 686, Prosecutor versus Funmdiija. 175. 
H I Penelope E. Andrews, "Violence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of Culture and the 
Limitations of the Law," Temple Political alld Civil Rights Law Review 8, no. 2 (1999): 454; Alice 
Arnlstrong, "Evidence in Rape Cases in Four Southern AfTican Countries," .Jollmal ofAfricll1l Lalli 33, no. 
2 (I989): 172; Valerie Ceccherini, "Rape and the Prophet," Illdex 011 Cellsorship 28, no. 1 (1999): 21; Amy 
Jo Everhart, "Predicting the Effect of Italy's Long-Awaited Rape Law Reform on The Land of Machismo," 
Vanderbilt .Jotlrnal of TranSNational Law 31, no. 3 (1998): 682-684; Mackinnon, "Defining Rape 
internationally," 952; Martha 1. Morgan, "The Bitter and the Sweet: Feminist Efforts to Refonn Nicaraguan 
Rape and Sodomy Laws,"lmer-Americall Law Review 26, no. 3 (1995): 439-488; Cassia Spohn and Julie 
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constraints of this study it is unfortunately not possible to list and discuss these issues 
surrounding rape and sexual assaults. What can be said is that these disputes had a role in 
the formulation of Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both the ICTR and 
the ICTy.432 Rule 96 gives some guidelines regarding the role of the victim's non-
consent and victim coercion in sexual interactions potentially classifiable as sexual 
assaults, stipulating that defendants have to satisfy the court that evidence of the victim's 
consent is relevant433 This has been seen as a moderate victory by some rape-law 
activists who argued that non-consent is notoriously difficult for prosecutors to prove, 
and who had confidence in the fact that Rule 96 prohibits the Defence's submission of 
evidence of consent once the Chamber had established the presence of coercive 
circumstances to which the victim was subject.434 Others criticised the very existence of 
Rule 96's consent-defence provision.435 Nevertheless, Rule 96 failed to provide 
enumerations and definitions of different sexual assaults. This explains the varied Case-
Law definitions of rape that have arisen from the ICTR and ICTy.436 In the context of 
cases processed through the Rwandan cou11s, the author of a follow-up Human Rights 
Watch report observed that the terms ' rape' and 'sexual torture' were used inconsistently 
in trials and judgements, indicating confusion among prosecutors and judges about what 
the terms meant.437 She furtller observed that the reliance on judicial discretion to identify 
criminalised acts of sexual violence had resulted in inconsistent guilty verdicts and 
Homey. "The Law's the Law, but Fair is Fair. Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual 
History Evidence," Crimillology 29, no. I (1991): 137, 157; Cassia Spohn, "The Rape Reform Movement: 
The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms," .Il/rimerrics 39, no. 2 (1999): 123-124; Beth 
Stephens, "A Developing Legal System Grapples with an Ancient Problem: Rape in Nicaragua," Women's 
Rights Law Reporter 12. no. 2 (1990): 75. 
43 2 i1lternatiollal Criminal Tribu11alfor the Former Yugoslavia: Rilles oj Procedllre and Evidence. Adopted 
on II February 1994 as Amended on 24 July 2009, UN Doc. IT1321Rev43, Rule 96 [Online]. Available: 
Illtn: /iwww.ictv .on!/x/file/Le!!al%J20Lihrarv/Rules procedure evidence/TT032 Rev43 en.pdf [2010, 
August 12]; international Criminal Tribunal for RWlIllda: Rules of Evidence aud Procedure, Adopted on 
29 June 1995 as amended on 9 February 2010 [Online]. Available: 
Imp:l/www.llllic tr.ondPonals/OIEIl" lishILegaIIROPIl 00209.pdf[2010, October 17]; Kate Fizgerald, 
"Problems of the Prosecution and Adjudication of Rape and Other Sexual Assault under International 
Law," EI/ropeall '/01/1'1/01 q(Ime/'llatiollal Lall' 8, no. 4 (1997): 646-647; Green el aI. , 189-192,2 17-21 9. 
m ICTR Rilles q{ Procedllre alld Evidellce, Rule 96 (ii)-(iii) . 
~3~ Green et ai., 217. 
'" Ibid. , 218, MacKinnon, "Defining Rape Internationally," 947. 
436 See for example: Proseclllor versus Akcwesu, paragraphs 686-688, Prosecwor versus Furuud=iia. 
paragraph 185; ProseCJl{or verSllS Semallza. paragraph 346. For a comprehensive overview of the rape 
judgements at the ICTR and ICTY, see MacKinnon, "Defining Rape Internationally," 940-958. 
437 Human Rights Watch, Struggling to Survive: Barriers to .II/slice for Rape Victims ill Rwanda (New 
York: Human RighL' Watch, 2004), 32. This Human RighL' Watch repon was written by Shiva Eftekhari. 
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punishments.43s Another observer pointed out that "the Rwandan rape law is limited and 
denies prosecution for deeds commonly committed during the genocide - peneb'ating 
women's vaginas with gun barrels, bottles and sharpened sticks.,,439 These are all 
foreseeable problems that the Shattered Lives authors should have addressed. 
4.2.3. Acts o(Sexual Violence as Acts q(Gel1ocide 
One might argue that the report made a fair case that some fonl1s or acts of sexual 
violence constituted genocide (according to the Genocide Convention's definition), if one 
overlooks the problems arising from the legal-technical definitions of different sexual 
assaults and concentrates on the basic facts of the perpetrated acts.440 All the individual 
cases of sexual violence were perpetrated in the context of organised and widespread 
killing and sexual violence against Tutsi civilians. Furthelmore, the actions and 
statements of the perpeb'ators - as recalled in some of the victim testimonies documented 
in the report - generally suggest that the perpetrators expected that attacking their victims 
sexually would inflict psychological and/or physical injury on the victims and thereby 
"advance the cause of the destruction of the Tutsi people.,,441 Some of the incidents of 
'sexual mutilation' and sexual penetration with objects ('rape with objects') recorded in 
the rep0l1 were a method of physical killing, even though death was n.ot always the 
43' Ibid. 
439 Elizabelh Barad, "Export and Import of the Rule of Law in the Global Era." JLSA .1o/ll'l/a/ ~r 
il1terlIatiollal alld Comparative Law 11 , no. 2 (2005): 328-329. 
"" Ibid., 35. 
441 Ibid. It is however important to point out that it would be very difficult - ifnot impossible - to argue 
that every single act of sexual violence was an act of genocide under the guidelines of the Genocide 
Convention. In some of the cases of sexual attack - especia lly in cases of so-called 4forced rnaniage' 
(individual sexual slavery) - Olle can easily argue that the attacks were opponunistic. In the course of 
attack...;; against the Tutsi , some militiamen appearto have seized the opponunity to seize a Tutsi 'wife' 
contrary to orders from leaderto kill these women. In such cases, it could be argued that it was the 
perpetrators' sexual desire for the Tutsi women, rather than the "intent to destroy" the Tursi group, that 
prompted the a!lack. See for example: Testimonies of"Perpetue" and "Venaulie", in Ibid. 44-45 , 61. 
"Venautie" explained that she was originally ordered to dig her own grave, but was spared when one 
militiaman randomly decided that he wanted her. Before he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, 
he explained, "Ifthere were peace, you would never accept me". "Perpetue" was pulled from a mass grave 
by a militiaman who wanted to engage her sexually. This attack seems to have been opportunistic; but the 
the perpetrator seemed to understand that a sexual attack could kill a victim, since he is said to have 
claimed that "any Tutsi woman from Gitarama would be killed in an even worse way than what he was 
doing " to Perpetue (raping her) . It is to the Human Rights Watch authors' credit that they did not cla im 
that all cases of sexual violence against Tutsi women were genocidal. 
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result.442 Cases where victims were forcefully subjected to sexual intercourse (usually 
with multiple perpetrators) could be divided into two types of harm: those cases in which 
the perpetrators intended to inflict such extensive physical injury as to cause physical 
death;443 and those in which the perpetrators expected to cause not only psychological 
. trauma due to the sheer violence of the attack but also psychological harm due to feelings 
of shame brought on by the social significance of sexual attacks against women.444 The 
authors explained that the victims' feelings of shame stemmed from the 'gendered' 
societal emphasis on female sexual virtue as the standard by which females maintained 
respect in their communities and were accepted (by males) to be wives and mothers.445 A 
female 's engagement in non-marital sexual activity - even if it was against her will -
compromised her public reputation of sexual virtue (measured via fidelity or virginity), 
brought shame to her family and ultimately resulted in the victim's ostracism. Sexual 
violence was an effective strategy of genocide because both the female victims and the 
perpetTators understood that these females would be ostracised by whatever remained of 
their communities and they would be rejected as reproducers (wives and mothers).446 In 
addition, the authors and victim testimonies underscored that fact that sexual violence 
against Tutsi women was fuelled by politically-chalmelled socio-cultural beliefs that 
Tutsi women were more beautiful and more sexually desirable than Hutu women.447 The 
subjection of Tutsi women to sexual violence thus served the purposes of sexually 
gratifying the male Hutu perpetrators as well as sexually ' defiling' Tutsi women and 
girls. Overall, cases of 'sexual violence as genocide' could be interpreted as falling 
'" Ibid. , 63-65. 
443 For the best example see: Testimony of "Bemadetle" in Ibid., 4:!. In explaining her attackers' surprise 
at finding her alive after they thought they had killed her, Bernadette explained that her attackers had 
exclaimed, "Those Tutsi people won't die - we raped her and she survived. We threw her in the river and 
she still survived." 
444 See the Testimony ofC!ementine, in Ibid. , 47. Clementine explained that older militiamen had ordered 
the younger militiamen to subject her to sexual intercourse ('rape'). When the young men were fini shed, 
the older men ordered them not to harm her further because they had "already killed her." The authors also 
claimed that some victims (unnamed) reported that their attackers stated that rather than kill the women 
immediately, they would leave them to die from their sorrow. See: Ibid., 35. 
44; Ibid. , 2, 26, 28 . 
. w. See Ibid., 26, 41. Rape survivors in Rwanda are documented as making statemenLc;; such as: "After rape, 
you have no value in the community"; "It was the humiliation of women"; "It was the disfigurement of 
women, to make them undesirable, used"; "Women's worth was not respected." 
"'Ibid., 18-19,43,47,51 ,54,63 . 
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within one of four acts of genocide as listed in Article 2 of the Gellocide Conventioll and 
the ICTR Statute respectively: 
Ua) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental hann to members of the group; c) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; d) Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group".448 
4.3. Jones: "Gender-Selective" Killings in Rwanda, April-July 1994 
4.3.1. Gelldercide alld Gellocide 
.lones's interest in the mass killing of males stemmed from his perception that male-
targeted violence in Rwanda (and in other conflicts worldwide) failed to attract the 
attention of scholars and policymakers alike, even though it was widely acknowledged 
that males were overwhelmingly represented among those killed.449 Jones first proposed 
that the mass targeting and killing of males be understood as gelldercide in an article 
entitled "Gendercide and Genocide", in which he defined gendercide "inclusively ... as 
gender-selective mass killing".45o .Jones asserted that for his purposes, gender was 
"defined pJimarily, if not exclusively in terms of biological sex.'0451 Jones's first article 
brought the term 'gendercide' into mainstream comparative genocide studies, having 
appropriated it from Mary Anne Warren, who had originally coined it to refer to either 
gender-selective killing or sex-selective killing.452 Two significant critical reviews 
44M COllVelltioll/or the Prevel1tion alld Pl/llishmellf a/the Crime o.(Gcnocide, Approved and Proposed for 
Signature and Ratification or Accession by General Assembly Resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948, 
Entry into force January 1951. in Accordance with Article XIII . Article 2 [Online]. Available: 
huo:l/www.lIllhchr.ch/htmJlmenu3/b/p !!enoc i.hlln [2007, November 28]; lCTR Slalllte, Article 2. quoted 
in Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Slzallcrcd Lives, 34-35. The authors lie the various acts of sexual 
violence explicitly to acts b), c) and d), but both the authors and the victims ' testimonies imply the 
relevance of act a) as well. 
44') Adam 1. Jones, " Gendercide and Genocide ," .lolfmal ofGel1ocidc Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 186; Jones, 
" Gender and Genocide." 85. 88. 
4 50 Adam J. Jones, " Gendercide and Genocide ," Journal qfGellocide Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 185. 
451 Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide," 186. 
452 Mary Anne Warren. Gelldercide: The lmplicariolls oISex Selection (Totowa, New Jersy: Rowman and 
Allenheld, 1985), cited in .Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide." 186. According to Carpenter. Warren had 
distinguished between those killings based on ' gender as social beliefs ' and those that had been based on 
biology. Her reason for subsuming killings based primarily on biological imperatives under the term 
'gendercide' was that the term ' sex-cide ' was not as 'catchy' . See R. Charli Carpenter, "Beyond 
Gendercide: Incorporating Gender into Comparative Genocide Studies," Illfemmiol1ulJolfmal of Human 
Rights 6. no. 4 (2002): 78. 97. Also see Stein. 39. 
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emerged in the scholarly response to Jones's work. One was produced by Stuart Stein, a 
sociologist in comparative genocide studies who promoted the production of more 
disaggregated analyses of the different kinds of mass killings and other atrocities that 
may typically make up a single campaign of genocide.453 The other was produced by R. 
Charli Carpenter, a Political Scientist promoting the diffusion of gender-based analyses 
beyond the study of "rape and sexual atrocity against women and girls in contemporary 
genocide" and into the mainstream of comparative genocide studies.454 Their criticisms 
found fault with his theoretical explanation that the victims had been selected on the basis 
of gender rather than the verity of the facts of the cases that he presented. These 
criticisms of the prior article have some relevance in understanding Jones's development 
of the term gendercide and its relationship to the concept of genocide within the article 
currently under review, particularly in as far as both concepts may apply to the Rwandan 
mass killings of April-July 1994. The possible impact of Carpenter' s critical review on 
Jones's subsequent article is initially suggested in Carpenter's inclusion in Jones's list of 
acknowledged persons.455 
Stein contended that in most of Jones's cases, the victims had not been primatily targeted 
on the basis of their "maleness" (since this was the primary basis of Jones's definition of 
their gender). Rather the male victims had been targeted on the basis of the perpetrators' 
beliefs about the ascriptive roles that they played or might play in "paniarchal-type social 
systems", leading perpen'ators to calculate that the males of competing communal groups 
posed a greater military (or political or economic) threat than females to the pelpetrators ' 
etlmo-national schemes.456 However Stein himself also tended to conflate sex with gender 
in his explanation of sex-selective or sex-specific outcomes (even after initially 
differentiating the two), leading to some confusion. Carpenter provided the more 
systematic and helpful clitique, calling for conceptual clarity and consistency in Jones 's 
work and maintaining the same clarity and consistency in her own explanations of the 
453 Stuart D. Stein, "Geno- and Other Cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation," JOllmal of 
Gel/ocide Research 4. no. I (2002) : 39-40. 50-54 
.lS4 Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide, n 77. 
45 5 Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 89. 
456 Stein. 52. 
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workings of 'gender'. According to Carpenter, the problem with Jones's whole 
theoretical explanation began with the fact that he had implied that the terms 'sex' and 
'gender' were essentially interchangeable, much in the same way that the terms were 
used colloquially.457 In social scientific study, the term gender was specifically created to 
differentiate between the "blUte facts of human biology" (in this case, the sexual 
differentiation of male and female individuals) and the social constlUctions around sex 
differences.458 Using the terms 'gender' and 'sex' interchangeably in a social scientific 
work such as .lones's article blunted gender as an analytical tool. Gender and sex needed 
to be kept analytically separate precisely because researchers needed to test - rather than 
assume - that sex disparities in mass atrocities were due to social beliefs (gender) rather 
than due to strictly biological imperatives or considerations.m By defining 'gel1dercide' 
as "gender-selective mass killing" and stipulating that gender was primarily defined on 
tlle basis of "biological sex", Jones was making the tautological claim that the killings 
were sex-selective (male selective, to be exact) without giving insight to the causes of the 
sex-selection of the victims. 
When gender is properly understood on the basis of social beliefs and institutions 
constlUcted around the differences between tlle sexes, one can begin to understand the 
direct and indirect ways in which 'gendered' beliefs could result in the sex disparities that 
may be evident in mass killings or other mass atrocities.460 Gender operates indirectly 
through gender stlUctures that chailllel males and females "into separate spaces where 
they are at risk of different types of harm," leading to outcomes that are 'sex-specific' 
rather than 'sex-selective '. The hypothesis is that males coincidentally occupy specific 
social roles that perpetrators deem threatening. If, for example, a certain government's 
forces were sent out to kill all the members of the political opposition, it is possible that 
males (specifically adult males) might be over-represented among the victims. Such an 
m Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 80. 
m Ibid. , 78. 
-159 Ibid" 80. The specific sex-selective atrocity that Carpenter gave as an example of targeting on the basis 
of biology is forced pregnancy. She maintained that in such cases "women rather than men are subjected to 
this fann of abuse because they are biologically female," even if gender discourses and ideologies are 
involved in the use of forced pregnancy as a strategy for the purposes of destroying a communal group. 
"But we do not need 'gender' to explain why it is women and not men who are targeted." 
<6" Ibid., 83. 
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outcome might be explained by referring to political institutions constituting a pre-
existing gender structure that has become 'masculine' through the channelling of men 
(adult males, however legally or socially defined) into the public sphere of politics and 
civil society and the concurrent systematic exclusion of women (adult females) from the 
same institutions 461 Provided that the attack was aimed at the members of the political 
opposition per se regardless of sex, the over-representation of males among victims 
would be termed 'sex-specific' . Gender operates directly as conscious gender discourses 
- specifically gender ideologies and gender norms - of actors "who may use sex as a 
proxy vmiable for socially constructed attributes," which may lead to sex-selective 
killing.462 Gender discourses and ideologies are particularly crucial where the ascriptive 
characteristics they espouse about males and females respectively trump the empirical 
reality regarding people's individual capacities, regardless of sex.463 If, for example, one 
was able to show in a specific case of mass killing that government forces had tm'geted all 
the male members of a specific communal group plimarily on the basis of beliefs that the 
males of that group were more likely to comprise the current or future political 
opposition, then one would be able to argue that the targeting of males was gender-based. 
This gender-based targeting might occur in spite of the fact of females being involved in 
political organisation. These considerations of gender often coincide with considerations 
of ethnicity and/or social class.464 However, a note of caution needs to be made here: in 
some cases, biological factors may be the plimary consideration determining sex-
selective outcomes, even where gender discourses and ideologies help create the 
conditions under which the sex-selective outcomes are secured. An example of this 
would be the subjection of sexually mature females to forced pregnancy as a strategy of 
inter-communal attack. 
Carpenter asserted that sex-selective killings - and sex-selective outcomes generally -
were not the only possible results of gender-selective targeting.465 Gender-selective 
killings could also be 'sex distinctive " for example in instances where perpetrators killed 
46 1 Ibid 8? 
46' Ibid:: 83: 
463 Ibid. , 91. 
464 Ibid.,86; Stein, 50·51. 
405 Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 90-91 
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more males than females within a specific communal group, but females were 
disproportionately targeted for rape and other sexual violence. Alternatively, both males 
and females might be killed; but males may first be 'emasculated' through castration, 
while females are raped to violate their presumed sexual virtue (indicative of family and 
community 'honour') and to taunt 'their' men for being unable to fulfil their assumed 
'protective' role.466 Carpenter also asserted that gender-selective targeting can include 
'sex-inclusive ' killings and other outcomes, which manifest in identical effects on 
individuals of either sex467 This would be due to the fact that gender creates certain 
categories that are not related to an individual's sex, but rather related to the individual ' s 
"relationship to a gender regime's definition of male/female relations more generally.'.46S 
What this means is that gender groups need not necessarily be composed of people of the 
same sex:
6Q For this reason, the deliberate targeting of confirmed or suspected 
homosexuals may be viewed as one form of gender-selective targeting resulting in sex-
inclusive killing:70 Thus, for Carpenter, when gender is appropriately distinguished from 
biological sex and gender-selective killing is distinguished from sex-selective killing, 
gelldercide (as gender-selective killing) is a concept that encompasses both sex-selective 
and sex-inclusive killings as empirical outcomes. 
Stein and Carpenter's criticisms of Jones's work also concerned the relationship that 
Jones established between 'gendercide' and 'genocide'. Both critics used the Genocide 
Convention's definition of genocide as the guiding framework for their own 
understanding of the concept: killings and other acts that fall short of killing are genocide 
in as far as they are perpetrated with "the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a racial, 
national, ethnical or religious groUp.,,47I Jones's own concept of genocide deviated from 
the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide in that Jones had defmed genocide as 
"the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder ill whole or ill 
'60 Ibid., 90. 
'6' Ibid., 91. 
' 68 Ibid 91 
' 69 Ibid" 85' 
470 See:"Richard Plant, Th e Pink Triangle: The Nazi Warllgains! Homosexuals (New York: Holt, 1996). 
ciled in Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide." 91 ; Frank Rector, The Nazi EXfermination q( Homose.\lIQ/s (New 
York: Stein and Day), cited in Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 91. 
'71 See Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," Stein, 43 , 51. 
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substantial part any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or 
economic group as these groups are defined by the perpetrator by whatever means.,,472 In 
spite of these significant conceptual differences, both critics supported Jones's argument 
that the sex-selective killing of males could and did feature in many case of genocides 
and other inter-communal attacks.473 Both critics disputed .Tones's claim that 
"gendercides against men and women - but particularly men - may be seen in this light as 
one of the more common forms of genocide." 474 In order for Jones (or anyone else) to 
make a credible argument about gendercide being a form of genocide, he would have to 
show that perpetrators of one gender group had tried to eliminate another gender group 
(as such/per se) by killing or otherwise harming the members of the victim group.475 
Since gender groups simultaneously constitute sex groups under Jones's framework, 
gendercide as genocide would envisage males executing the intent to destroy females as 
group or vice versa.476 With the possible exception of some female infanticides, cases in 
which one gender/sex group had tried to destroy another gender/sex group were thus far 
either unknown or non-existent.477 This was due to the fact of basic male-female 
interdependence 111 reproduction; a fact which may change in the future with the 
development of cloning technology. 
4.3.2. Gender, Gendercide and Genocide: The Sex-Selective Killing of Men and Boys as 
a Component of the Genocide against the nt/sis 
Jones's article, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," serves as a continuation of and a 
departure from the work begun in "Gendercide and Genocide".47K It is a continuation in 
the sense that Jones was still prirnmily concerned with the gendered causes of the sex-
selective killing of males.479 It is a departure from the previous work in the sense that 
.Tones decided to focus on a single case study, this being the sex-selective killings aimed 
m Jones. , "Beyond Gendercide," 199-200. 
·173 Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 78, 85; Stein, 51. 
474 Jones, "Gendercide and Genocide," 200, quoted in Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 
m Carpenler, "Beyond Gendercide," 86. 
"'[bid. 
m Ibid. , 87; Slein, 51. 
478 Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 65-66. 
41? Ibid. , 69-76. 
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predominantly against Tutsi men in April-July 1994. The gendered cause of sex-inclusive 
killings is also discussed, among a number of other sex-specific and sex selective 
outcomes whose details are too lengthy to be discussed here.48o 
Jones's "Rwandan Genocide" study is based on original testimony collected in what he 
identified on the "five most significant human rights reports on the Rwandan genocide 
published in English so far.,,481 Jones claimed that the general thrust of human rights 
reportage suggested that males were overwhelmingly targeted "in the genocide's earliest 
and most virulent stages"; and yet, Jones depended heavily on a single human rights 
report for his study of sex-selective killing of Rwandan males: Rwanda. Death Despair 
and Defiance by African Rights.482 His motivation for his dependence on this particular 
report is that it is superior to others in "its detail and specificity," thus making it 
"foundational to our understanding of our understanding of events overall - and their 
complex 'gendering' in pmticular.,,483 Timothy Longman (a political scientist with pre-
1994 and pos(-1994 fieldwork research experience in Rwanda) raised concerns about any 
reliance on this particular report and on African Rights work on Rwanda generally, 
stating that research for the report was conducted quickly "without verification of the 
facts" and that "as a result, the details are flawed.484 He further warned that (he African 
Rights report reflected that the orgarusation was deeply influenced by the RPF regime's 
propaganda. Two other independent reviewers offered very positive reviews concerning 
the detail of African Rights ' descriptive account of the killing ofTutsi in 1994; but much 
like Longman, both contended that the African Rights writers had been uncritical in their 
portrayal of the RPF (particularly the role of the RPF soldiers in human rights violations 
against Hutu civilians).4B; It thus appears reasonable to conclude that the evidence that 
"" Ibid .• 76-87. 
481 Please refer to Chapters One and Two for the full listing of these reports. 
4112 Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda.," 71. 
m Ibid 66 
4114 Tim~thy' Longman, "Placing Genocide in Context: Research Priorities for the Rwandan Genocide," 
.Io111'llal o[Gel/ocide Research 6, no. I (2004): 33. 
4115 Villia Jefremovas, review of Rwanda: Death_ Despair alld Defiance, by African Rights, Africa 
Alaga=illc. 22 March 2000 [Online] . Available: 11IIp:liwww.accessmvl ibmrv.com/anicle-IGI-
o4tl9S533invanda-dealh-despair-and.html [2009. October 211; Rene Lemarchand, "Rwanda: The State of 
Research," Onlille Encyclopedia of Arfass Violence 4 November 2007 [Online] . Available: 
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Jones used from the African Rights report is quite reliable in as far as he has limited his 
reliance on the report to facts and evidence about the killing of Tutsis and Hutu political 
moderates in the April-July 1994 period. All the cases to which he referred were of mass 
killings that occurred in Rwanda's central and southern prefectures: Butare (far southern 
Rwanda) Cyangugu (far southwestern Rwanda), Gikongoro (southwestern Rwanda), 
Gitarama (southern Rwanda), Kibuye (western Rwanda), Kibungo (southeastern 
Rwanda) and Kigali (central to eastern Rwanda) 486 These are the regions where it is 
currently believed the largest scale ofTutsi mass killings occurred:87 
Unlike his prevIOus article, "Gender and Genocide" contains no preliminary general 
definition of gender and hence no attempt at a general explanation of the relationship 
between 'gender' and 'biological sex ' . This makes efforts to follow his arguments about 
the gendered causes of empirical outcomes more difficult than they have to be (especially 
without a background reading of Carpenter's review of the previous article) . 
Furthermore, .lones neglected to provide an explicit definition of 'ge/locide ' to which he 
subscribed, consequently making Jones ' s conception of the relationship between 
' gendercidal' and 'genocidal' killings less clear than it could be . .lones mentioned tlle 
Genocide Convention 's definition of genocide, but in a rather non-committal way:88 
What can be gathered from the article is that genocide entailed the canying out of the 
intent to destroy the Tutsi as a group through mass killings of Tutsis from April 1994 to 
.luly 1994, with a great deal of ambiguity about whether acts falling short of killing would 
. 'd I 489 conslltute genoc! a measures. 
hup:/lwww. massviolence.or!!lRwunda-The-State-of-Research'!arto il !!e=4 [2010, July 28]. lefremovas (an 
anthropologist) and Lemarchand (a historian) have lengthy experience in Rwandan history and politics and 
lhe mass killings of 1994, constituting (like Longman) part ortlte small body of "Rwanda experts" pre-
dating the war and mass killings. 
'" Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 71-76, 79-80, 81-84. 
·un Ibid.; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: NaIivism. Colonialism amI the Gel/ocide ill 
Rwanda (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 219; Linda Melvern, Compiracy to 
Mllrder : Til e RWQlIdalI Gellocide. revised ed. (London: Verso Books, 2006), 193, 199, 212- 215, 227-229. 
4811 Ibid. , 82. Jones simply stated that the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide could be used to 
argue that certain inter-communal rapes could be considered to be acts of genocide. 
4H9 Ibid. 70, 82. 
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Within the general context of mass killings that occurred in the stipulated timeframe, 
Jones defmed gendercide as the "gender-selective targeting of males", that is, sex-
selective killings on the basis of gender-selective targeting4 90 Rwandan Tutsi males were 
the predominant targets of gendercide, particularly Tutsi males ranging from adolescents 
(starting at the age of thirteen) up to adults in their forties 4 ,!! In other instances Tutsi 
male infants and very young boys were also killed alongside those within the 
aforementioned age_groups.49" The remainder of the gendercidal attacks were aimed at 
Hutu male adolescents and adults "of an oppositionist bent", a group that Jones identified 
as including political moderates in government, prominent members of civil society and 
ordinary civilians; basically every Hutu male who refused to sanction or partake in the 
killing of the Tutsi.493 Jones locates the "gender-selectivity" of the killings of Tutsi and 
Hutu males within the overall strategy of genocide against the Tutsi as a group. 
Gendercidal killings against Tutsi males constituted acts of genocide; gendercidal killings 
against the Hutu "oppositionists" did not. Nevertheless gendercide against both groups 
of males served "as a kind of vanguard for the genocide as a whole, an initial barrier to be 
surmounted and a threat to be removed before the remainder of the [Tutsi] community is 
consigned to violent death. ,,494 
Hutu extremist authorities had incited the general Hutu population to attack the Tutsi 
male population and the Hutu "oppositionist" males because they were perceived - as 
males - to present the greatest military threat. 495 The belief was that Tutsi males and 
Hutu "oppositionist" males who were between adolescence and middle age ("battle age" 
males) posed the greatest immediate military tIu'eat; hence the Hutu extremists' often 
unfounded accusations that the males within this age group were RPF soldiers or 
490 Ibid. , 72. 
491 African Rights, Rwallda: Dealh, Despair alld Defiallce (London: African Rights, 1995), 466, 522, 597-
598, 625-626, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda." 72. African Rights, Rwanda: NO( so 
ill/lOeen!, 165, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 72; Human Rights Watch and FIDH, 
Leave Non e to Tell the 51011" 296 cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 72. 
492 African Rights, Dealh, Despair alld Defiallce, 39, 561 , 717, 815, 798, cited in Jones, "Gender and 
Genocide in Rwanda," 72. 
,fIn African Rights, Death. Despair and Defiance, 85, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 
68; Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 70, 71, 78. 
0194 Jones, "Gendercide and Genoc ide," quoted in Jones "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 70. 
4f)S Jones , "Gender and Genoc ide in Rwanda," 70, 73. 
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infiltrators.496 The deliberate separation of battle-age males fTom groups of Tutsi captives 
and their immediate murder was further meant to fulfil the objective of leaving the Tutsi 
adult female ('women') defenceless, along with very Tutsi young children, the elderly 
and the infirm of both sexes. This is why gendercidal killings against "battle-age" males 
featured mainly in "the early and most exterminatory weeks of the mass killings.,,497 In 
the instances where male infants and young children were included in gendercidal 
killings, the justification was that these children would grow up to become Tutsi 
leaders.498 Remarkably, the Hutu male oppositionists were also targeted on the basis of 
"gender ideologies" about what they had failed to do: their failure to sanction and partake 
in the killings of Tutsis (particularly Tutsi males) was seen as their failure to fulfil their 
'traditional' masculine roles as 'soldiers' and 'protectors' of the Hutu nation against the 
'Tutsi threat; in a context where Tutsis were branded as de/acto RPF supporters499 It is 
also necessary to remember that efforts to conscript Hutus into compulsory 'killing duty' 
groups (namely the party militias and others trained under the national 'civil defence' 
plan, who were responsible for manning the roadblocks and travelled across p,.~reCIll,.es 
to kill) were aimed primarily at ordinary civilian Hutu males 500 
Without adopting Carpenter's terminology, .Tones was fairly successful in shifting his 
concept of gender-selection from one based primarily on the basic fact of "biological 
sex" to one based on social beliefs about the capabilities and duties of those of a certain 
sex - what Carpenter refen'ed to as targeting based on explicit gender discourses and · 
gender ideology.50l .Tones's analysis would have been even better had he distinguished 
more clearly between the role of gender in the targeting of Hutu political moderates and 
the role of gender in the targeting of ordinary male civilians who refused conscription or 
other inducement to participate in the Tutsi genocide on the other hand. Jones did at one 
point in the article refer to the killing of Hutu and Tutsi authorities and politicians who 
were identified from written lists as "elitocide", but it appears that he subsumed these 
'" Ibid. 
0197 Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 
'" Ibid. , 73. 
,,. Ibid., 68. 
500 Ibid., 83. 
50! Carpenter, "Beyond Gendercide," 84. Carpenter also used the killing ofTutsi males as an example of 
gender-based killing. 
] 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
100 
killings under the label "gendercide".502 Since these male authorities and other elites were 
killed on the basis of the political positions they occupied and the authority they had in 
pushing for the negotiation and implementation of the peace agreements with the RPF, 
their killings are primarily attributable to the pre-existing gender structure. There were far 
more males involved in the government and in party politics than there were females and 
hence, far more male Hutu political moderates. A point to remember is that all political 
moderate who were explicitly in favour of peace agreements with the RPF were kjjjed 
and the "elitocide" included not only the killing of Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwingiliyamana, but also the killing of the wives and other family members of the 
political elite/50J Jones himself acknowledges this fact, wllich makes it difficult to 
understand why he included the killing of males in the "elitocide" as being part of the 
gendercidal killings. The Hutu extremists may have made certain 'gendered' statements 
about the character of the male political "oppositionists"; but this should not detract from 
the fact that they were killed primarily because of their political views and the fact that 
they occupied real political offices or had informal political clout that would have 
allowed these political views to be expressed in policy-relevant ways. Anyone in those 
offices who had adopted a position of political moderation would have been killed, 
regardless of sex. 
Jones explained that Tutsi males were killed in at least two other types of killing, besides 
gendercide. Groups of "battle-age" Tutsi males were also disproportionately killed due to 
the fact that, whether voluntary or through pressure from other Tutsi, they fulfilled 
gender expectations to protect those perceived as more vulnerable in the community 
("women and children") by forming human barriers between Tutsi refugees and Hutu 
militias or by hiding in less sheltered locations (such as hilltops) while adult females and 
children hid in more enc losed locations (such as churches and health centres).504 Lastly, 
'00 Ibid., 78. 
503 Human Rights Watch and FIDH. Leave None 10 Tell the Story, 187-192. cited in Jones, "Gender and 
Genocide in Rwanda," 78; Taylor, 165-167. It should also be recalled that Prime Minister Uwingiliyamana 
had her character as a wife attacked prior to her murder, with cartoons showing her in compromising sexual 
positions with the leader of her party. As Rwandans valued chastity and fidelity in women, 
Uwingiliyamana's portrayal as an adulterer was particularly damaging. 
, ... African Rights, Death, Despair alld Defiallce, 341,380.446.466. 550, cited in Jones, "Gender and 
Genocide in Rwanda," 74, 79. In the latter case, there is testimony suggesting that TuL~j males seeking 
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Tutsi "battle age" males were killed in cases of age and sex-indiscriminate attacks. 50S It is 
these sex-inclusive killings that are the real enigma within .lones's work . .Iones claimed 
that both sex-selective and indiscriminate killings ofTutsis occun'ed in the early weeks of 
the genocidal campaign506 The killing of Tutsi females was rare in Rwanda's post-
colonial history of inter-communal violence; the killing of Tutsi women and girls in 1994 
required the removal of gender nonns that mitigated murderous attacks against them507 
Both .Iones and the Shattered Lives authors cited Hutu extremist ideology (encapsulated 
most famously in the Hutu Ten Commandments), which identified Tutsi women as 
collaborators in a Tutsi scheme to dominate the Hutu majority and claimed that children 
born of Tutsi women in Hutu-Tutsi unions were actually being raised to further the Tutsi 
cause508 They argued that it was this ideology that worked to repeal the protection that 
Tutsi women married to Hutu men had traditionally relied on and minimised the sparing 
of Tutsi women on the basis that they could be impregnated with Hutu children (on the 
basis of legally-enforce culturallUles that children automatically assumed the ethnicity of 
their fathers) , enabling the killing ofTutsi females 509 Both .Iones and the Shattered Lives 
were unable to identify to any extent Tutsi females were more likely to be killed 
immediately in an anti-Tutsi attack in the earliest stage of the genocide (the first weeks of 
April), or to be raped before murder or to be spared for sexual slavery. 
Jones's inquiry into the existence of a central government policy concerning the 
scheduling of the killing of Tutsi females did not yield any clear answer510 Jones 
refuge in more open spaces actually faired better than Tutsi adult females and children hid hidden in 
buildings; this being because males were able to assess the situation more clearly and to flee when militias 
attacked while adult females and children found themselves trapped in their enclosures. 
505 African Rights, Death. Despair and Dc~fiaJJce. 662-664, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in 
Rwanda," 7 1; African Rights, Not so Innocent, 26, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 71; 
Human Rights Watch and FIDH, Leave NOlie 10 Telll"e SIOI~ " 488. cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide 
in Rwanda," 71. 
SU6 Jones, "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 71-72. 
,o7 Ibid. 
'UK Human Rights Watch and FIDH, S"attered Lives , 16-18: Jones, "Gender and Genocide," 77-79.The 
other pan of these gender nanTIS was based on beliefs of the innate weakness and vulnerabi lity of females 
and that females did not pose a significant military threat lO the Hutu regime. 
jfl') Ibid. 
510 African Rights, Death. Despair Gild Defiallce, 299, 491, 508, cited in Jones, "Gender and Genocide in 
Rwanda," 79-80; Human Rights Walch and FIDH, Leave NOlie to Tell the Story, 296 . cited in Jones, 
"Gender and Genocide in Rwanda," 79. Witness accounts vary between those claiming that the killings of 
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suggested that there may have been some provincial differences regarding the killing of 
Tutsi females, but did not go on to seriously pursue this line of inquiry in a sustained, 
systematic manner. 5 I I It is unfortunate that Jones did not include African Rights reporting 
on the first mass killing of Tutsis in the northwestern province of Giyseni (the stronghold 
the of alleged chief planners of the genocide and other killings), which suggested that 
killings of Tutsi in this prefecture tended to be generally comprehensive and sex-
inclusive.512 His theory needs to be empirically tested at the local level in view of 
evidence of exceptions to the rule of sex-selective killing in Rwanda in April-July 1994. 
4.4. Concl usion 
In both the works reviewed here, there is little reason to doubt the accuracy of the basic 
facts or doubt the credibility and reliability of the sources used. However, in view of the 
greater objectives of both works respectively, each needed well-developed conceptual or 
theoretical frameworks to process the evidence. In the case of Human Rights 
WatchlFIDH report, authors needed to identify the relevant international and national 
laws that criminalised acts of sexual violence in armed or communal conflicts. The report 
did not pay attention to the finer aspects of the prosecution of sexual violence crimes, 
namely the possible importance of legal-technical precision in identifying different acts 
or forms of sexual violence and the evidentiary rules that hinge on this legal-technical 
precision. Overall, Jones 's work provided a relatively good framework for understanding 
how social beliefs ('gender') could bring about sex-selective outcomes, namely the 
deliberate killing of Tutsi males and Hutu 'oppositionists'. His concept of gender could 
have been improved with a clear and upfront definition of gender. While Jones 's 
argument about the early prevalence of gendercidal killings in 1994 is plausible, he did 
not test it. Local level testing of his theory might provide a better idea of how prevalent 
gendercide was. It might also provide a better idea of the instances in which local politics 
Tutsi females were only enforced from May 1994 and others suggesting that local officials called off the 
killing of females after the initial killings in Apri l. 
' " Ibid. 
Sl2 African Rights. Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiallce, 547, 557, cited in Melvern, Conspiracy to 
Mllrder, 167-1 68 
.".. 
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and other factors were more likely to have contributed to females being killed alongside 
males in the early stages of the 1994 mass killings. 
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Chapter 5: Closing Reflections 
This study was inspired by a Longman's review on the state of research on the "Rwandan 
genocide of 1994". Longman assessed that the literature on the predominantly Tutsi-
targeted Rwandan mass violence of April-July 1994 was saturated with secondary 
analyses, whereas more works based on "rigorous" empirical research were required. He 
suggested that the over-reliance of many of tlle post-1994 works on Rwanda on 
secondary sources had resulted in the circulation of "myths and inaccuracies" which had 
long been disproved. Longman recommended that the kind of research that was most 
required was research that would provide more facts and evidence about the violence, as 
well as research that would empirically test the various theories that had been proposed 
about why the violence had occurred. In view of Longman's statement about "myths and 
inaccuracies" in the literature, this study questioned whether the main points of concem, 
criticism and dispute within the literature arose from the basic facts and evidence 
presented in the literature's descriptions of the details of the violence or whether the 
disputes arose from competing interpretations of the facts and evidence at hand. This 
study made a preliminary suggestion that it was necessary to assess each work according 
the research priorities and objectives that were typical to the "literary genre" to which it 
belonged. Only then could the contributions of tlle existing literature be better 
appreciated. 
Four works were selected and identified as advocacy-related journalism, advocacy-
orielltated humall rig/Its reportillg and scholar"v literature respectively. Works belonging 
to different "genres" were grouped together to study how each one approached a similar 
theme with regards to how the evidence on the Rwandan mass violence of April-July 
1994 was collected and interpreted. Mamdani and Melvem were grouped together for 
their contribution to the understanding of how Hutu civilians were mobilised through 
military training and through racist ideology to palticipate in the Rwandan government's 
Wal· effOlt and to eventually palticipate in the killing of Tutsi civilians and others. Human 
Rights Watch/ FIDH and Jones were grouped together for their contribution to the 
understanding of how the violence of 1994 manifested in sex-selective or sex-specific 
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ways. Overall, within the reviewed works, it appears that the interpretive frameworks 
used to "process" the facts were more problematic than the basic facts and evidence 
presented. Nevertheless, it is clear that much more empirical data is required both to 
improve descriptive accounts and to improve or change interpretations. As examples of 
advocacy-related literature and advocacy-orientated literatllre based on original 
empirical research, the works of Melvern and Human Rights WatchlFIDH provided the 
new empirical evidence and factual details on which their respective "genres" are 
primarily dependent. Melvern provided previously unpublished details about who was 
responsible for the creation of the civil defence programme and how they went about 
developing the programme. Like Mamdani, Melvern could not provide details about how 
many Hutu civilians were eventually absorbed into the programme and how many civil 
defence members actually took palt in the killing. Human Rights WatchlFIDH gave a 
detailed micro-level evidence of sexual violence against Tutsi females (and a few Hutus), 
whereas .Jones was primarily concerned with the broader patterns of the mass killing of 
Tuisi males (and a few Hutus). Both Melvern and Human Rights Watch largely assumed 
an uncomplicated relationship between factual findings and their assessment under 
International Law, which is a weakness that has been identified (by expelt observers of 
both "genres") as being typical of the both "literary genres". Melvern's inferences that 
the creation and expansion of the civil defence programme was proof of a 'conspiracy to 
commit genocide' were unpersuasive and fell short of the requirement under law that a 
genocide conspiracy should be the only reasonable inference to be drawn from 
circumstantial evide ce. Likewise, Human Rights WatchlFIDH's strategy of naming 
different acts/forms of sexual violence and trying to show that they fell under the 
international crimes punishable under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda - namely genocide, crimes against humanity and Violations of 
Alticle 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II ('war crimes') 
- masked some serious unresolved issues surrounding the legal-technical determination 
of what constitutes a crime of "sexual violence" under law and what does not. 
The works of Mamdani and Jones were both examples of scholar(l' literalllre providing 
theoretical explanations based on basic facts and evidence provided in previously-
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published literature - in Mamdani's case - a few original interviews. Mamdani focused 
on the Hutu mass civilian participation in the Rwandan mass killings of April-July 1994. 
Of all the works under this study' s review, Mamdani's work was the only one found to 
have used sources and evidence of seriously questionable quality, particularly his use of 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) informants to support the factual assertion that there was 
a very high level of Hutu civilian participation in the killings of April-July 1994. 
Mamdani ' s theory was that State-created political identities could result in violent 
conflict between State-marginalised groups and groups who were the State's main 
beneficiaries. The study found this to be a plausible theory. However, critics questioned 
the theory's applicability to the Rwandan context, based on contestations over the 
historical significance of the 1959 'Social Revolution' in pitting Hutu against Tutsi and 
based on the fact that the theory had not been empirically tested. Jones used the available 
incomplete but otherwise uncontested fact that males tended to be killed more often than 
females during the Rwandan genocide as the launch-pad to his explanation of gendercide. 
His theory was that males were predominantly killed due to 'gendered beliefs' that males 
were more likely to defend the group against violent attacks and to join the RPF military 
campaign. While his theory was also plausible it also needed to be tested empirically. The 
works of both authors suggest that scholars may still have to provide complex 
explanations of events even in view of a limited empirical data base. Much like the prima 
facie cases made through human right reporting, such analyses can only be viewed as an 
initial inquiry into the events under study and are subject to later revision as the empirical 
data base is expanded. 
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